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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE STATE:  
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE TURKIC WORLD 
 
Köstem, Seçkin 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
July 2010 
 
 Transformation in world politics, which is marked by globalization, has led to 
the emergence of transnational actors. This on the one hand caused different forms of 
governance to occur and on the other hand resulted in cooperative behavior by states 
in their interaction with non-state units. This cooperation is a result of the necessity 
felt by states to incorporate normative issues in their national interests as well as 
changing identity perceptions of decision-makers. This study focuses on how Turkish 
foreign policy towards Turkic-speaking states and communities has been influenced 
by the transnational idea of “Turkic World” in the post-Cold War era. The 
explanatory factor or the independent behavior in this case study is the transnational 
idea of “Turkic World”, which is advocated by non-state actors. Although the 
Turkish state distanced itself from the idea of “Turkic World” in the early 
Republican period and during the Cold War, it re-emerged in Turkish politics in 
1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. In the last two decades Turkish foreign 
policy towards the Turkic world has passed through a process evolution; in which 
stages were rapid entrance in the early 1990s, disappointment in the late 1990s and 
revision in the 2000s. This evolution includes certain patterns of behavior that 
indicate that the idea of “Turkic World” is institutionalizing in Turkish foreign 
policy. This institutionalization stages indicate that Turkish foreign policy in this 
case is not only influenced by the geopolitical factor, but by ideational factor, which 
has driven Turkish decision-makers towards closer political, economic and cultural 
cooperation with Turkic states.  
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Key Words: Transnationalism, Non-State Actors, Identity, Turkish Foreign Policy, 
Turkic World. 
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ÖZET 
ULUSÖTESİCİLİK VE DEVLET:  
TÜRKİYE’NİN TÜRK DÜNYASINA YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASI 
 
Köstem, Seçkin 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
Temmuz 2010 
 
 Dünya siyasetinde küreselleşmeyle gelişen dönüşüm ulusötesi aktörlerin 
doğuşuna yol açmıştır. Bu bir yandan farklı yönetişim türlerinin ortaya çıkmasına 
sebep olmuş, öte yandan da devletlerin devlet-dışı aktörlerle olan ilişkisinde işbirliği 
temelli davranış biçimiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu işbirliğine devletlerin normatif 
meseleleri ulusal çıkarlarına dâhil etme gereğini hissetmeleri ve karar alıcıların 
değişen kimlik algılamaları sebep olmuştur. Bu çalışma Türkiye’nin Türk devlet ve 
topluluklarına yönelik dış politikasının ulus-ötesi “Türk Dünyası” fikrinden nasıl 
etkilendiğine odaklanmaktadır. Bu vaka çalışmasında açıklayıcı faktör ya da 
bağımsız değişken, devlet dışı aktörler tarafından savunulmakta olan ulus-ötesi 
“Türk Dünyası” fikridir. Türk devleti erken Cumhuriyet döneminde ve Soğuk Savaş 
boyunca kendisini “Türk Dünyası” fikrinden uzaklaştırmış olsa da, 1991’de 
Sovyetler Birliği çöktüğünde fikir Türk siyasetinde yeniden doğmuştur. Son yirmi 
yılda Türkiye’nin Türk dünyasına yönelik dış siyaseti, aşamaları 1990’ların başında 
hızlı giriş, 1990’ların sonunda hayal kırıklığı ve 2000’lerde yenileme olan bir evrim 
sürecinden geçmiştir. Bu evrim “Türk Dünyası” fikrinin Türk dış politikasında 
kurumsallaştığına işaret eden bazı belirli davranış biçimlerini içermektedir. Bu 
kurumsallaşma aşamaları, bu vakada Türk dış politikasının sadece jeopolitik 
faktörden değil, aksine, Türk karar alıcılarını Türk devletleriyle daha yakın siyasi, 
ekonomik ve kültürel işbirliğine yönlendiren fikri bir faktörden etkilendiğini 
göstermektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusötesicilik, Devlet Dışı Aktörler, Kimlik, Türk Dış 
Politikası, Türk Dünyası 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The question that this thesis tries to find an answer for is; “how has the 
transnational idea of “Turkic World”, which has been advocated by non-state actors, 
influenced Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic world in the post-Soviet 
period?” Scholars of International Relations and Comparative Politics have paid 
attention to how globalization have strengthened activities and capacity to influence 
of non-state actors over national governments as well as how those actors help spread 
ideas and identities beyond borders. This made transnationalism an important topic 
on the scholarly study of world politics. On the other hand, studies on foreign policy 
have focused on the range of opportunities and possibilities of actions for states 
especially in the post-Cold War era. However, little has been done to explain or 
understand how those two – interests of non-state actors and states – may converge 
in specific policy areas.  
This has been the case for Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic world, 
which is a term used to encompass all Turkic-speaking peoples in the world. Studies 
on Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union and Turkic 
minorities in several regions such as the Caucasus and Volga-Ural region of Russia 
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have been studied from a geopolitical perspective, in which Turkey’s efforts to 
acquire a regional power status in the post-Soviet space were evaluated in terms of 
rationality and political outcomes. Content of such studies have tended to flow in a 
chronological order in which Turkey’s rapid reaction to the emergence of five newly 
independent Turkic states – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – in 1991 was analyzed and success and failure of Turkey to achieve 
several goals were discussed. On the other hand, several studies have tended to focus 
only on cultural relations to indicate how Turkic brotherhood speeded up social 
interaction and connectedness among Turks of Turkey and Turkic peoples of entire 
Eurasia. Such studies have tended to approach non-governmental activities among 
Turkic peoples as mere “cultural” activities that were carried out by pan-Turkist 
circles that had little contact with Turkish decision-makers and politicians. However, 
there is certainly a need to combine the aims and activities of both Turkish 
governments and non-state actors that advocate closer ties with the Turkic world. 
This study takes the impact of a transnational idea on the redefinition of 
Turkey’s national interests just during the collapse of the Soviet Union and then on 
how it shaped the new foreign policy toward the former Soviet space and led to an 
evolution of it later on. What leads to non-state actor impact and re-definition of 
national interest in the case analyzed in this study is the idea of “Turkic World”. 
Because the idea has originated outside the borders of Turkey and emerged due to 
attempts of intellectuals and activists, it will be referred to as the transnational idea of 
“Turkic World” throughout the study. Besides the impact of the idea on Turkish 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era its relations and interaction with the Turkish 
state since it was born at the turn of the 20th century will be analyzed. Within the 
process of the transformation of this particular idea; the Turkic World, into a norm in 
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Turkish foreign policy, governments’ perceptions of Turkey’s identity as a great 
nation with deep historical roots and as a bridge of civilization between the East and 
the West have played a considerable role. The transnational idea of bringing the 
Turkic-speaking peoples together culturally, economically and politically added an 
ideational factor based on identity perception into Turkish foreign policy and the 
conception of national interests. As the idea was brought into the agenda of Turkish 
foreign policy by non-state actors – NGOs, intellectuals and activists who advocate 
Turkic rapprochement – this study also tries to indicate what conditions drive states 
and non-state actors to interact and converge their interests. Another purpose of this 
study is to contribute to a theoretical debate going on in IR discipline on how and 
under what circumstances transnational actors influence decisions made and policies 
followed by states. This study argues that if the aims of the transnational – or non-
state – actors overlap with the foreign policy goals of states there will be cooperation 
between the two, which will then pave the way for transnational impact upon the 
policies of the latter.  Finally, this study aims to indicate the patterns of 
institutionalization of the idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy behavior. 
 The second chapter gives an overall picture of the above-mentioned 
theoretical approaches and debates on the emergence and strength of transnational 
actors in world politics. Moreover, Constructivist literature on ideas and identities 
will be analyzed because ideational factors are the major driving-forces behind the 
incorporation of norms into national interests of states. Finally, based on the 
assumption that states try to utilize ideational factors to promote their national 
interests, the interaction between transnational ideas, identities and foreign policy 
formation will be discussed.  
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 Having laid the theoretical basis, the third chapter will analyze the historical 
evolution of the transnational idea of “Turkic World” from its very start to the year 
1991. This analysis will start with the nascent forms of the idea to indicate why it is 
transnational. Hence, the third chapter will include the origins of the idea outside 
Turkey, how it spread to Turkey as a result of the efforts of Turkic intellectuals and 
activists of the Russian Empire, how its relations with the Turkish state – first 
Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey – evolved and the impact of the 
nation-building process in Turkey and the Bolshevization of the regime in Russia on 
the idea. Finally, the influence of state policies on Turkism and Turkists during the 
Second World War and how it resulted in a marginalization and disappearance of the 
idea in Turkish political life throughout the Cold War will be analyzed.  
 The fourth chapter will deal with the re-emergence of the idea of “Turkic 
World” in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era and how it shaped the 
formation of an active foreign policy framework toward newly-independent Turkic 
states of the former Soviet Union. The fourth chapter will also analyze on the role of 
NGOs as norm entrepreneurs on Turkish foreign policy toward the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, focusing on transnational platforms that they have established in order 
to foster ties among Turkic peoples. The fourth chapter will also try to indicate that 
the perception of Turkish decision-makers regarding Turkish identity has evolved to 
encompass the entire Turkic world.  
 Having discussed the new foreign policy framework towards the Turkic 
world and the cooperation between non-state actors who advocate the idea and 
governments, the fifth chapter will focus on the patterns of institutionalization of the 
idea in Turkish foreign policy. This will include an analysis on the transformation of 
the idea of “Turkic World” into a norm in Turkish foreign policy with signs of 
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internalization such as special attention paid to the establishment of international 
platforms to increase cooperation among Turkic states, the existence of relations with 
the Turkic world in government and programs and deepening relations with 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Finally, the conclusion chapter will refer back to the 
theoretical debates in the second chapter to better understand the process of norm 
creation in Turkish foreign policy in this case study.  
 
 1.1 Methodology 
 This study is a single case study, which tries to analyze the impact of a 
transnational idea and non-state actors that advocate the idea on the foreign policy re-
formation of a state. The case analyzed is therefore, Turkish foreign policy towards 
Turkic states and communities, which all together constitute the Turkic world, in the 
post-Cold War era. Since the idea of “Turkic World” has influenced Turkey’s 
approach toward all Turkic-speaking peoples, no single country – for instance 
Turkey’s relations with Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan – was selected, but rather an 
overall approach was followed. It would be indeed very difficult, if not impossible to 
deal with Turkish foreign policy towards each independent Turkic state and Turkic 
community living as a minority in a master’s thesis. An overall focus on the Turkic 
world has also helped to understand whether there is coherence and consistency in 
Turkish foreign policy. In addition, following quantitative methods would have been 
very difficult for this study, which focuses on normative components of foreign 
policy behavior and national interests.  
 I have conducted an extensive literature review in Turkish and English both 
on the historical evolution of the idea of “Turkic World”, principles of Turkish 
foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia in 
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the post-Cold War era. In addition, I have read several official and semi-official 
documents such as government programs, party programs, declarations and articles 
on official websites and international agreements. I have also included some texts in 
Azerbaijani language. In order to better comprehend the complexity of policy-
making for this case, I have made interviews with several former activists, politicians 
such as an advisor to the President and former ministers of state responsible for 
Turkic republics and communities, and a journalist, who has been writing on Turkish 
politics and Turkey’s relations with Turkic-speaking peoples. Furthermore, I have 
made references to several speeches of key Turkish decision-makers such as the 
Presidents and Prime Ministers in order to understand how the idea of “Turkic 
World” has affected their discourse and policies. Such studies can be enriched with 
deeper contacts with non-governmental organizations that have tried to influence 
governmental policies on the Turkic world. Moreover, field research would 
contribute to such studies to a great extent, which was impossible for me to conduct 
due to lack of time and resources. Finally, literature review can be expanded to 
include publications and reports in Russian as well as regional languages such as 
Kazakh and Uzbek. However, I have had limited access to such books and 
documents. Reading such publications might help researchers to understand the 
impact of the idea of “Turkic World” in foreign policies of other Turkic countries. 
Consequently, this study tries to offer a new framework for understanding or 
explaining foreign policy. The independent variable is the transnational idea of 
“Turkic World” and the dependent variable is the change in Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Turkic world since 1991. What makes such an approach more interesting 
for the study of IR is that actors who promote the idea are non-state actors. Changing 
geopolitical context, domestic structures and international institutionalization are 
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accepted to be intervening variables that also have an effect on transnational 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TRANSNATIONALISM MEETS NATIONAL INTERESTS:  
IDEAS, IDENTITY AND NORMS 
 
 
 
International Relations as an academic discipline has incorporated non-state 
actors and transnationalism into its literature increasingly for the last two decades. 
Such a necessity arose first and foremost as a result of the ontological shift in world 
politics with the end of the Cold War. The state-centric Realism and Liberalism were 
now questioned and challenged as the states had to share their authorities with the so-
called “transnational” actors. The sudden shift in world politics with the collapse of 
one of the poles of the bipolar structure led scholars of the discipline to find new 
ways of explaining or understanding the transformation of the role of state and newly 
emerging non-state actors. The increasing focus on approaches to global governance, 
transnational social movements and international norms as well as the rise of 
Constructivism with its emphasis on identity and norms in world politics has been 
the indicators of a need for change in the discipline. On the other hand countries 
which had strong cultural and historical ties with their neighborhoods now had the 
chance to widen their scopes of foreign policy actions. The end of the Cold War 
offered countries with regional power aspirations to search for new foreign policy 
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orientations as there was no more the pressure of belonging to either side of the 
ideological blocs. Hence matters such as culture and identity in foreign policy 
analysis became quite important or no-more-repressed elements of foreign policy. 
One should mention here that structural change was not the only reason why there 
was such a shift in world politics and the academic study of it. There were indeed 
transnational relations, norms and ideas floating around the globe for centuries. 
Moreover identity and norms had always been an important aspect of both domestic 
politics and foreign policy. However the discipline was so focused on the rivalry 
between the Soviet Union and the United States that there was very little written on 
how transnational ideas and norms affected interstate relations or world politics in 
general.        
 
2.1 Globalization, Governance and Demise of State Authority 
 Literature on globalization and how it transforms the nation-state constitutes a 
background for why non-state actors have been incorporated into the academic study 
of International Relations. It has been a point of debate among the scholars of 
International Relations and Comparative Politics whether there has been demise in 
state authority as new actors have emerged with substantial power to influence world 
politics. While some think that the state has been undergoing a process of erosion as 
the principle of sovereignty is challenged by non-state actors (Reinicke, 1997; 
Spruyt, 1994), a second group of scholars have counter-argued it claiming that states 
are still the major and most powerful actors in world politics that continue to shape 
major developments such as conflicts, wars, regional and supranational cooperation 
bodies and international organizations (Waltz, 1999), and a third group has argued 
that the state is going through a process of transformation (Held at al., 1999; 
10 
 
Slaughter, 2004). Hence, as Slaughter argues the state was no more a unitary actor, 
but rather a “disaggregated” one as it had to behave and make decisions in a web of 
transgovernmental relations (Slaughter, 2004: 6, 10, 15). The words globalization 
and governance were followed by new concepts such as “non-state actors” and 
“transnationalism” to better depict the newly emerging reality in the domain of 
intergovernmental relations. As globalization forced governments to redefine their 
powers within the concept of governance, the Westphalian norm of territoriality 
started transforming as well. The increasing interaction between the citizens of 
different states, the increasing level of interconnectedness among societies, 
transportation, communication technologies and the rapidly growing amounts of 
international trade were the first signs and triggers of the nascent forms of both 
transformation in inter-state relations and transnationalization of world politics 
(Keohane and Nye, 1971: 329-349).  
 “Global governance” was a new concept attracting attention by the scholars 
of the discipline as it incorporated the transformation in world politics toward a 
multi-centric structure. With this respect, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the increasing 
degree of economic globalization and the signs of an emergence of global civil 
society triggered students of transnationalism to focus more on global governance 
(Hewson and Sinclair, 1999: 3). The reason why governance replaced government in 
order to better explain and understand the transformation of world politics is that the 
international system was moving toward a multi-centric one in which subnational, 
international, transnational and global had to exist together (Hewson and Sinclair, 
1993: 6). Spruyt (1994: 183) wrote in 1994 that we were witnessing profound 
changes in the international system as we head toward the end of the millennium. 
Although this did not mean that the primacy of the state in international relations was 
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moving away, Rosenau (1999: 292) gave a clear idea of how they were losing 
ground: 
Yes, states retain their sovereign rights, but the realms within which these 
rights can be exercised has diminished as the world becomes ever more 
interdependent and as state boundaries become ever more porous. With the 
increasing diffusion of authority, states can no longer rely on their 
sovereignty as a basis for protecting their interests in the face of increasing 
global challenges. 
 
 
Therefore, non-state actors and states together lead us to study governance 
rather than government, or a move from the study of anarchy between states to 
cooperation in global civil society (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008: 63). In other words 
“even the notion of international relations seems obsolete when so many of the 
interactions that presently sustain world politics do not unfold directly between states 
or nations” (Rosenau, 1989: 2). This meant that new actors such as International 
Organizations (IOs), Multi-national Corporations (MNCs), transnational social 
movements and transnational terrorist networks were increasingly becoming new 
forces that shaped international relations. Furthermore with the help of structural 
change in the system with the end of the Cold War transnational ideas, movements 
and norms were becoming quite powerful in influencing the policies and interests of 
both non-state actors and the states themselves.  
 
2.2 New Actors in the International System 
 As the authority of the state was challenged by globalization and the need to 
governance in various issues occurred with utmost importance, it also became a 
necessity to define the new actors of world politics. Although the state continued to 
be the dominant actor, the sudden transformation of the system reminded many of a 
turn back to pre-Westphalian structure in which the Catholic Church, city states, 
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feudal lords and central governments existed together (See Spruyt, 1994 for a 
historical analysis of how the nation-state has become the major actor of world 
politics). This meant that post-Cold War world politics would include more space for 
non-state actor activities and influence. The major non-state actors were Multi-
National Corporations (MNCs), on which Neo-Liberal theorist had already been 
writing since the early 1970s.  
However non-state actors could no more be limited to MNCs as the sphere of 
influence of non-governmental organizations of various kinds necessitated a wider 
focus. With the help of the rapid developments in communication technologies and 
the integration of the capitalist world economy by the late 1980s NGOs have had the 
chance to establish networks across boundaries, which turned into pressure groups 
influencing governments. Ironically, even anti-globalization movements benefited 
from globalization in order to organize themselves in a transnational manner. 
Different civil society movements all over the world were pressuring on governments 
to adapt certain human rights norms or environmental policies. Similarly informal 
violent groups with transnational networking capabilities such as the al-Qaeda were 
starting to have bigger weight both in inter-state relations and in relations among 
each other. Especially, the surprising attacks on the Twin Towers on 9/11 attracted 
attention of decision-makers and scholars on the transnational violent character and 
capability of action of the global Jihadist network led by Osama bin Laden. There 
was already a certain trend of internationalization of terrorism with the PLO since the 
early 1970s, though what made the Jihadist network more formidable and powerful 
in the eyes of governments and citizens globally was their ability to organize 
transnationally without depending on the support of any government.1  
                                                 
1 For an evaluation as to how transnational informal violence has changed the minds of scholars on 
religion as world views, see J. Ann Tickner. 2009. “On Taking Religious Worldviews Seriously”. In 
13 
 
Consequently, the study of nongovernmental actors has been a strong element 
in the study of transnationalism since it is mostly non-state actors that promote and 
spread transnational activity. According to Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002: 11) 
the nongovernmental sector “represents a third sector distinct but interacting with 
government and business” – which are the two primary actors of world politics – 
whose members, either individuals or groups, are “primarily motivated to shape the 
world according to their principled beliefs”. The impact of this motivation of a 
transnational group acting according to a certain common set of rules and behavior 
that are shaped by their ideology has been best witnessed by the rise of the al-Qaeda. 
Al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization made up of networks that could evolve its 
structural organization in line with globalization.  
 
2.2.1 Micro Actors, Distant Proximities and Fragmegration 
The growing ease with communication globally, the unprecedented rapidity 
of technological advances that enable micro actors to establish networks dramatically 
beyond their national borders, the rise of cross-border flow of immigrants, the 
necessity felt by governments to release protectionist economic policies in order to 
better cope with the world capitalist economy as well as the opportunities offered by 
the transnational economic transactions and even identities that promote the national 
interest have all been causing the “transnational” to be taken care of by the 
governments and international organizations. In other words, governments had to 
adapt certain policy prescriptions offered by the requirements of the age of 
globalization in order to cope with it. This has also resulted in a widening gap 
between the “international” and the “transnational” as it is easier for non-state 
                                                                                                                                          
Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds.). Power, Interdependence and Nonstate Actors in 
World Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 223-240.  
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entities to achieve their goals, material or ideational, at the expanse of the state 
(Aydınlı, 2010: 1-4).  
Rosenau (2003: 5) has helped better conceptualize the rapid change in world 
politics. One significant point he makes is that the approach toward domestic and 
international politics as two distinct areas of research is getting more and more 
meaningless as individuals are becoming more and more able to act in “distant 
proximities” (Rosenau, 2003: 5). Hence the multi-centric structure toward which 
world politics have been evolving offers great opportunities for micro actors such as 
individuals or social movements to advocate certain causes such as human rights or 
environmental protection. Rosenau (2003: 11) develops this line of thinking by 
putting forward the concept of “fragmegration”, which refers to “the pervasive 
interaction between fragmenting and integrating dynamics unfolding at every level of 
community”. This duality is the essence of the transformation in world affairs as well 
as the root cause of the emergence of non-state actors as important actors. 
“Fragmegration” is the basis as a result of which micro – or non-state – actors such 
as individuals, activists and leaders/elite of macro collectivities make distant 
developments proximate (Rosenau, 2003: 27-37).  
As the world has been becoming more like a single globe in which distant 
places were getting proximate, governments had to cope with and adapt to the 
emergence of micro actors suggested by Rosenau and moreover had to learn 
sacrificing sovereignty to some extent and even incorporate the identities and norms 
advocated by non-state actors into their own policies. Cases in which a state aspires 
for regional power or tries to gain international prestige non-state actors may even 
become attractive for governments as cooperating with them will further contribute 
to what the state seeks. In such cases, what is advocated by transnational actors may 
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become state policy and transnational relations may flourish with the help of the 
state.  
Consequently, globalization has been the background for the transformation 
in world politics to incorporate non-state actors alongside national governments and 
international organizations. This was mainly because globalization was a stimulating 
factor to spread ideas beyond national borders, re-awake transnational identities and 
put the issues that are advocated by transnational activist networks into the policy 
agendas of governments. The increasing ease with global communication, rapidly 
developing technological systems and media facilities made national borders more 
penetrable to transnational ideas, sometimes even those with violent character. Hence 
the need for governance became more evident as the national interest started to be 
defined beyond pure national security analyses. Finally, as a result of globalization, 
IR scholars have paid more and more attention to the role of ideas and identity in 
foreign policies of national governments as well as how they are promoted by 
transnational actors.  
 
2.3 The Study of Transnationalism 
 
2.3.1 Defining Transnationalism 
The case of al-Qaeda and “the fourth wave of terrorism” justified that there 
was more than an international character in certain trends of world politics. The term 
“international” belonged to the modern times in world politics when it was only 
national governments and decision-makers who could have the last say on the fate of 
their citizens. However as distances became more proximate and non-state actors of 
various types have day-by-day had bigger opportunities to become autonomous 
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actors to shape world politics, the term “international” was no more an adequate one 
to cover all what was happening across national borders. Therefore, “transnational”, 
“transnationalism”, “transnational actors” and “transnational relations” started to be 
used especially by those scholars of International Relations who wanted to show that 
Neo-Realist focus on states as the sole units in the international system was deemed 
to be wrong.  
The term “Transnational Relations” was first used by Neo-Liberal scholars 
Keohane and Nye in 1971. Keohane and Nye (1971: 330) were the first scholars of 
International Relations who recognized the fact that inter-societal relations were 
taking place in world politics without necessarily being controlled or directed by 
governments. Although this article published in 1971 and the special issue of the 
journal “International Organization” titled “Transnational Relations and World 
Politics” of the same year did not alter the dominance of state-centrism in both 
Realism and Liberalism of the Cold War, they at least started a new wave of studying 
non-state actors that operated across the globe (Keohane and Nye, 1976). Keohane 
and Nye (1971: 331) defined transnational relations as “contacts, coalitions, and 
interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign 
policy organs of governments”. Four major types of transnational interactions 
mentioned in the article were communication, transportation, finance and travel, 
which all had global power to influence non-governmental relations (Keohane and 
Nye, 1971: 332). Based on this definition, Keohane and Nye (1971: 335-336) state 
that multinational business enterprises, international trade union secretariats, global 
religious organizations and far-flung foundations were some of transnational actors.  
Building on the earlier work of the Neo-Liberals, Rosenau wrote on 
transnationalization of world affairs in a book of his first published in 1980. Rosenau 
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(1980: 11) went as far as arguing that the world was no longer organized along 
international lines as non-governmental organizations and the activities of micro 
actors were leading the a restructuring of world politics. Accordingly, the new era 
has been marked by strengthening of network-based relations beyond borders among 
social movements and terrorist organizations. Finally, spread of information 
technologies has enabled non-state actors to organize and operate globally in 
informal networks.  
Keohane and Nye’s attempt to conceptualize transnationalism attracted 
criticism from scholars who wished to better uncover relationships with transnational 
character. Sidney Tarrow, a sociologist who studied the globalization of social 
movements and identities, was a prominent critique of the Neo-Liberal 
conceptualization. According to Tarrow (2001: 4), Keohane and Nye’s studies of 
transnational relations in the early 1970s had three narrowing effects. Firstly, Tarrow 
(2001: 4) mentioned that the work of these scholars attracted attention mostly to the 
field of international political economy. Therefore studies on transnational relations 
focused mostly on MNCs and global economic transactions, which ignored types of 
transnational action such as civil society activism, migration and terrorism. Secondly, 
Tarrow (2001: 5) argued that Keohane and Nye’s definition ignored the activities of 
global social movements and hence did not recognize the integration of the fields of 
transnational politics and contentious politics. Thirdly, and most importantly for the 
purpose of this study, Tarrow (2001: 5) put forward the idea that Keohane and Nye’s 
Neo-Liberal approach “left the impression that transnational activity occurs at the 
cost of the states”. Therefore, the question of how and why the state got involved in 
or became a part of transnational relations remained unanswered. What was even 
more important in Tarrow’s (2001: 3) study was that he argued that states are also 
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transnational actors as their activities have reached beyond borders and played a key 
transnational role. 
Risse-Kappen and a group of scholars made a serious attempt to redefine 
transnational relations in a book in 1995 as they thought there were certain gaps in 
the way Keohane and Nye used the term “transnational”. Risse-Kappen (1995:8) 
divided transnational actors into two; “those motivated primarily by instrumental, 
mainly economic gains and those promoting principled ideas as well as knowledge”. 
The first group includes multinational corporations that operate transnationally and 
that aim economic benefits in their target states, whereas the second group advocate 
certain causes such as human rights or environmental protection and hence try to 
influence state policies on a normative base. According to Risse-Kappen (1995: 3), 
transnational relations were “regular interactions across national boundaries when at 
least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization”. The main question Risse-Kappen 
(1995: 5) and his colleagues tried to understand in the book was under what domestic 
and international circumstances non-state actors who can be titled as transnational 
ones could manage or fail to achieve their goals. What made this book a turning 
point for the study of transnationalism was, as stated by its editor, that it was an 
attempt to understand how the state and non-state actors needed each other to achieve 
their interests (Risse-Kappen: 281). In other words this meant that there was not 
necessarily a clash between “the state world” and “the society world” as there was 
some kind of interdependence among each other (Risse-Kappen: 310).  
Making this statement was of invaluable significance for the discipline as the 
early works on transnationalism relied heavily on the assumption that the rise of non-
state actors worked against the national interests and sovereignty of the state. 
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“Success or failure of transnational coalitions” according to Risse-Kappen (1995: 13) 
“would depend on their ability to persuade or line up with domestic and/or 
governmental actors”.  Accordingly, transnational impact upon governments 
increases to the extent that states are responsive to their demands, pressures or 
advice. By combining Tarrow’s and Risse-Kappen’s assumptions on transnational 
actors and relations, one can reach the conclusion that transnationalism does not 
necessarily function at the expense of states as states are also transnational actors, 
which have comprehended the transformation of world politics and the need for 
governance in certain issues of foreign policy.  
Political scientists who have tried to define transnationalism and explain or 
understand what kind of an impact they have had on governmental decisions aside, 
the second group of scholars who has studied the topic is migration and diaspora 
scholars.2 Unlike political scientists or IR theorists, this field of study has got less to 
do with the role of non-state actors – in this case transnational migrants and the 
diasporas they form most commonly in Western liberal-democratic countries – in 
world politics. It is rather a way of studying transnational relations through matters 
of identity and culture from a rather societal perspective such as collective memory 
and group behavior (Basch, 1993; Vertovec, 2010). Thirdly, Sociology has been an 
academic field which has contributed to the study of transnationalism in parallel with 
the IR theorists, even filling an analytical gap by introducing the impact of 
“transnational social movements” on the transformation of world politics into the 
topic, which will be covered in the next sub-chapter.  
                                                 
2 Scholars of transnationalism such as Tarrow in his book The New Transnational Activism, Khagram, 
Riker and Sikkink in their book Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, 
Networks and Norms think that transnationalism studies are mainly directed by IR theorists and 
Sociologists. This is true to the extent that it is only those two field of study which focus on the issue 
within the transformation of world politics, state sovereignty and non-state actors. However, there is a 
huge literature on transnational immigration activities and diaspora identities which are shaped as a 
result of the former. See Vertovec. 2010. Transnationalism. New York: Routledge. Eva Østegaard-
Nielsen. 2003. Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany. New York: Routledge.  
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2.3.2 Transnational Social Movements and Contentious Politics 
Though not yet integrated into the IR discipline and IR theoretical studies, the 
contemporary literature on global social movements that emerged from Sociology 
has been another very important component of the study of transnationalism.  By the 
mid-1990s this group of scholars who studied globalizing social movements started 
to have a bigger say in the literature concerning transnational relations and non-state 
actors. Social movements such as human rights groups, environmental organizations, 
women’s associations and anti-globalization activists have acted transnationally 
thanks to the growing ease with worldwide communication and transportation. Even 
loosely connected networks of a certain cause can unite easily and rapidly in distant 
parts of the globe in order to protest against governments, businessmen or 
international organizations.  
The global capacity that social movements has reached and their impact on 
national and international decision-making in several issue areas are clear indicators 
of how multi-centric world politics have become. As Tarrow (2007: 21-23) pointed 
out besides the scholars of International Relations who analyzed systemic change in 
world politics sociologists were the second important group who put emphasis on 
transnational actors and relations. Hence “Social Movement Theory” established a 
basis for sociologists who studied globalization to enhance their studies to include 
transnational identities, cultures and movements. According to a Sociological 
perspective on the transformation of world politics, “Globalization is a fashionable 
term which has been used to refer to different things” and “the underlying idea – for 
sociologists – is that, in the contemporary world, social action in a given time and 
place is increasingly conditioned by social actions in very distant places” (Della 
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Porta, Kriesi and Rucht, 2009: 3). This definition of Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht is 
indeed very close to that of Rosenau who claims in the various works of his that the 
process of globalization makes domestic and international spheres fuse with each 
other and that even the most distant geographies, peoples and activities become 
proximate consequently, making it easier for micro actors to organize 
transnationally. 
At this point “Contentious Politics” came out as a field of study among the 
scholars of transnational social movements (Tarrow, 1998, Sikkink and Keck, 1998) 
as contentious political action directed against governments and international 
organizations such as the IMF and the G-8 was a strong motivation for social 
movements to organize in a transnational manner. According to Tarrow contentious 
character of social mobilization was the key to understanding how NGOs moved 
beyond national boundaries and governmental control toward transnational networks 
(2007: 24). In other words, by building their arguments on contentious politics, 
sociologists put emphasis on the role of non-state actors as forces that undermined 
state sovereignty and hence their work was of great significance for the study of 
transnationalism as a relatively new sub-field of International Relations.  
Tarrow defined three actors of transnational action in a 2001 article of him. 
According to Tarrow (2001) the three major actors that operated transnationally are 
Transnational Social Movements, International Nongovernmental Organizations 
(INGOs) and Transnational Activist Networks. Transnational Social Movements 
were defined as “socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, 
engaged in sustained contentious interaction with power-holders in at least one state 
other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational 
economic actor” (Tarrow: 2001, 11). Whereas Transnational Social Movements are 
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engaged in contentious action with governments, multinational actors or international 
institutions, INGOs are more formally oriented bodies that interact with the above 
mentioned actors on a service basis (Tarrow: 2001, 12). Transnational Activist 
Networks are those groups who advocate certain issues such as human rights or 
environmental protection, and therefore are the representatives of the “normative 
turn” in the study of transnationalism in International Relations (Tarrow: 2001, 13).  
According to Khagram, Sikkink and Riker (2002: 4) “One of the primary 
goals of transnational advocacy is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor 
international norms”. One needs to look further in detail into how international 
norms, whether they are promoted solely by social movements or not, play roles in 
the transforming structure of world politics. This is because norms are the main 
factors why and how the interests of non-state actors and those of states converge in 
certain issue areas and foreign policy domains. Besides material interests of states, 
ideational and normative factors influence foreign policy formation and national 
interest definition. This study will focus more on the role of norms in world politics 
in next pages. However in one of the next chapters it will be referred back to 
transnational social movements and their impact of the redefinition of state interests 
in the case of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Turkic world.  
 
2.3.3 Prerequisites for Transnational Impact: Domestic Structures and  
Internationalization 
  
Political conditions that determine the success of transnational action has 
been another important issue concerning the academic study of transnationalism. 
Various scholars of the topic have asked the question “when and under what 
conditions do transnational ideas/actors influence governmental policies most?” This 
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question is quite a valid and relevant one for the case being studied here as Turkey 
was going through a simultaneous period of democratization and foreign policy 
activism. According to Aydınlı (2008: 904), transnational relations of both peaceful 
and violent characters are easier to be established when confrontations between states 
ease up. Major examples for such easing up of tensions among major powers are the 
Concert of Europe, the Interwar Period or the most recent post-Cold War era, which 
has given non-state actors wider spheres of influence and the capability to act 
transnationally (Aydınlı, 2008: 904).  
On the other hand, Risse-Kappen (1995: 6) argues in his prominent book on 
transnationalism that domestic structure has got a lot to do with the interaction 
between non-state actors and the state as well as the outcomes of the interaction as 
understood from state policies. According to Risse-Kappen (1995: 20) “the notion of 
domestic structures refers to the political institutions of the state, to societal 
structures, and to the policy networks linking the two.” What is deferred out of the 
connection between those three is that transnational actors and the ideas that they 
promote tend to penetrate into the target state more easily if state control over the 
society is weaker. On the contrary, if there is a strong central-state operating in an 
undemocratic structure transnational influence will get harder. According to Risse-
Kappen (1995: 7, 28-32) international institutionalization is the second pillar of the 
power of transnational activity. Accordingly, “the more regulated the inter-state 
relationship by cooperative international institutions in the particular issue-area, the 
more are transnational activities expected to flourish” (Risse-Kappen: 32).  
 Evangelista (1995: 1-38) more or less opposing to the the domestic structures 
approach of Risse-Kappen argues that transnational actors not necessarily have 
bigger impacts on open societies with democratically-elected governments. 
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Evangelista argues that transnational actors played a crucial role in the Soviet 
security policy under Gorbachev. Opposing also the mainstream Neo-Liberal 
assumption of Keohane and Nye that transnational relations affect governments’ 
policies if the latter is democratic and free enough to accept the impact of the former, 
Evangelista (1995: 1-38) claims that even Soviet type regimes can be influenced by 
transnational actors depending on several circumstances. Unlike Risse-Kappen as 
Evangelista argues that authoritarian regimes can be open to transnational influence 
as the case of Gorbachev’s policy on strategic arms and defense policy justifies. 
Moreover, Evangelista (1995: 34) states that although non-state actors with 
transnational ties flourished in Russia just after collapse of the Soviet Union as a 
result of the power vacuum, they could not be as effective as before in affecting 
Yeltsin’s security policy.  
Both Risse-Kappen’s and Evangelista’s approaches to the relation between 
domestic structures and transnational relations are quite helpful in order to 
understand Turkey’s evolving attitude towards the transnational Turkic identity and 
its evolving foreign policy toward the five newly independent Turkic post-Soviet 
countries. This study will focus on how a transnational idea and transnational 
advocacy networks met the Turkish State. One reason for this is that it was Turkey 
who initiated the rapid interaction process with Turkic peoples in 1991. But more 
important than that, authoritarian domestic structures in Azerbaijan, four Central 
Asian countries and Russia – where a considerable number of Turkic peoples live in 
major cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow and in separate autonomous 
republics such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Chuvashia – prevented the activities 
of NGOs promoting the pan-Turkic identity and closer ties with Turkey. Moreover, 
pan-Turkist intellectuals and activists have found closer and stronger connections to 
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penetrate into Turkish political system, making the transnational idea of “Turkic 
World” more comprehendible for politicians and decision-makers. Consequently, 
global conjuncture, domestic structures and international institutionalization are key 
elements for transnational impact changing the possibilities of non-state actors to 
lobby on, pressurize upon and inform governmental bodies.  
 
2.4 Norms in World Politics: Redefinition of National Interests 
 A significant concept in explaining and understanding how transnationalism 
meets the state is norms and processes of norm creation in international relations (see 
Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Khagram, Riker 
and Sikkink, 2002 for detailed analysis of the interaction between norms and foreign 
policy). This study will try to show with a case study that the transformation of a 
transnational idea into a norm in foreign policy may be the real reason why the 
interests of non-state actors and a state can converge and lead to political change. 
Within the process the state’s perception of its identity and re-determining its 
position regarding the transnational idea and helping it to transform into a norm in its 
foreign policy behavior will be explained in a case study.  
The above mentioned transformation and ontological shift in world politics 
has inevitably led to a re-conceptualization of national interests of states. The 
Westphalian principles of defining national interests (for an in-depth analysis see 
Spruyt, 1994) based on sovereignty, territoriality and non-intervention dominated 
inter-state relations for more than three centuries and still constitute an important 
portion of the relationship. However the post-Cold War era and the rise of the non-
state actors have led to such an innovation in defining the national interest that the 
concept is no more limited to territoriality. In other words according to the new 
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understanding of foreign policy and national interest sovereignty and national 
territories are not necessarily two unquestionable holy principles. In contrast, as put 
forward by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888), who are two prominent scholars of 
the Constructivist approach to the study of International Relations, normative and 
ideational concerns are considered when states define their national interests as 
norms and rationality are “intimately connected”.  
As opposed to the dominance of Realism in explaining international relations 
throughout the Cold War Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 887) argue that 
decolonization of the post-World War II era was a normative effort of changing the 
status of some peoples as opposed to some other governments. Hence the end of the 
Cold War was only a reminder of how important norms, culture and ideas were in 
defining national interests and how rational it was for a national government to 
follow transnational norms such as the rights of women, minority rights, 
democratization or environmental protection as they were also supposed to be 
promoting the national interest alongside increasing material capabilities.3 Therefore, 
adapting transnational norms on the hand led to domestic change and on the other 
hand led to a redefinition of national interests; or of the way how they were pursued. 
As conceptualized by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) a norm is standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. Similarly Katzenstein (1996: 5) 
defines a norm as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a 
given identity”.  
 
                                                 
3 For a detailed study of how “human rights” as a norm leads to domestic change in different regions 
of the world, see. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). 1999. The Power of 
Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
The book includes a theoretical chapter on “the socialization of human rights norms in the domestic 
practices” and case studies including Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Chile, Guatemala and Eastern Europe. 
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2.4.1 The Norm “Life Cycle” 
Before arguing how norms influence national interest one should address 
what the “life cycle” of a norm is according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888). 
The Norm “Life Cycle” process has three stages. The first is “norm emergence” 
when norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms from which the promoters of 
the norm act. There is a tipping or a threshold point to be reached when a critical 
mass of states adopts the norm before they get ready to change their policies 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 901). The second stage is “norm cascades” when 
more countries adopt the norm within a process of “socialization”. Socialization is 
the mechanism through which norm leaders persuade others to adhere (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 902). Motivations for a state to socialize are legitimation, 
conformity and esteem. The third and final stage is “internalization” when “norms 
become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a taken-
for-granted quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 904). Finnemore and Sikkink’s study takes European 
integration, decolonization, women’s rights and the international protection of human 
rights as some examples of how transnational norms lead to political change once the 
norm “life cycle” is completed.  
Risse and Sikkink (1998) state that scholars of International Relations have 
been increasingly focusing on norms and ideas, though few have yet demonstrated 
their impact on domestic politics. They try to contribute to this gap by establishing an 
analytical framework for how human rights as an international norm affect policies 
of states. Similar to the attempt of Finnemore and Sikkink, Risse and Sikkink (1999: 
1-39) try to explain how transnational norms are internalized as a process of 
“socialization” and with this conceptual tool they theorize the impact of norms on 
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domestic change focusing on the relationship between the state, society and the 
international/transnational.  
There are three stages of the socialization process at the end of which the 
transnational norm is internalized. The first stage is the process of instrumental 
adaptation and strategic bargaining, in which the norm is accepted by the state as a 
way of promoting the national interest in material terms. The second stage is the 
process of moral-consciousness raising, in which argumentative discourses play a 
crucial role concerning argumentation, dialogue and persuasion. The final stage is the 
process of institutionalization, in which the norm becomes a habit in the policies of a 
country (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11-17). Once norms are institutionalized, “changes 
in government and in individual leaders matter less and less” as norms are 
implemented independently from the ideological side of the politicians and are 
simply “taken for granted” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 17).  
 
2.5 Transnational Meets the State: Ideas, Identity and National Interest 
 Rosenau (1980: 2) predicted quite correctly in 1980 that although non-
governmental organizations may never become as powerful as national governments, 
their attempts to move toward their goals would somehow force the governments to 
interact with them. Now in a world of globalization, it is clearer how non-state actors 
interact with governments and vice versa. The role of norms and the relationship 
between ideas, identity and norms in world politics is the key to understanding how 
the interests of transnational actors intersect with those of states. Finnemore (1996: 
2) argues that state interests are defined in the context of internationally held norms 
and understandings about what is good and appropriate. In parallel with the rapid 
transformation in world politics mentioned above, states started to recognize the need 
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to act together with non-state actors. Such a necessity was not only a matter of 
increasing pressure from the international society to comply with certain norms such 
as human rights and liberal democracy but also a new understanding of foreign 
policy based on promoting national interests through the expertise, power and 
mobility of transnational actors. Moreover adapting transnational ideas to foreign 
policy options offered a serious opportunity of achieving better results in foreign 
policy moves toward several target countries with which there is a room for 
transnational ties.  
Drawing on social Constructivism it can be argued that identities of actors 
shape the interests and behaviors of those actors to a certain extent. What one state 
wants depends to a large degree on who that state is and how that states perceives its 
role within a cultural, historical and sometimes even civilizational context (Risse and 
Sikkink, 1999: 9). Therefore there may be cases with no problems for a state to 
combine its interest with a transnational idea/norm and non-state actors that act to 
promote the idea/norm in order for that state to promote its own national interests. 
The question why norms are of key importance in understanding policy 
change should be better addressed. Norms have had critical significance in the 
above-mentioned transformation of world politics as governments have felt the 
necessity to comply with international norms in order to promote their national 
interest by acquire prestige or legitimacy or materializing ideational or normative 
factors such as identity or humanitarian aid (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894). In 
other words, norms lead to the convergence of rationality and strategic calculations 
of national interests, which together constitute the material side of the issue, and 
identity or culture. This process is called by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888, 909) 
as “strategic social construction”.  
30 
 
One should pay special attention to the role of Social Constructivism in the 
study of theories of International Relations in order to understand the growing focus 
on transnational relations, identity, norms and political change. With the help of 
increasing Social Constructivist studies on international relations, the interaction 
between material and ideational elements in the redefinition of national interests and 
formulation of foreign policy options have become important issues at stake (Risse 
and Sikkink, 1999: 6). Similarly, it has been understood that ideas and perceptions on 
identity have a certain impact on foreign policy goals of states as well as material 
aims such as economic and military superiority over rivals. According to Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998: 894) although both Constructivism and Neo-Realism try to 
explain change in state behavior and in the international system, the former argues 
that “idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles” for change as opposed to the 
assumption of the latter that systemic transformation occurs only as a consequence of 
a change in the distribution of power among states. Social Constructivism in 
International Relations has tried to explain why it is not only material interests of 
utility maximization that states seek to achieve (see Finnemore, 1996: 1-34; 128-151 
for a detailed theoretical discussion). 
 
2.5.1 Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Alternative Framework 
An alternative explanation on the impact of ideas on foreign policy is offered 
by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), who try to establish a causal relationship with the 
former and the latter. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) separate ideas into three major 
groups; world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. No matter in which 
category an idea is, there are three causal pathways, according to these scholars, for 
that idea to make an influence on the foreign policy of a state. Accordingly, the first 
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pathway is that ideas serve as “roadmaps” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 12) to 
define the interests of an actor and to guide the foreign policy direction on a certain 
issue. Secondly, ideas may contribute to “outcomes in the absence of a unique 
equilibrium” (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 12), which means that they can act as 
consensus-providers for decision-makers on certain unclear foreign policy directions. 
Thirdly, “Once ideas become embedded in rules and norms – that is, once they 
become institutionalized – they constrain public policy”, which means that “policy 
would have been different in the absence of the idea in question” (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993: 12-13). This third pathway of Goldstein and Keohane can be valid 
for foreign policy cases in which the idea or the norm which has the impact over the 
decision-makers has been “internalized” as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), or 
“socialized” as Risse and Sikkink (1999) argue. This study will try to understand 
how the transnational idea of “Turkic World” has guided the actions of Turkish 
decision-makers and governments regarding Turkey’s relations with the Turkic 
world and hence try to see whether the idea has worked as a “roadmap” or “causal 
belief”.  
Katzenstein and several Constructivist scholars such as Wendt and Finnemore 
collected their essays concerning the social construction of states’ interests in a book 
titled The Culture of National Security in 1996. The analytical tools on which this 
book rest, namely norms, identity and culture are very important to understand how 
transnational meets the state; in other words how the non-state world and the state-
world intersect. Katzenstein et al. take national security as one of the most important 
conceptual tools in the study of International Relations and examine it with a 
Constructivist approach referring to norms, identity and culture. Such an approach 
can be easily taken to the study of foreign policy and national interest as two other 
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important analytical concepts since the theoretical approach of Katzenstein et al 
regarding national security can easily fit into the study of these two sub-fields of the 
academic study of International Relations. Moreover, thanks to the end of the Cold 
War and the ease with international connectedness and transnational relations 
national security is not necessarily the dominant element of states’ interests and 
policies.   According to Katzenstein (1996: 6) norms have two impacts on the 
policies of states. These impacts are closely related to the identity of an actor, which 
he defines as “a shorthand label for varying constructions of nation and statehood”. 
Firstly, norms may have a “constitutive effect” (Katzenstein, 1996: 5) by defining the 
identity of the state and hence lead to the definition of national state for that state 
based on its identity. Secondly, norms may work somewhat like reminders of the 
identity of the state; leading to proper behavior (foreign policy formulation) 
accordingly (Katzenstein, 1996: 5). This indicated that norms either “Norms thus 
either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do 
both” (Katzenstein, 1996: 5).  
In this case, it would not be odd to argue that the transnational idea of “Turkic 
World” may have led to a redefinition of Turkishness – the very identity of the 
Turkish state – in terms of foreign policy actions to incorporate the once forgotten 
“Outside Turks” into its agenda.4 Hence, Turkish nationhood with which the Turkish 
nation-state had been associated with somehow enlarged in definition in the eyes and 
minds of the Turkish decision-makers just during the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Identity and Culture became two important concepts in Turkish foreign policy 
especially with the end of the Cold War. This was not only the case for Turkey but 
                                                 
4 “Outside Turks” or “Dış Türkler” in Turkish was the term used for the Turkish minorities of the 
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus as well as the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union 
which included the Norhern Black Sea steps, Central Asia and the Volga basin. The term started to be 
used in the first years of the Republic of Turkey.    
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for various states and non-state actors as they had a freer hand to redefine their 
interests.  
 
2.5.2 Transnational Identities  
As identities matter for the making of foreign policy and definition of 
national interests, transnational identities matter for how transnational actors meet 
states. Concerning identity as a transnational element that shapes states’ policies, 
cases of religious belonging are the prominent examples. Hundreds of millions of 
citizens of national governments feel loyal to religious authorities in different parts 
of the world, which is the very identity of those millions; and this connects 
individuals and peoples across boundaries with same feelings of identity. Roman 
Catholic Church and the Pope, and the idea of being a part of the Muslim Umma are 
the two strongest identity-constructers that tie Catholic and Muslims globally 
(Haynes, 2001; Vallier, 1971). Louër’s (2008) study on transnational Shia politics is 
an important study combining the theoretical study of transnationalism with the 
transnational identity of the Shiite population of several Muslim peoples ranging 
from Afghanistan in the East to Lebanon in the West. In her own words, “the case of 
the Shia Islamic movements offers a perfect empirical illustration to some key 
findings of the sociology of transnational social movements” (Louër, 2008: 3) that 
has been developed by scholars such as Tarrow (2007), Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 
(2009) and Sikkink and Keck (1998).  
Regarding the relationship between transnational networks of Shia 
movements and the Muslim states of the Middle East, Louër (2008: 297-298) argues 
that the state cannot be excluded from the analysis of transnational political practices 
and movements as the former gives the impetus to the latter on their ways to 
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transnationalize themselves. Iran is a typical example of how a state utilizes a 
transnational identity – the Shia identity – in order to promote its national interest in 
its backyard to increase its influence wherever a Shiite population with loyalty to the 
Marja’ (the religious highest authority) lives. Therefore, the case of transnational 
Shiite identity indicates that the “state world” and the “society world” as Risse-
Kappen argues, are not necessarily separate from, and opposite-in-nature to each 
other.  
Secondly, governments try to keep in touch and even take the support of 
lobbying activities of diasporas that are formed as a result of decades of immigration 
from the homeland to host countries that in time become the second homeland. As a 
transnational extension of national identity beyond borders diasporas might 
contribute foreign policy formations of nation-states and promote the national 
interests of their homelands, for which Jewish, Greek and Armenian cases are 
prominent examples (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998: 7). There may be a third element of 
identity, which includes ethnicity or cultural-linguistic ties, and which keeps an 
understanding of brotherhood across national boundaries alive although policies 
based on such ethno-linguistic brethren are not necessarily followed by governments. 
Hispanic Latin America, Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe, Greek populations in 
Greece and Cyprus (Hellenic civilization), Arabic-dominated North Africa and the 
Middle East – except for the Persians and Kurds – and finally Turkic-speaking 
peoples of roughly what is called Eurasia are the major cases of identity with a 
transnational character.  
In all these cases peoples with same ethnic origins, and close or almost the 
same languages live as citizens of various nation states. Although they make 
references to their historical identities in their official texts, but are supposed to 
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establish relations based on Realist conceptions of national interest with their 
“brother” governments and peoples. Compared with transnational Shiite identity, it is 
impossible to claim that Turks of the Balkans, Anatolia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, 
Volga-Ural region, Siberia and Central Asia have a commonly shared understanding 
of “Turkishness” or belonging to the same ancestry going back to the Huns or the 
Göktürks (the Turkic Khaganate). However there is a considerable degree of 
intellectual and non-governmental activism since the late 19th century, when the 
Turkic intellectuals in İstanbul, Bakhchisaray, Kazan, Baku and Bukhara started 
sharing their views on the need to unite culturally and politically as the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires were being shaken by domestic and international factors. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 26) “recognize that ideas and interests are not 
phenomenologically separate and that all interests involve beliefs, and therefore 
ideas” as decision-makers understand them. Similarly, Risse and Sikkink (1999: 2) 
argue that scholars of International Relations are increasingly interested in studying 
norms and ideas though very few of them have yet made it clear how and what kind 
of an effect they make on the policies of a state. This builds on the earlier argument 
of Risse-Kappen (1995: 3-36) that there is a need to demonstrate how the “state 
world” and the “society world”, which are the domain of national interests of states 
and interests and goals of non-state actors, intersect. This study aims to contribute to 
Risse-Kappen’s argument by trying to demonstrate how and under what 
circumstances transnational ideas/norms influence the foreign policy of a state. 
Contrary to the assumption of the scholarly literature on the “counter-hegemonic” 
(Guarnizo and Smith, 1998: 5) nature of transnational actors and relations on the 
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power and interests of the nation-states, there can be cases that are closely related to 
ideas and identities that are perceived to be promoting the national interest by 
national decision-makers.  
This study is an attempt to explain how a transnational idea may have led to a 
redefinition and formulation of foreign policy of a state toward a particular issue 
area. The transnational idea is the idea of “Turkic World”, which incorporates the 
brotherhood and cultural integrity of Turkic-speaking peoples that live in a wide 
geography stretching from the Balkans to Eastern Turkestan in China, and from 
Siberia in Russia to Kirkuk in Iraq. The foreign policy case is Turkey’s active foreign 
policy toward the five newly independent republics of the Former Soviet Union, 
whose population are ethnic cousins of the Turks of Anatolia and who speak a Turkic 
dialect as well as other Turkic-speaking peoples such as the Crimean Tatars of the 
Ukraine and the Gagauz of Moldova, who live as minorities in their countries.5 The 
case study may seem to be a very big one with numerous countries and peoples to be 
examined. However, all these peoples are incorporated into Turkish foreign policy as 
the branches of a uniform fraternity. Therefore in order to examine how 
“transnational meets the state” theoretically our case has to include all the 
components of a certain issue of foreign policy. Although Finnemore, Sikkink, 
Risse-Kappen and Katzenstein have accepted to demonstrate the impact of 
international norms such as human rights on political change this study tries to 
incorporate a somehow regional-and at the same time- transnational idea and its 
process of becoming a norm – though not yet internalized – in Turkish foreign policy 
into the theoretical frameworks constructed by these scholars.  
                                                 
5 These five republics are in alphabetical order Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan.  
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 This study, moreover tries to see whether there has been a “socialization” of 
the “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy as conceptualized by Risse and Sikkink 
on the case of human rights. This means that the evolution of the idea’s status in 
Turkish politics and whether it has been consolidated with the help of the Turkish 
state will be analyzed. In order to understand this, this study will follow a 
chronological order to examine the initial impact of the idea, how it led to a 
reconfiguration of national interests and whether it has led to the internalization of a 
certain behavior in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, this study will also focus on how 
the process of incorporation of the norm into Turkish foreign policy, in other words 
the norm “life cycle” has paved the way for increasing transnational ties and non-
governmental activities among Turkic-speaking peoples. The earlier studies on the 
impact of human rights as a transnational norm will be very helpful for this study as 
they offer sound theoretical frameworks such as the norm “life cycle” of Finnemore 
and Sikkink, and the norm “socialization” of Risse and Sikkink.   
38 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSNATIONAL IDEA OF  
“TURKIC WORLD” 
 
 
 
3.1 “Outside Turks” and the Emergence of Turkic Intellectual 
Movement and Activism 
 
 
3.1.1 Turkic Peoples of the Russian Empire and Muslim Awakening  
Before addressing the chronological development of the transnational idea of 
the Turkic World one has to say that it was the “Outside Turks” rather than the Turks 
of Turkey, or the Ottoman Empire, who led to the emergence of this idea. Hence for 
the purpose of this study Turkish foreign policy has been shaped by an idea which is 
closely connected with Turkish identity but which has its roots outside Turkey. The 
emergence of the idea that Turkic-speaking peoples should get closer in cultural, 
economic and political terms with a transnational character dates back to the late 19th 
century when the Turkic-Muslim intelligentsia of the Russian Empire started a 
campaign to claim the rights of their people. The effort was a counter-move against 
the chauvinistic identity policies of the Tsarist regime and at the same time a struggle 
for improving the socio-economic and political status of Turkic peoples as subjects 
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of the Russian Empire. What turned the efforts of the Turkic intelligentsia to protect 
the rights of their peoples into a transnational movement was that they united their 
opinions through several publications and meetings in several cities such as Kazan, 
Bakhchisaray, and Baku6. It must be stressed that these cities, where books and 
journals promoting the culture and political rights of the Turkic peoples were 
published and meetings among the intelligentsia was summoned, all belonged to a 
single state – the Russian Empire, and later on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, their 
impact reached beyond borders very soon as people in İstanbul, which was the 
capital of the Ottoman Empire and even in Kashgar, which was a part of China since 
1877 and the home of Uighurs for centuries read those books and journals, and were 
informed about the meetings taking place in several parts of the Russian Empire.  
 According to Landau (1995: 7), the census of 1897 indicated that the number 
of Turks living in the Russian Empire was 13,600,000 out of a total population of 
125,600,000, which constituted almost 11 per cent. It was the Tatars of Kazan, which 
is today the capital of the autonomous Republic of Tatarstan within the Russia, 
whose intellectuals first spread the idea that the Turkic peoples of the Russian 
Empire should unite politically in order to have a representation in the Duma and 
hence protect the rights of their peoples. The Tatar intellectuals found out that 
common roots had to be discovered in order to re-connect the geographically and 
politically separated cousins of the Russian Empire such as the Kazan Tatars, 
Crimean Tatars, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens and Azerbaijanis. The most common 
point was with no doubts religion; they were all Muslims as opposed to the official 
Orthodox Christianity of the Tsar and the Russian majority. However, the wave of 
nationalism was dominant in Europe and there were other non-Turkic Muslim 
                                                 
6 Today Kazan is the capital of the autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, 
Bakhchisaray is a small town in the Crimea, Ukraine, and Baku is the capital of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan.  
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peoples within the Empire, whit which it was more difficult to establish a unity. As 
Landau (1995: 9) puts forward “the linguistic element was obviously the first choice, 
as languages were similar, although not identical, among these groups, and 
intellectuals could communicate in a sort of ‘High Turkish’”. Besides intellectuals, it 
was not too difficult for different Turkic societies to understand each other after 
learning about the basics of grammatical change among dialects. This meant that 
Turkic cultural integration was quite easy especially in prominent Turkic cities such 
as İstanbul, Baku, Kazan and Bukhara due first and foremost to linguistic affinity.  
 
 3.1.2 Unity in Language, Thought and Action: Basis for Turkic Activism 
 Ismail Gasprinskiy, or Gaspıralı in Turkish, was the prominent intellectual 
who raised the consciousness among the intelligentsia of the Turkic peoples that the 
only way to prevent assimilation and achieve social, political and economic 
development was unity. Hence his famous words “unity in language, thought and 
action” became the motto of contemporary politicians, NGOs, activists and 
intellectuals who have dealt with and supported closer relations among the Turkic 
World. Gasprinskiy had a triggering impact in various parts of the Russian Empire 
where Turkic peoples lived. His method of modern education, which he titled Usul-ü 
Cedid, “the new method” became quite popular in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Volga-Ural region; and the schools he opened in the Crimea became a model for the 
hundreds of new schools opened for the Turkic students throughout the Russian 
Empire, in which native tongues were the medium of education (see Kırımlı 2004 for 
detailed information on Gasprinsky’s life). What was important about Gasprinskiy 
concerning the emergence of a transnational Turkic higher identity was that his 
schools promoted the same ideas among the new generations of the Turkic peoples of 
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the Russian Empire. What was even more important was that his journal titled 
Tercüman – the interpreter – was published deliberately in a common Turkic 
language which could be understood in Kashgar (Eastern Turkestan), İstanbul, Baku, 
Kazan and Bukhara. Gasprinskiy consciously used a language of common Turkic – 
in which his native Crimean Tatar was very useful as this dialect is a form of 
transition between the two major branches of contemporary Turkic languages; Oghuz 
and Kipchak – and insisted on the idea that a language of communication had to be 
adopted by the Turkic intelligentsia in order to have a united political and cultural 
position. As the impact of Tercüman and Gasprinskiy were growing bigger and 
bigger, schools based on “the new method”, which educated new generations of 
Turkic students with the idea that their future is brighter as long as they come closer 
with their ethnic cousins living under the hegemony of the Tsar, flourished in Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the Volga-Ural region.  
Gasprinskiy’s journal Tercüman was first published in 1883 in the Crimea 
and readers and reached thousands of readers all over the Turkic-speaking lands until 
1918 when it was published for the last time (Kırımlı, 2007: 155-176). In three 
decades Gasprinskiy’s Tercüman and modern schools created an atmosphere of 
rapprochement and even a re-discovery of a common identity, which as a 
transnational phenomenon, have had an impact on contemporary politics of various 
countries including Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus and Central Asia regionally. 
The movement’s attraction and popularity strengthened enormously during the 
upheaval going on within the Russian Empire at the turn of the 20th century. As 
Landau (1995: 12) indicates, the number of periodicals published by Turkic groups 
in the Russian Empire rose impressively to 250 between 1905 and 1917. The new 
generation of Turkic intellectuals all over the Russian Empire, who were supporting 
42 
 
the modernization of the education systems of Turkic peoples and making them more 
active in the political life of the Empire would be called as the Jadids. From the early 
1900s until the establishment of Bolshevik rule in the regions where Turkic peoples 
form the majority, Jadids would be the major figures of Turkic nationalist activism.   
   
3.1.3 Turkic Activism in the Russian Empire: “Norm Entrepreneurs” 
Turkic intellectuals and activists of the Russian Empire are the architects of 
the transnational idea of “Turkic World”. In this sense, they have played the role of 
“norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) and therefore, have tried to 
influence state policies. Having reached a consensus on the future of their oppressed 
peoples, Turkic intellectuals from the Crimea, Kazan and Baku agreed to gather All-
Russia Muslim congresses in major cities of the Empire (Bennigsen and Lemercier-
Quelquejay, 1967: 43-45). This was also a move to transform the modernist 
movement of education and culture into a political one by penetrating into the 
political life in St. Petersburg. Hence, leading Turkic intellectuals of the Russian 
Empire such as Gasprinskiy from the Crimea, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf – later Yusuf 
Akçura, famous historian and politician of the Republican period – from Kazan and 
Akhmet Agayev – later famous Turkish politician Ağaoğlu of the Republican period 
– from Azerbaijan acted together to summon an all-Russian Turkic-Muslim Congress 
in 1905 in the city of Nizhniy-Novgorod. The Congress was titled Russiya 
Musulmanlarinin Kongresi – Congress of the Muslims of Russia – as Islam was still 
the predominant identity among the rural populations and moreover supporting a 
pan-Turkic identity would provoke the Russian authorities at the very start. The 
second Congress was held in 1906 in the capital of the Empire, St. Petersburg, with 
Gasprinskiy as the chairman. After the third Congres, which was organized in the 
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same year, the movement became one of political activism as Turkic leaders 
established a party named Ittifak-ı Müslimin – Union of Muslims – and sided with 
the liberal Cadet Party in the Duma. After the February Revolution in 1917 Turkic-
Muslim delegates of the Duma convened another All-Russia Muslim Congress in St. 
Petersburg with the hope of agreeing on the future of the political life of the Turkic-
Muslim peoples of the collapsing Empire. However their hopes were deemed to fail 
soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 as the Soviets took control of 
the country totally in 1921 and changed the fate of the Turks as well as that of 
Russians, Ukrainians and all the other peoples of the former Empire. 
  
3.2 Turkic World in Turkey: Immigration and Turkism  
There was certainly a normative side of the struggle of Turks of the Russian 
Empire for the Turkish intelligentsia centered in İstanbul. There were several reasons 
for that. Firstly, there is no doubt that the Tatar, Azerbaijani and Turkestani 
intellectuals of the Russian Empire had great sympathy toward the Ottoman Empire 
as the Sultan was at the same time the Caliph of all the Muslims in the world and the 
Turks of Turkey were an independent Turkic nation whose very independence was 
threatened by the Russian Empire. Moreover, Gasprinskiy as the intellectual and 
activist who spread the idea of unity among all the Turkic peoples was from Crimea 
and his native Crimean Tatar was very close to the İstanbul Turkish. Hence his 
Tercüman could easily be followed in İstanbul causing the newly emerging Turkish 
nationalism to acquire a Pan-Turkic character. One obstacle to the popularity and 
strength of the idea of bringing Turkic peoples closer was the Pan-Islamist foreign 
policy of the Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was famous for his authoritarian rule. 
However Turkish intellectuals, namely the Young Turks, had already met one of the 
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most important ideological outcomes of the French Revolution; nationalism. By the 
late 19th century Ottoman intellectuals in İstanbul started publishing books, journals 
and pamphlets on the might of the Turkish ethnicity and its great role in the evolution 
of world history. Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, a Kazan Tatar intellectual and activist, has been 
accepted to be the first to conceptualize the ideological debate going on İstanbul in 
order to find a solution for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In 1904 
Akçuraoğlu Yusuf published an article titled Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset – Three Models of 
Politics – in which he compared Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism as the correct 
way to prevent the collapse of the Empire and bring the glorious days back (see 
Akçura, 2005).  
Hence the term “Turkism” to include Turkish nationalism entered Turkish 
intellectual and political agenda. Turkism was a political option to unite the Turks of 
Turkey with their ethnic brothers in Iran, the Russian Empire and China under the 
rule of the Ottoman Sultan as it was the only possible way to guarantee the survival 
of the Empire and the Turkish nation. According to Landau (1995: 36), there were 
two major reasons why Turkism or Turkish nationalism became the only political 
option by eradicating Ottomanism and Islamism. The first reason was the end of 
Abdulhamid II’s reign in 1908 as a result of the coup committed by the Committee of 
Union and Progress and the second reason was the increasing number and activity of 
émigrés leaving the Russian Empire for Turkey by the same year. 
Immigration from the Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire has paved the 
way for transnationalization of activism among Turkic intellectuals. Émigré 
intellectuals of Kazan Tatar, Crimean Tatar and Azerbaijani origin continued their 
activism in İstanbul. They, on the one hand tried to influence nationalist circles in 
İstanbul and on the other hand established transnational contacts that would lay the 
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basis of advocacy networks with the Russian Empire. The NGOs they established in 
İstanbul strongly propagated for the protection of the rights of Tatars, Uzbeks, 
Azerbaijanis or any other Turkic groups living under the rule of the Tsar. Later on 
these intellectuals such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura would contribute to the 
official state ideology of the young Republic of Turkey regarding Turkish 
nationalism, historical studies, cultural politics and even party politics. Consequently, 
immigration of Turkic “norm entrepreneurs” who came to live under the Ottoman 
rule from the Russian Empire made a big impact during the ideological upheaval 
going on in İstanbul when both Empires were about to collapse and established the 
future patterns of transnational Turkic activism.  
Prominent Turkish intellectuals such as Ömer Seyfeddin, Halide Edip 
(Adıvar), Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) and Ziya Gökalp responded to the call of 
émigrés from the Crimea, Kazan and Baku by strongly supporting Turkism as the 
only available, practical and also honorable political action. Besides the associations 
formed by Turkic intellectuals, Turkist literary circles and academics established 
Pan-Turkist associations soon after the Committee of Union and Progress took 
control of the country in 1908. Türk Derneği (Turkish Association) was the first to be 
established in 1908. The association collected intellectuals and promoted the rights 
of Turks all over the world with a transnational understanding. The establishment of 
the Türk Ocağı (Turkish Hearth) in 1912 was a turning point for Turkish nationalism 
as well as the institutionalization of the idea that Turkic peoples should get closer in 
cultural, economic and political terms among Turkish intellectuals and politicians 
(see Sarınay, 2005 for an historical overview of the Turkish Hearth).  Türk Ocağı 
became a gathering point for nationalist intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Halide 
Edip, Ahmet Ferit and Hamdullah Suphi as well as émigré activists such as Ahmet 
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Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura. The establishment of Türk Ocağı was a turning point for 
Turkish nationalism as well as for the impact of the “Outside Turks” and their idea of 
saving the brother peoples from Russian imperialism within the Ottoman political 
domain. At the same time the nationalist Young Turks held control of the country 
and opened rooms for the penetration of the Turkist ideology into the political 
agenda of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Ziya Gökalp, a prominent 
Turkish nationalist and pan-Turkist who wrote that “homeland is neither Turkey for 
Turks nor Turkestan, homeland is a great and eternal country; Turan”7 was a member 
of the Central Commission of the CUP and had a certain influence on the nationalist 
policies of the government. Moreover, one of the three leaders of the CUP, Enver, 
was a leading Turkist. As Enver Pasha became the Minister of War in 1914 it was 
becoming clearer that the Ottomanist foreign policy of the CUP would evolve into a 
pan-Turkist one although the remaining two leaders of the party, Talat and Cemal 
Pashas were not Turkists (see Hanioğlu, 2008: 150-202 for detailed information).  
Consequently, Turkist intellectuals and civil society movements in İstanbul 
were connected to the ones in the Crimea, Kazan, Baku and Central Asia thanks to 
the transnational impact of émigré activists coming to Turkey from the Russian 
Empire and journals published in prominent cultural centers of the Turkic-speaking 
world. These cities were aware of the intellectual and political struggle going on in 
each other as both the Ottoman and the Russian Empires were about to collapse and 
new windows of opportunities were opening for a rapprochement among the Turkic 
cousins. This very first step taken by the intellectuals at the turn of the 20th century 
was the cornerstone of the transnationalization of the idea of “Turkic World” as well 
as the transnationalization of civic activism among the Turkic peoples.  
                                                 
7 Ziya Gokalp’s poem titled “Turan” first appeared in Turkist circles in 1911 in the prominent 
nationalist journal Genç Kalemler (Young Pens); see Sarınay, 2005: 116.   
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3.3 The First World War, the Bolshevik Revolution and the New 
Republic of Turkey 
 
 
3.3.1 The First World War: CUP and Turkism as a State Ideology 
The First World War inevitably transformed the Turkist movement into an 
irredentist one as uniting with the brothers in the Caucasus and Central Asia was the 
only hopeful action to awake the collapsing Empire. Due to war conditions 
intellectual efforts for protecting the rights of the Turkic peoples of the Russian 
Empire were curbed by enmity and the desire to enlarge by military terms at the 
expanse of the Tsar. What made the World War I a turning point for the transnational 
idea of “Turkic World” was that it met the state seriously for the first time, as the 
leaders of the Union and Progress tried to utilize Turkism as a means of resurrecting 
the collapsing Empire. This meant that the state needed the transnational idea of the 
Turkic World and the intellectual and political activism that had been going on in 
major cities with significant Turkic-speaking populations in order to promote the 
national interest.  
Hence the Committee of Union and Progress relied heavily upon the views of 
the Turkist intellectuals and the Turkic émigré activists in İstanbul. Some examples 
were the Turkist sociologist Ziya Gökalp and the Azerbaijani émigré intellectual and 
activist Hüseyinzade Ali Bey who became the members of the Central Commission – 
the Executive Board – of the CUP (Sarınay, 2005: 158-159).   Nevertheless, Turkism 
was not the only political tool used by the Committee of Union and Progress as 
Ottomanism was followed as a way of uniting the non-Turkic Muslim peoples of the 
Balkans against the increasing Slavic aggression, and Islamism was used to a great 
extent – because of the German insistence benefiting from the authority of the Caliph 
on Muslim peoples all over the world – in order to re-ally the Arabs with İstanbul 
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against British imperialism. Enver Pasha, who died in a battle against the Bolshevik 
forces in today’s Tajikistan in 1922, was the primary actor behind İstanbul’s search 
for Turkic-Muslim revolts in Afghanistan and Iran; as well as sending troops to Baku 
in 1918 to save it from allied Armenian and Russian invasion (see Andican, 2009: 
306-321; 329-341 for wider information on relations between the Ottoman Empire 
and Central Asia during the First World War).  
The First World War brought about a serious dilemma for the Turkic 
intellectuals of the Russian Empire, who supported unification and closer ties with 
the Turks of the Ottoman territories. In November 1914 the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed 
V declared a “Great Jihad” to call the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman, Russian and 
British Empires for a religious war against the “infidel”. However, not much could 
be done by the Turks of the Russian Empire as the War put an end to the liberalizing 
political climate in Russia. Although Turkic activists of Central Asia organized aid 
campaigns for the Ottoman armies since the First Balkan War of 1912, their efforts 
came to a halt as two Empires were bitter enemies during the Great War (Andican, 
2009: 308-309). The aid campaigns organized by the activists in Central Asia would 
later become a turning point for the transnational connection between the region and 
Anatolia as all these efforts were carried by what we today tend to title as “advocacy 
networks”. Despite all kinds of difficulties related to the war, journals that promoted 
Turkic rapprochement continued to be published and political groups such as the 
Young Bukharans or the Young Khivans8 in Central Asia continued to struggle for 
the rights of their peoples (d’Encausse, 1994a: 241-249).  
                                                 
8 These “Young” movements in the Russian Empire were all ideologically inspired by the “Young 
Turks” and organized according to the principles of the Committee of Union and Progress. In 1917 the 
Committee of Union and Progress was established in Tashkent by Ottoman officers who were sent by 
the government in İstanbul in order to organize a rebellion against the Russians. 
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Russian Empire was in a turmoil in 1917 when two revolutions, the former in 
February and the latter in November shook and finally destroyed the more-than-two 
hundred years old Empire. Turkic intellectuals and activists such as the Bashkir Zeki 
Velidov9, Kazak Mustafa Chokayev, Tatar Mirseyid Sultangaliyev10, Azerbaijani 
Nariman Narimanov, Uzbek Feyzullah Khojayev and many others took active roles 
in the establishment of the new regime in their regions in order to make the Turkic 
peoples have greater say in the newly emerging political system. Resistance of 
several Tatar and Central Asian activists against the Sovietization of the new regime 
could not help much and the Bolsheviks took control of the entire boundaries of the 
former Russian Empire in 1921.  
 
3.3.2 Mustafa Kemal, Turkish War of Independence and Turkism 
The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, Enver, Cemal and Talat 
Pashas all had to leave Turkey as the Ottoman Empire lost the war and the Turkish 
armies in Azerbaijan had to retreat as a result of the Armistice of Mudros signed in 
1918. Although the independence movement and the anti-imperialist struggle led by 
Mustafa Kemal was Turkish nationalist and Mustafa Kemal himself was influenced 
by the ideas of Turkist intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura to a great 
extent, the nationalist war of independence aimed to save the territories declared in 
Misak-ı Millî (the National Oath) including Anatolia, Thrace and the Mosul province 
– roughly today’s Northern Iraq – to sustain a Muslim-Turkish homogeneity (see 
Hale, 2000: 44-78 on Ankara’s foreign policy during the Turkish War of 
                                                 
9 Zeki Velidi Togan of the Turkish Republican period. 
10 Sultangaliyev, a socialist pan-Turkist who allied with the Bolsheviks in the Revolution, has 
attracted utmost attention from Turkish left-wing intellectuals since the last decade in parallel with the 
search for new foreign policy options. Some of the works on Sultangaliyev in Turkish are, Halit 
Kakınç. 2003. Sultangaliyev ve Milli Komünizm (Sulyangaliyev and National Communism). İstanbul: 
Bulut Yayınları; Halit Kakınç. 2004. Destansı Kuramcı Sultangaliyev (Legendary Theoretician 
Sultangaliyev). İstanbul: Bulut Yayınları; Attila İlhan. 2006. Sultangaliyev: Avrasya’da Dolaşan 
Hayalet (Sulangaliyev: The Ghost that Roams in Eurasia). İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları.  
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Independence). On the other hand, the Bolsheviks were the only option to ally 
against the British and the Greek in terms of money and arms supply. Throughout the 
war, a great majority of the pan-Turkist intellectuals, who gathered together under 
the umbrella of the above mentioned Türk Ocağı, moved to Ankara, the center of the 
national independence struggle, in order to support Mustafa Kemal and the Grand 
National Assembly. They had to sacrifice their focus and emphasis on the “Outside 
Turks” although several of them were from the Crimea, Azerbaijan or Kazan, 
because the last independent Turkish land, Turkey, was under invasion.  
At the same time, Enver Pasha was continuing his struggle in Turkestan as 
the leader of the Basmachi11 movement, which was a major Turkic uprising against 
the Soviet rule in Central Asia that lasted in 1931 (see Olcott, 1981; Hayit, 1997 for 
detailed information on the Basmachi uprising in Turkestan). According to 
d’Encause (1994a: 252) Enver Pasha was using the Turkic uprising in Central Asia 
as a stepping stone to fulfill his political ambition of become the leader of the 
Turkish War of Independence. This was also the perception related to Enver Pasha in 
Ankara. Pan-Turkism was not only associated with Enver Pasha and the CUP, but 
also impossible to be implemented as the new government in Ankara had to fight its 
own war against the Greek invasion by conducting successful battles and following a 
rational and anti-imperialist foreign policy simultaneously. It can be seen that 
Mustafa Kemal himself dismissed pan-Turkism as a foreign policy option several 
times and stressed the importance of establishing an independent state only including 
the Turks of Thrace, Anatolia and the Mosul district (Atatürk, 2005: 310-311).12 
                                                 
11 Although the uprising was called by Russian authorities as Basmachi, which means “bandit” in 
Uzbek, the movement was a national liberation struggle of the Turkic peoples of Turkestan.  
12 In his Great Speech he made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Atatürk dismissed pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism as two irredentist and imperialistic political moves; see Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. 2005. Nutuk (The Speech). (Reprint). İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 310. For Ataturk’s speeches 
on the “Outside Turks” see Utkan Kocatürk. 1999. Atatürk’ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri (Ataturk’s Ideas 
51 
 
Mustafa Kemal’s government signed the Moscow Treaty, which started the official 
alliance between the two countries during the Turkish War of Independence, with the 
Soviet Union in March 1921 and Enver Pasha died in a battle against the Bolshevik 
armies in today’s Tajikistan while he was commanding the Basmachi uprising in 
August 1922. Moreover, Ankara had to overlook the collapse of the Turkish 
nationalist Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in April 1920, and the establishment of 
Bolshevik rule in the country (Swietochowski, 1995: 86-87). Consequently, although 
Turkish nationalism was the dominant ideology of the commanders of the Turkish 
War of Independence, it was much more narrowly defined as pan-Turkism was 
perceived to be an irrational as well as an irredentist foreign policy option that would 
curb the international reputation of Ankara.  
 
3.3.3 Bolshevik Revolution and Changing Fate of Turkic Activism 
Although Mustafa Kemal did not follow a pan-Turkist foreign policy agenda, 
relations between Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asia were quite dense and 
strong. The Turkic intellectuals – generally of Kazak or Uzbek origin – of the 
Turkestan region continued to publish journals and newspapers with great emphasis 
on the Turkish War of Independence (see Andican, 2009: 399-405 for the impact of 
the Turkish War of Independence in Central Asia). Mustafa Kemal was a legendary 
leader in the eyes of the Central Asian activists and his anti-imperialist ideology was 
a popular one as the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution had offered a temporary liberal 
atmosphere for the Turkic peoples of the former Russian Empire. Today it is no 
secret that a great portion of the money that was given by Lenin to Ankara in 1921 
                                                                                                                                          
and Thoughts). Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 219. It can be seen in Atatürk’s speeches that he 
makes reference to Turkish history including Turkic emperors such as Attila, Timur and Suleiman the 
Magnificent. He refers to the “greatness” of Turkish history and Turkish nation as a symbol of 
civilization since they first appeared on the scene of humanity in Central Asia. Despite his romantic 
views on Turkish history, Atatürk followed constitutionalist nationalism.  
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for its war against the Greek invasion came from the People’s Republic of Bukhara. 
The president of the Bukharan Republic, Osman Khojaev, who would later join 
Enver Pasha’s revolt against the Bolsheviks, and Feyzullah Khojaev, who was a 
prominent Uzbek socialist-nationalist were the main actors behind the 11 million 
Rubles sent to Ankara by Lenin (Andican, 2009: 396-397). Moreover Ankara’s 
victory in the Battle of Sakarya against the Greek armies was celebrated by 
thousands of demonstrators in Tashkent, which was then a part of the Turkistan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Andican, 2009: 402). The Moscow Treaty 
signed by the Grand National Assembly and the Soviet Union in March 1921 paved 
the way for establishing closer ties with the Caucasus and Central Asia, which were 
then ruled by socialist leaders with pan-Turkist backgrounds. The first diplomatic 
relations between Ankara and the People’s Republic of Bukhara were established in 
January 1922 with an official visit paid by the Bukharan envoys to Mustafa Kemal. 
Soon after the visit, in April 1922, the Grand National Assembly sent Turkish 
representatives to Bukhara, Galip Pasha and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın), as counselor 
and undersecretary of the consulate. However, Enver Pasha’s active role in the 
Basmachi revolt stopped Moscow from letting the Turkish delegation reach Bukhara 
and hence the diplomatic relations were broken.   
 
3.4 New Turkish Identity in Turkey and Turkish-Soviet Relations: the 
Idea of “Turkic World” Weakens    
 
3.4.1 Turkey under Nation-Building: “Turkishness” Re-defined 
The transnational character of Turkey’s relations with the Turkic peoples 
continued in the early years of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. This was 
because Turkic intellectuals who were either in exile in European capitals or who 
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fled Bolshevik repression came to Turkey, mostly under protection of Mustafa 
Kemal, in order to contribute to the state-building process in Turkey. Just like the 
émigré community, which emerged in the early 1910s in İstanbul, now in Ankara, 
there were various intellectuals and former activists of Azerbaijani, Crimean Tatar, 
Kazan Tatar and Uzbek origin. The most prominent several among them were 
Mehmed Emin Resulzade, former president of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, 
Sadri Maksudov13, former Member of Parliament of the Russian Duma, Zeki 
Velidov14, former president of the stillborn Republic of Bashkortostan, Crimean 
Tatar politician Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, who would be the major figure behind the 
reorganization of Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey by the early 1950s and Osman 
Khojayev15, former president of the Bukhara People’s Republic. Among the “Outside 
Turks” in Turkey several of them such as Yusuf Akçura and Sadri Maksudi Arsal, 
who were both Kazan Tatars, became close friends and consultants of Atatürk, but 
had to withdraw their pan-Turkist ideologies in favor of the official Turkish 
nationalism. Therefore, even if there were émigré Turkic leaders inside Turkey, they 
did not have a transnational capacity of activity.   
Transnational character of the idea of rapprochement among the Turkic 
peoples came to a halt by the 1920s to be awakened decades later, due to the 
simultaneous political developments in Turkey and the Soviet Union.  After Enver 
Pasha’s death, former-Ottoman soldiers who were still active in Central Asia were 
sent out of the region. Moreover, Moscow’s stance against pan-Turkism got fierce, 
                                                 
13 Sadri Maksudov took the surname Arsal as a citizen of Turkey. As a consultant to Atatürk, he 
contributed to the higher education and legal system in Turkey. He was a professor of law at Ankara 
Law School and a Member of Parliament.  
14 Zeki Velidov, later Zeki Velidi Togan as a citizen of Turkey, was a world-wide prestigious 
professor of Turkic peoples and Turkic history.  
15 Osman Khojayev took the surname Kocaoğlu as a citizen of Turkey. As a policy of appeasing the 
Soviet Union just before the Second World War broke out, Kocaoğlu was dismissed from Turkish 
citizenship. Similarly, several other Turkic activists were released from Turkish citizenship due to 
Soviet pressure in the 1930s.  
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which led to the cancellation of the plans of Turkic activists to unite all Central Asian 
peoples under a socialist state, part of but autonomous from Moscow. At the same 
time Turkish War of Independence resulted in the foundation of the Republic of 
Turkey, in which the main focus would be on creating a nation-state inside the 
national borders without causing problems for the neighborhood (see Sander, 1993: 
34-37 for Atatürk’s legacy on Turkish foreign policy). It was hence considered by 
the rulers of the new regime that dealing with the problems of the “Outside Turks” 
would be both impossible and irrational as the country itself was war-torn and had to 
be reconstructed in a peaceful atmosphere. Although the new regime established in 
Turkey was based on a nationalist understanding, Turkish identity was defined 
within constitutional boundaries eliminating references to ethnicity (Yeğen, 2004: 
51-66). According to Heper (2007: 85), there was a strong tendency to define a Turk 
based the history and traditions of Anatolia only. Arguing that pan-Islamism and 
pan-Turkism have never been policies that can be implemented, Mustafa Kemal told 
in his Great Speech that “national policy” means depending on one’s own power and 
resources inside national borders and hence preventing the nation from impossible 
dreams (Atatürk, 2005: 311). Hence, even the hundreds of thousands of Turks in 
today’s Northern Iraq, or the Mosul district in Ottoman terms, had to remain outside 
the definition of Turkishness although the Misak-ı Milli encompassed the region as a 
legitimate land of Turkey and Turks.  
 
 3.4.2 Turkish-Soviet Alliance 
The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in December 1925 between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union further assured the Bolsheviks that Turkey would not 
interfere with the protection of the rights of the Turkic peoples of the Crimea, 
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Caucasus, Central Asia and the Volga-Ural regions in return for economic and 
political support for the young Republic of Turkey. On the other hand Bolshevik rule 
in the Crimea, Caucasus and the Volga-Ural regions was firmly established by the 
early 1920s as a result of the Red victory in the Civil War. The only remaining part 
with serious problems related to pan-Turkism was Turkestan, which was divided into 
different autonomous republics in 1924 thanks to the policies of prominent Bolshevik 
figures such as Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR 
between 1923 and 1930, and Stalin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1953 (see d’Encausse, 1994b: 254-266; Karasar, 
2002: 199-209 for detailed information on the delimitation of Central Asia ). 
It appears in the official Soviet documents that Turkestan region, which 
literally means the land of Turks, was named as Srednyaya Aziya, Middle Asia, 
which would later evolve into Tsentralnaya Aziya, Central Asia as more frequently 
used in English, by the early 1920s. This was a clear manifestation of the policy of 
dividing Turkestan into different autonomous republics based on different branches 
of Turkic peoples and the Tajiks, the only Persian-speaking people of Central Asia. 
Hence was founded the Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics in 1924. 
Tajikistan was made an autonomous republic in 1929, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
followed in 1938. Finally, in 1938 Central Asia comprised of five autonomous 
republics. At the same time Stalin’s totalitarian rule in the country made it 
impossible for Turkic intellectuals and activists of the Soviet Union to establish 
contacts with their fellows in Turkey, and vice versa.  
According to Andican, the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship signed in 1925 
between Ankara and Moscow was a turning point for Turkey’s attitude toward the 
Turkic world. As the young republic needed Soviet diplomatic support in the 
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international arena, it had to sacrifice all its attention paid to the Turks of the former 
Russian Empire and restrict Turkist activities – publications and civic activism – in 
order not to harm the pragmatic relationship with the Soviet Union (see Andican, 
2009: 438-442 for political pressures on Turkic intellectuals living in Turkey in the 
1920s). In 1927, Türk Ocağı, which had established the intellectual basis of Turkish 
nationalism as well as the transnational character of the Turkic advocacy networks, 
was forced by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) to replace the phrase “Turks all 
over the world” with “the territory of the Republic of Turkey” to address its area of 
interest. Türk Ocağı was finally closed in 1931 mainly because it did not fit into the 
official nationalist ideology and was transformed into the Halkevleri (People’s 
Houses), which made it impossible to sustain the transnational connection (see 
Sarınay, 2005: 251-359 on the official nationalism policy of the Republic of Turkey, 
the place of the “Outside Turks” in the official policy, and transformation of Türk 
Ocağı into Halkevleri). 
On the other hand, things were not going well for the Turkic intellectuals as 
the Soviet Union allowed no opinion to be expressed other than the propaganda of 
the official socialism. “Outside Turks” who had been promoting Turkic 
rapprochement were titled as spies of Mustafa Kemal and pan-Turkists and hence 
were eliminated through means of political repression (Andican, 2009: 449). The 
demarcation of Turkestan reached its final stage in 1936 with the foundation of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as two distinct autonomous republics, and Stalin’s Great 
Purge ended the lives of national intellectuals in 1938. Hence by 1940 there was an 
“iron curtain” between Turkey and the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union, which 
made both inter-state and transnational contact impossible. Finally, Moscow changed 
the alphabet used by Turkic – and Muslim – peoples of the Soviet Union from Arabic 
57 
 
to Latin between by 1930 and from Latin to Cyrillic by 1942. This inevitably made 
all kinds of publications made by the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union illegible in 
Turkey and vice versa, and hence further limited transnational connections and 
activities.  
 
3.5 The Second World War, the Cold War and Turkish Nationalists 
  
3.5.1 The Second World War: Pan-Turkism in Jail 
While The Second World War was a nightmare for İnönü and Turkey, it was 
seen as an opportunity to overthrow communist rule over the Turkic peoples of the 
Soviet Union by pan-Turkist activists. Therefore, the idea of “Turkic World” had the 
chance to be re-awakened. Turkic leaders, who were either Soviet citizens or in exile 
in European cities, reorganized within the Nazi Army to fight against the Soviet 
Army. In December 1942, upon the request of Von Pappen, the German ambassador 
in Ankara, the leader of the “Turkestan Legions”, which fought alongside the Nazis 
against the Bolsheviks, Veli Kajum Khan16 visited Turkey to conduct talks with 
Turkish security establishment and politicians in order to find support for the Turkic 
war against the Soviet Union (Andican, 2007: 473, 520-524; see Deringil, 2004: 129-
132 for detailed information on the official attitude of the Turkish government on the 
German offer of liberating the Turkic lands of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia as puppet states for Turkey).  
However İnönü was quite determined not to make Turkey, an active 
participant of the War. It was quite surprising that in order to make the increasing 
                                                 
16 Veli Kajum Khan was a Turkestani activist supported by the Nazis against the Soviet Union. He 
was the chairman of the Milli Türkistan Birlik Komitesi (Turkestan National Unity Committee), which 
was a diaspora organization of Central Asians aiming to overthrow the Soviet rule in Central Asia. 
The Committee coordinated the activities of Turkestan Legions that was formed by the Nazi Army 
against the Soviet Union.  
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nationalist public opinion in Turkey in the early 1940s, Prime Minister Şükrü 
Saraçoğlu said “we are Turks, Turkists and shall remain Turkists forever” right after 
he presented the government program to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 
August 1942 (quoted in Heper, 2007: 104). Besides Saraçoğlu, prominent figures of 
Turkish politics such as Mahmut Şevket Esendal, secretary-general of the RPP, Fevzi 
Çakmak, Chief of General Staff and Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, Minister of Customs and 
Monopolies were known to have sympathy toward and contacts with pan-Turkist 
circles (Heper, 2007: 102). However, their personal attitude never turned into official 
state ideology and policy. It was Numan Menemencioğlu, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who had to correct Saraçoğlu politically by assuring the Soviet officials in 
Ankara that Turkism was only a matter of domestic affairs in Turkey and that they 
only wanted the Turks of the Soviet Union to live in peace and welfare (Andican, 
2009: 485). Consequently, Veli Kajum Khan and the Turkestan legions could find 
neither political nor economic support in Turkey, and by the end of 1942 Turkey 
began to follow a strict policy against Turkism and its followers as the war turned 
against the Nazi armies. 
The fate of the idea of “Turkic World” changed dramatically as soon as it 
was no secret that the Soviet armies would defeat the Nazis. This resulted in a fear of 
pan-Turkism as Turkey had to keep its borders intact and free from Soviet 
aggression. The famous “Turkism-Turanism trials” of 1944 were a turning point for 
the attitude of the Turkish state toward the Outside Turks and they established a 
pattern to be followed throughout the Cold War (Landau, 1995: 111-135). A huge 
propaganda campaign was launched by the government and the RPP to denounce 
pan-Turkism and indicate its negative consequences for Turkey’s security (Landau, 
1995: 117). There were also Turkic émigré intellectuals who had been following 
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peaceful methods of promoting Turkic fraternity through journals. For instance 
among those trialed and jailed one of them was former anti-Soviet leader of Bashkirs 
and a professor of History Zeki Velidi Togan. Furthermore, prominent Turkic émigré 
activists were sent out of Turkey and Soviet citizens of Turkic origin who fled to 
Turkey during the war were turned over to Moscow as a result of Soviet pressure on 
Ankara (Andican, 2009: 488).  
 
3.5.2 The Cold War and the idea of “Turkic World” 
Throughout the Cold War the idea of “Turkic World” could have no 
influence in Turkish foreign policy as Turkey had a limited scope of foreign relations 
based primarily on an anti-Soviet transatlantic security alliance, NATO. The 1944 
trials pushed pan-Turkism and people who tried to sustain their ties with the Turkic 
peoples of the Soviet Union into marginal and sometimes radical positions, which 
would lead finally to the establishment of a pan-Turkist nationalist party in 1969. 
During the internal bloodshed of the 1970s in Turkey, the Idealists of the Nationalist 
Action Party (NAP) tried to bring the “Imprisoned Turks” of the “Soviet Empire” 
into the political agenda of Turkey. However, issues related to the “Outside Turks” 
were perceived by decision-makers and left-wing politicians as well as intellectuals 
to be closely related to racism and fascism. It has to be said here that National Action 
Party had little or no contact with the “Outside Turks”. This meant that there was no 
more a transnational network advocating the Turkic cause throughout the Cold War. 
This would be of critical importance for the future of transnational activism in the 
Turkic World as Turkish nationalists, whose leader was prominent pan-Turkist 
politician Alparslan Türkeş, would be the only “norm entrepreneurs” keeping 
Gasprinsky’s ideal of “unity in language, thought and action” alive.  
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It should not be surprising that Turkish public opinion had no idea as to 
when and under what conditions several Turkic peoples such as the Crimean Tatars, 
Balkars, Karachais and Ahiska Turks were deported to Siberia and Central Asia in 
1944 by Stalin as they were accused of cooperating with Germany and/or Turkey 
against the “Homeland” in the Second World War. Although the Turkish Hearths 
were allowed to re-open in 1949 it could not be as active and influential over 
politicians and intellectuals during the Cold War. Several diaspora associations such 
as the Kırım Türkleri Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (Crimean Turks’ Culture and 
Solidarity Association) was established in 1955 and Irak Türkleri Kültür ve 
Yardımlaşma Derneği (Iraqi Turks’ Culture and Solidarity Association) was 
established in 1959. However, those organizations could not act like pressure groups 
making demands related to change in Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq and the 
Soviet Union. Several hundreds of Kazakh and Uighur immigrants fled Eastern 
Turkestan in China for Turkey starting from 1952 to the 1980s (see memoirs of 
Uighur leader Alptekin, 1985 for Kazakh and Uighur immigrations to Turkey). 
Uighur diaspora in Turkey would be quite active politically though it could not find 
popular support from political groups except the pan-Turkist Idealists. Finally, 
almost a thousand Kyrgyz of Afghanistan immigrated to Turkey in 1982 and settled 
in the Ulupamir village of Van. Consequently, during the Cold War diaspora 
associations tried to sustain their activities in Turkey and immigration from the 
Turkic world continued. However, they could not contribute to transnational Turkic 
activism. Their contribution to the consolidation of the idea of “Turkic World” would 
be on Turkish nationalists, who as the only “norm entrepreneurs” in the Cold War era 
had contacts with Turkic diasporas in Turkey. 
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It was indeed only several left-wing intellectuals such as İlhan Selçuk and 
Aziz Nesin who could visit the Soviet Union and have observations about the Turkic 
peoples of Azerbaijan and Central Asia. It was the first time in Turkish history that 
the head of government in Turkey visited Central Asia, when Prime Minister 
Demirel included the region in his official visit to the Soviet Union in 1967 (see 
Tellal, 2006 for detailed information on Turkish-Soviet relations during the Cold 
War). Although Turks of Azerbaijan SSR and Uzbekistan SSR welcomed Turkish 
Prime Minister with cheers the visit firstly aimed to develop Turkish-Soviet relations 
(Milliyet, 25 September 1967). Turkish daily Milliyet (26-27 September 1967) 
newspaper wrote that Demirel’s visit to Baku looked just like a demonstration of 
Justice Party in Turkey, but Demirel had to praise “Turkish-Russian friendship” 
before the media. Therefore, the visit meant very little, if not nothing concerning 
transnational connection among Turkic peoples and the promotion of the idea of the 
“Turkic World” as Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War focused highly on 
keeping Russian aggression at a distance. Repressive policies and massacres 
conducted by Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots as well as the Cyprus Operation of 
July 1974 would be the only case, in which Turkey followed an active foreign policy 
towards a Turkish community living outside the borders of Turkey. But still, Turkic 
peoples of the Soviet Union were not in the agendas of Turkish diplomats and 
decision-makers.  
 
3.6 Conclusion: Changing Fate of Turkic Activism and its Relations with 
the Turkish State 
 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 898) “ideational commitment is 
the main motivation when entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they 
believe in the ideals and values embedded in the norms”. Intellectuals of the Turkic 
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world in the early 20th century turned their ideational commitment to civic and 
political activism and have established the patterns of transnationalism among 
Turkic-speaking peoples. This historical survey of the idea of “Turkic World” and 
the intellectual and political activism that has shaped it was an effort to indicate the 
transnational character of the idea. This chapter has tried to make an analysis of how 
intellectuals and activists of Turkic unity or rapprochement, who in theoretical terms 
constitute “norm entrepreneurs” of the idea of “Turkic World”, were connected to 
each other and acted in a transnational manner. The fact that Turks also lived outside 
of the Ottoman Empire or Turkey was firstly promoted by Crimean Tatar, Kazan 
Tatar, Azerbaijani and Central Asian Turkic intellectuals, who waged a campaign of 
modernizing the Turkic subjects of the Russian Empire for developing their socio-
economic conditions and protecting their political rights. The impact of the idea of 
“unity in language, thought and action” soon reached İstanbul as Turkish 
intellectuals considered Turkism as the only available political option to save the 
homeland.  The civic activism within the Russian and Ottoman Empires has 
contributed to the transnational character of the idea of “Turkic World” and gave it a 
feature, which is still evident today. This feature is that the idea and activism related 
it have evolved around the efforts of intellectuals, activists, advocacy networks and 
non-governmental organizations, who in other words have been the “norm 
entrepreneurs”. For the contemporary literature of International Relations, this means 
that it was the non-state actors that promoted the idea and established its contact with 
governmental authorities.  
The concept of statehood in Turkey confined to the borders of nation-
statehood and the foreign policy framework developed accordingly limited the 
transnational capacity of the idea of “Turkic World” and distanced it from Turkish 
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political life. Mustafa Kemal’s project of establishing a Turkish nation-state with 
Turkishness limited only inside the territories of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Bolshevik repression on national intelligentsia developed a pattern for the future of 
the idea of “Turkic World”. These together limited the transnational capacity of 
Turkic activism and decreased cross-border contacts to very low levels. Friendly 
relations between the new Republic of Turkey and the Soviet Union contributed to 
the disappearing of transnational networks among the Turkic World. Moreover, 
throughout the Cold War dealing with the Turkic peoples, or the “Outside Turks”, 
was understood as a means of irredentism and a kind of the continuation of 
imperialistic foreign policy vision, which contradicted with the peaceful principles of 
the Republican regime. According to Andican (2009: 489), who was one of the main 
figures behind the re-formation of Turkey’s relations with the Turkic peoples in the 
1990s as Minister of State, İnönü’s efforts to curb Turkish nationalism and the 
“Turkism-Turanism trials” of 1944 pushed the idea of “Turkic World” into a 
marginal and romantic line, which has been associated with irredentism. It had a 
certain impact on Turkish foreign policy as all the political and bureaucratic elements 
related to the “Outside Turks” were eliminated as Turkey was preparing itself for the 
post-war period in the mid-1940s.  
The attitude of the Turkish state towards the idea was negative during the 
Cold War as well. The idea would be only supported politically by the NAP in 
Turkey and the “Idealist” Turkish nationalists who tried to keep the issue alive with 
the “imprisoned Turks” discourse, though in a quite anti-communist and irredentist 
line. As the bloody and civil war-like struggle between left wing groups and the right 
wing nationalists resulted with deep social and socio-psychological outcomes, 
Turkism and the idea of “Turkic World” was associated with racism and a fascistic 
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line of imperialist-nationalism. The idea would be re-visited by politicians and social 
groups of various ideologies in the Cyprus operation of 1974, which aimed to protect 
the rights of the Cypriot Turks who were massacred by the Cypriot Greek terrorist 
actions.  
Consequently, entrepreneurs of the transnational idea of “Turkic World” 
were unable to influence the new ideology and nationhood defined in Turkey, which 
resulted in the disappearance of a Turkic concept in Turkish foreign policy. Besides 
such an inability to influence state policies, pan-Turkist intellectuals and activists 
were regarded as dissidents and problematic figures for the Turkish state. Having lost 
their contact with the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union, entrepreneurs of the idea 
of “Turkic World” had to wait until the Cold War ended. It would be until the late 
1980s, when Turkey rediscovered its ethno-linguistic ties with the Balkans, the 
Crimea, Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus and Central Asia as a result of the end of 
the Cold War that the transnational idea of “Turkic World” met the Turkish state and 
started to make an impact on Turkish foreign policy. This would also be a new era in 
which the Turkish governments and decision-makers tolerated and even promoted 
the idea themselves in order to achieve certain foreign policy goals. The next chapter 
will continue with how Turkish governments responded to the newly emerging 
independent Turkic World within the activist foreign policy framework of the post-
Cold War era and hence how the idea of “Turkic World” re-appeared in Turkish 
political life.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE TURKIC WORLD: THE 
IDEA, NON-STATE ACTORS AND GEOPOLITICS 
 
 
 
4.1 The End of the Cold War and New Activism in Turkish Foreign 
Policy 
  
Inherited from the experiences of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after 
the First World War, the Allied invasion in Anatolia, the War of Independence and 
the need to sustain territorial integrity during both the early Republican period and 
the Second World War, Turkish foreign policy was based on Ataturk’s words; “peace 
at home, peace in the world”. According to Aydın (1999: 162), Turkish diplomats 
were “famous … among other things, for being skeptical and cautious”. During the 
Cold War Turkey positioned itself as a staunch member of NATO and its foreign 
policy behavior was shaped primarily by a security-dominant approach of the civilian 
and military bureaucratic elite. Turkey’s Western direction and its search for 
becoming a modern European nation was the second most important factor that 
shaped Turkish foreign policy. However Cold War conditions and lack of 
democratization inside the country made it almost impossible for transnational actors 
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and relations to flourish to have a say in Turkey’s foreign relations. Not surprisingly, 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic World were out of the agenda of Turkish decision-
makers and diplomats for a very long time since it was supposed to be the remnants 
of an adventuristic and irredentist policy (Rubin, 2002:2). 
The end of the Cold War offered new windows of opportunity for Turkish 
decision-makers, who now had the chance to re-interpret the traditional official 
version of the above-mentioned Kemalist motto to incorporate regional activism. As 
the three centuries old Russian threat was moving away, Turkey could rediscover 
what was left behind when the Ottoman Empire was collapsing eight decades ago. 
This especially made the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus three important 
regions with historical significance for Turkish foreign policy. Added to this was the 
fear among Turkish diplomats and decision-makers that Turkey would no more be as 
strategically important for the Atlantic Alliance and especially the US as it used to be 
throughout the Cold War. Turkey’s strategic location in the Cold War was based on 
its neighborhood with the Soviet Union and the elimination of the threat for the 
Atlantic World might very well end Turkey’s strategic value for the West. As 
important as that, the hesitance of European states to accept Turkish accession into 
the European Community was a strong motive for Turkish decision-makers to feel 
isolated at a time when world politics was going through a systemic transformation. 
Hence Turkey’s doubts about getting lonely in international platforms contributed to 
the emergence of the new activism in Turkish foreign policy.  
Within its new foreign policy paradigm, which was also related to the 
economic transformation toward a liberal order inside the country, Turkey started to 
act as an assertive actor with regional power inspirations in its near neighborhood. 
The most important policy change within this context was toward the Middle Eastern 
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or southern neighborhood of Turkey, in which an active foreign policy composed of 
both security and economic aspects. Relations with Iraq, Syria and Israel have 
marked this new activism in Turkish foreign policy (Sayarı, 2000: 172). Similarly, 
Turkey kept an assertive position toward the tragic developments in the Balkans, first 
in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, by supporting the Western-led international 
community to stop the bloodshed and engage in post-conflict peace building (Sayarı, 
2000: 178). As a “kin-state” Turkey was very rapid to respond to recognize and 
establish political, economic and military relations with the Muslim Albania and 
Bosnia as well as Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania, where Turkish minorities live. 
Under such a political atmosphere made up of post-Cold War freedom and 
assertiveness Turkish foreign policy started to move away from its cautious and 
skeptical attitude toward regional and global developments. It was with the help of 
such a conjuncture and eagerness by Turkish decision-makers that the idea of the 
“Turkic World” entered Turkish foreign policy agenda. 
 
4.2 Turkey Re-discovers the Turkic World: Transnationalism Revisited 
 
4.2.1 NGOs and the Idea of “Turkic World” 
  
The “Outside Turks” was first remembered by a huge number of Turkish 
citizens with the repression directed by Zhivkov of Bulgaria towards its Turkish 
minority, which was the remnant of the Ottoman Empire and made-up around 10 % 
percent of the population of the country. Turkish state and public opinion “reacted 
with outrage” to Zhivkov’s policy of ethnic assimilation in Bulgaria that started in 
1984 and “mass rallies were allowed for the first time since the military coup of 1980 
and huge crowds filled Taksim Square in İstanbul” (Poulton, 1997: 208). Tens of 
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thousands of Turkish citizens attended the meeting to condemn the “Bulgarian 
cruelty” (Milliyet, 25 June 1989) in Istanbul in June 1989, which was an event 
coordinated by pan-Turkist activist and politician Namık Kemal Zeybek. As a result 
of international pressure and increasing warning from the Turkish government 
Zhivkov allowed the Turks of Bulgaria to immigrate to Turkey in 1989. Following 
that, some 300,000 Turks came to Turkey. It was especially the ongoing Armenian 
aggression and human rights violations over the Azerbaijani territory of Nogorno-
Karabakh that made Turkish media and public opinion develop ethnic Turkic 
consciousness and internalize the idea of the Turkic World (Cumhuriyet, 5 April 
1993). Hence Turkish public opinion was ready and sensitive towards any 
development related to Turkish or Turkic minorities as well as the independence of 
brother nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It was under such an atmosphere of 
sensitivity that Turkey discovered its common ethno-linguistic ties with the Turks of 
the former Soviet Union and started to incorporate the transnational idea of the 
“Turkic World” into its foreign policy and national interest.  
It would be a role for NGOs as norm entrepreneurs to promote the idea of 
“Turkic World” by pressuring upon and informing governments and key decision-
makers to benefit from the opportunity offered by geopolitical change in Eurasia. 
The simultaneous processes of the collapse of the Soviet Union and globalization 
enabled Turkish non-state actors who were either advocating the Turkic cause or 
trying to develop economic ties with the newly independent Turkic republics to 
establish relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. As Turkey, with its recent 
aspiration for becoming a regional power was trying to respond to the newly 
emerging reality in the East several Turkish non-governmental groups were ready to 
re-awake the forgotten and once-punished idea of “Turkic World” by re-establishing 
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a relationship similar to the one realized by Turkic intellectuals and activists almost 
eight decades ago. Prominent nationalist NGOs such as Türk Ocakları (Turkish 
Hearths), Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Hearths), Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı 
(Turkic World Research Foundation), and Türkiye Milli Kültür Vakfı (Turkey 
National Culture Foundation) rapidly established personal as well as organizational 
ties with the intellectuals and NGOs of the newly independent republics. As Andican 
(2010) mentions it was nationalist NGOs in Turkey that established the first ties 
between Turkey and the Turkic world by organizing visits and transnational meetings 
almost immediately after the Soviet Union disintegrated. Similarly, Kavuncu (2009), 
general secretary of the Turkish Hearths, argues that efforts of several nationalist 
individuals were quite effective in directing Turkish decision-makers towards the 
Turkic world17. 
As Karasar (2007: 151) mentions, by the turn of 1993, just one year after the 
former Soviet republics declared their independence, “dozens of Turkish NGOs were 
active”, which were nationalistically or religiously motivated, in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Similarly, NAP and its leader Alparslan Türkeş had a high reputation in 
the newly independent republics due to the party’s traditional anti-communist policy 
emphasizing on the freedom and independence of “imprisoned Turks”. In his first 
visit to Azerbaijan and Central Asia in April-May 1992 Prime Minister Demirel 
included Türkeş alongside a large group of intellectuals, businessmen and journalists. 
Robins (2003: 277) argues that Türkeş was consulted by the Turkish government on 
the new policy toward the Turkic states. Relations between Türkeş and NAP and 
Elçibey, the President of Azerbaijan between June 1992 and September 1993, and 
Halk Cephesi, the Popular Front, which he was leading, were quite dense and strong 
                                                 
17 Kavuncu lists Namık Kemal Zeybek, Umut Arık, Köksal Toptan, Ayvaz Gökdemir and Enver 
Altaylı among those nationalist individuals who influenced Turkish decision-makers.  
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signaling future transnational coalition among pan-Turkist political parties. During 
Pime Minister Demirel’s first visit to the Turkic republics in April-May 1992 
hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis gathered in the Azadlıq, Independence Square 
in Baku. The crowd welcomed Türkeş and Elçibey as two pan-Turkists on May 3, 
which is the celebration day for Turkists in Turkey dating back to the “Turkism-
Turanism trials” of 1944. Periodicals of such nationalist or pan-Turkist associations 
flourished in the early 1990s and they paid special attention to the Turkic world as 
they were now freed from the pressures of the 1980 coup. Just like the followers of 
Ismail Gasprinsky in the late 19th and early 20th centuries pan-Turkist intellectuals of 
Turkey, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia re-started to share their views on 
media, scholarly journals and NGO publications.  
Islamist or conservative NGOs and communities were as rapid as Turkish 
nationalists to open up to the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the Balkans and 
the Muslim Middle East, which were their natural zones of interest. The Nurcu 
community led by Fethullah Gülen was the strongest in Turkic republics, which 
opened schools in each Turkic Capital as well as in the autonomous Turkic republics 
of Russia in the early 1990s.18 Zaman newspaper, which is the media branch of the 
Gülen movement opened offices throughout the Turkic world from the Balkans to 
Central Asia in the early stages of the post-Cold War era. Ironically, even the leader 
of the NAP Türkeş, whose political life was one of a struggle to make the Turkish 
state recognize the “Outside Turks”, would defend and support the activities of 
Fethullah Gülen’s Islamic movement in the Turkic world.19 Several other Islamist or 
                                                 
18 Schools of Nurcu community would later be closed down and banned in the Russian Federation and 
Uzbekistan as they were connected by official authorities with pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. See 
Yanık, 2004: 301-302.  
19 When Gülen was associated with Turkish mafia who had connections with the so-called Turkish 
deep state during the Susurluk Crisis in 1997, Alparslan Türkeş defended Gülen publicly in a press-
conference organized by the Nationalist Action Party.  
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conservative NGOs such as Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkey Foundation for Religious 
Affairs), İslami İlimler Araştırma Vakfı (Islamic Sciences Research Foundation) and 
Ilim Yayma Vakfı (Foundation for Spreading (Islamic) Science) also started their 
activities in the Turkic states mainly in order to develop Islamic consciousness 
among brother peoples, upon which atheism was imposed by the Soviet Union for 
decades (Karasar, 2007: 151). As Fuller (1993: 68) mentions nationalist and 
conservative – Islamic oriented – press has devoted serious attention to events in 
Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Nationalist newspapers such as Yeni Düşünce (the New 
Thought) – media branch of NAP – Türkiye (Turkey) and Islamist newspapers such 
as the above mentioned Zaman and Milli Gazete (National Newspaper) were cited by 
Fuller (1993: 68) as the ones with the “heaviest coverage and an editorial policy 
strongly in support of” unity among the Turkic world.  
 
4.2.2 Turkish Business Community in the Turkic Republics 
Turkish business community was another strong non-state entity that has 
contributed to the relationship between Turkey and the Turkic world. The place of 
Turkish business community in Turkey’s relations with the Caucasus and Central 
Asia has been a neglected but an essential one. In order to “fill a gap” and focus 
more on micro actors rather than macro politics in Turkey’s relations with Turkic 
republics, Şen (2007: 110) in his own words questions top-down perspectives that 
overlook the role of increasing levels of economic activities of small and middle-
range Turkish entrepreneurs in Central Asia. Both Özal and Demirel took ambitious 
and willing entrepreneurs alongside them and introduced them to regional leaders 
during official visits. Having taken state support from both Ankara and Turkic 
Capitals hundreds of Turkish businessmen flew to Azerbaijan and Central Asia in the 
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early 1990s. Besides Turkish big business entities such as Koç, Anadolu, Çukurova, 
Rumeli, Okan and Çalık Holdings small and medium-range Turkish entrepreneurs 
have contributed to the emergence of a free market economy in the Turkic republics 
(Şen, 2007: 120).  
What is more interesting and important concerning Turkish entrepreneurs in 
Central Asia was that they were motivated either with Islamic or pan-Turkist feelings 
and hence they perceived their activities in the region as helping their brothers on 
their ways for Islamic and/or national awakening (Şen, 2007: 130). Therefore, as Şen 
(2007: 141) mentions, Turkish business community in Central Asia have not 
regarded themselves as immigrants but rather “relatives” or brothers of the peoples 
of the region. Finally, within fifteen years time from the opening-up of the Central 
Asian markets to Turkish businessmen, a dynamic Turkish community has emerged 
in the region, which pays great significance to Turkic-Muslim identity as a bridge for 
promoting multilateral relations (See Şen, 2007: 109-142 for a detailed analysis of 
how such a dynamic Turkish community has emerged in Central Asia). 
 
4.3 Perceptional Change: Re-integration of the Turkic World in Turkish 
Intellectual and Political life  
 
According to Çay (2010), a pan-Turkist activist, professor of History and 
former Minister of State responsible for coordination between Turkey and Turkic 
states and relative communities, Turkey’s perception about the Turkic world used to 
be limited to the Turkish diaspora in European countries and issues of conflict such 
as Turks of former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Western Thrace in Greece and Northern 
Cyprus until 1991. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new era in 
which cooperation would be dominant over conflict in the minds of Turkish 
73 
 
decision-makers concerning the Turkic world. Within the newly emerging post-Cold 
War international environment, Turkey “found itself at the center of Eurasian region 
that has become the focal point of global geopolitics” (Aydın, 2003: 139). Although 
the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus were all in Turkey’s neighborhood, 
Turkey engaged in a redefinition of its national interest to also include Central Asia 
within its new foreign policy formulation. The focus on Central Asia and especially 
on the newly independent Turkic-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union 
including Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia – the remaining four are Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia – was so dense that it 
soon reached a status similar that of Iraq, Cyprus and European Community 
membership.  
Soon Turkish Prime Minister Demirel would define the “Turkic World from 
the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” in his speeches before the media. Aydın (2003: 
139) defines the situation regarding Turkey’s potential activism toward the Turkic 
republics as follows: 
The emergence of eight independent states to Turkey’s northeast at the end of 
the Cold War, arguably enlarged Turkey’s role in the world, and made 
Turkey deeply aware of a vast territory inhabited largely by fellow Muslim, 
Turkic-speakers. This presented Turkey with a historical opportunity, ending 
years of introversion, and emphasizing Turkey’s common cultural, linguistic, 
and religious bonds with the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. 
  
It was the fact that Turkey discovered its “fellow” countries, in other words 
“ethnic cousins” in its Eastern neighborhood that made it develop a particular foreign 
policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, what was lacking in Aydın’s 
picture was the actors who helped Turkish decision-makers comprehend and feel the 
need to act according to the new geopolitical situation. This re-discovery owed very 
much to efforts of micro actors such as former nationalist activists who now had 
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higher positions in Turkish politics and non-governmental organizations, which had 
been waiting for the collapse of the Soviet Union to meet the “imprisoned Turks”. As 
Zeybek (2009), former Chief Advisor to the President Özal and a prominent pan-
Turkist argues, it was the efforts of nationalist NGOs and both official and non-
official individuals – micro actors – that lobbied for the entrance of the Turkic world 
as a concept into Turkish foreign policy. In this study, those nationalist NGOs, 
groups and individuals that advocate the Turkic cause similar to the activists of the 
early 20th century, are all together accepted to be the new “norm entrepreneurs” in 
the post-Cold War era.  
Consequently, Turkish decision-makers were very rapid to respond to the 
emergence of five newly independent Turkic republics as well as the relative 
liberalization of the political situation in countries such as Russia, the Ukraine and 
the Balkan countries where significant numbers of Turkic minorities resided. 
Simultaneously Turkish public opinion realized that brother nations were going 
upwards in the agenda of Turkish politicians and media. Socio-psychological impact 
of the crises of Turks of Bulgaria in the 1980s further deepened with Armenian 
invasion of Azerbaijan and hence Turkish public opinion became quite sensitive 
towards the Turkic world.  
 
4.3.1 Lack of Expertise: Turkish Nationalists Come In  
 
According to Karasar (2007: 147), a Turkish expert on Central Asia as well as 
a political activist of Turkic rapprochement, neither Turkish academia nor 
bureaucracy was ready to conceive of and prepared to respond to the new situation. 
Cold War tensions between Turkey and the Soviet Union and Turkey’s cautious and 
skeptic foreign policy behavior had prevented Turkish diplomats and politicians from 
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developing connections with Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union, Iran and even the 
Turks of the Balkans. It was a common point made by scholars who studied Turkish 
foreign policy toward the Turkic world that Turkish politicians and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs were indeed “unprepared” for the newly emerging reality (Bal, 2000; 
Aydın, 2004; Karasar, 2007). It was only a group of Turkish nationalists, who had a 
political and ideological desire to unite with the Turks outside of Turkey. Moreover 
it was only Turkish nationalists, who had developed certain focus on Turkic peoples 
– despite their limits of knowledge and connection – and hence carried the idea of 
“Turkic World” until the end of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the supposed unpreparedness of 
Turkish politicians and diplomats for the newly emerging Turkic reality have clearly 
indicated that non-governmental actors were behind the state in a certain issue area. 
Moreover, those non-governmental actors – NGOs and individuals – had the 
ideational power and political will to establish contacts with the Turkic world 
immediately. Therefore, Turkish policy makers and bureaucrats tried to consult the 
knowledge of the nationalist elite in order take the first steps of a well-established 
and institutionalized foreign policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia (Karasar, 
2007: 147). This consultation process was a key-point for Turkey’s relations with the 
Turkic world for several reasons. Firstly, it paved the way for the influence of the 
transnational idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy as well as to its 
process of becoming a norm as a result of the incorporation of the idea into the 
Turkish political system Secondly, it resulted in flourishing of transnational ties, 
contacts and networks among the Turks of Turkey and Turkic-speaking peoples 
because it was supposed to be not only legitimate but also beneficial for Turkish 
foreign policy to act as an element of “Soft Power” of Turkey. Finally, this process 
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constituted the very basis of the interaction between the Turkish state and nationalist 
NGOs promoting the idea of “Turkic World”. The interaction started as a win-win 
situation for both non-state actors advocating the idea and governments that have 
been desiring to utilize the post-Soviet geopolitical power vacuum.  
Pan-Turkist figures such as Namık Kemal Zeybek as the Minister of Culture 
in Özal’s and Akbulut’s cabinets and chief advisor to President Özal played a major 
role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy toward Turkic-speaking peoples. With 
the help of Turkish nationalists, who were now free to propagate their publicly, 
Turkish media developed a consciousness toward the five newly-independent Turkic 
republics. Moreover, it was the nationalist NGOs, activists and intellectuals, who 
first organized visits to the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as to the autonomous 
Turkic republics of the Russian Federation, and established cross-national ties with 
regional journalists, intellectuals and pan-Turkist politicians and political parties 
such as the Halk Cephesi (Popular Front) in Azerbaijan, Birlik (Unity Party) and later 
on Erk (Freedom Party) in Uzbekistan and the Ağızbirlik (United Voice) movement 
in Turkmenistan. 
 
4.3.2 Changing Turkish Identity and the Turkic World 
Rosenau’s argument on “fragmegration” in world politics seemed to be true 
concerning Turkish identity just as the Cold War ended and a new epoch of foreign 
relations started for Turkish policy makers. Turkish political life was shaken by the 
fragmentation of constitutional Turkish identity based on the common bond of 
citizenship as the PKK intensified its violent terrorist campaign based on a Marxist 
ideology mixed heavily with Kurdish nationalism. With the Özal period ethnic 
identities other than the upper Turkish identity were publicized and started to be 
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discussed seriously among intellectuals and activists. Despite this fragmenting side to 
Turkish identity one opposite trend, an integrating one, was emerging which enlarged 
the definition of “Turkishness” to a wide geography stretching from “the Adriatic 
Sea to the Chinese Wall” in President Demirel’s own words. The re-discovery of 
transnational Turkic identity was indeed a turning point for the formation of Turkish 
foreign policy toward the post-Soviet space with a strong emphasis on the five 
Turkic states.20  
As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this study, republican definition of Turkishness 
made a considerable limiting impact on the transnational idea of “Turkic World” as 
being a Turk was confined to the borders of the Republic of Turkey. According to 
Fidan (2010: 110), one reason why Turkey’s foreign policy elite would attribute 
special significance to the region was because “the region is perceived as the original 
land of ethnic Turkic populations” as well as that of the Turks of modern Turkey. 
The roots of this perception go back to the 1930s as the “Turkish Historical Thesis” 
suggested by the Turkish Historical Society argue that the fatherland of Turkish 
nation and civilization is Central Asia. However, although Pan-Turkism meant an 
adventuristic and dangerous policy that could annoy the Soviet Union, the idea 
remained the logical outcome of the deliberate process of nation-building through 
glorification of Turkish history and culture, including the pre-Islamic times 
(Kushner, 1997: 226). For the intellectuals and bureaucrats of the Republican era the 
idea of “Outside Turks” mainly included the remnants of the Ottoman Empire who 
                                                 
20 One clear example of how Turkish policy makers tried to utilize the newly emerging Turkic World 
was the official backing for the celebration of Nevruz, 21st of March, as the mythological day for the 
freedom of ancient Turks as well as a welcome for spring. Nevruz has been celebrated by most of the 
Turkic peoples of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Russian Federation though it is not the case for 
Anatolian Turks. In contemporary Turkey Nevruz has been celebrated by Kurds as the day is a 
common Turco-Persian tradition of the Middle East and Eurasia. More seriously, Nevruz celebrations 
of several Kurdish-origin Turkish citizens have got involved in PKK propaganda, and hence the day 
has been perceived to be a dangerous and illegal one by the Public. Within the new “Turkishness” 
Turkish governments have been organizing official celebrations with huge media coverage on each 
March 21 in order to justify that Nevruz belongs to Turks rather than Kurds.   
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were the extensions of the Anatolian Turks such as the Turks of Bulgaria, Western 
Thrace, Cyprus and Iraq. Nevertheless, the Turkish elite knew since primary school 
education that Turks spread to Anatolia, the Balkans, the Middle East, Siberia and 
Russia from Central Asia, which was now to be rediscovered.  
The perceptional change related to Turkish history and identity was the key 
for Turkish decision-makers to engage in active relations and open-up a new agenda 
for Turkish foreign policy. What reminded Turkish decision-makers of history and 
identity would be the entrepreneurs of the idea of “Turkic World”, who managed to 
established channels with them. The end of the Cold War offered Turkish 
intellectual, academics and media to discuss about various ethnic identities in Turkey 
such as those of Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and Chechens. This 
courage to move away from the Kemalist definition of Turkish nation inevitably 
paved the way for searching for Turks outside Turkey, or the “Turkic World” as the 
term started to be frequently used by highest level of statesmen including the 
President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel (Ataman, 2002: 128).  
According to Fidan (2010: 120), who as a high level bureaucrat has played a 
major role in the institutionalization process of Turkey’s policy toward the Turkic-
speaking peoples, “a common historical heritage between Turkey and Central Asia” 
was a “great motive” for developing good relations with that region and moreover 
ethno-linguistic and religious commonalities have paved the way for searching for 
various areas to develop relations with the region. Similarly, Bal (2000: 43) argues 
that Turkey would not be “so interested” in developing relations with the Caucasus 
and Central Asia if five of the newly independent former Soviet republics were not 
Muslim in origin and Turkic in origin. According to Ersanlı (2001: 117-122), it was 
Turkism as one of the most dynamic foreign policy incentives in the 1990s, which 
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was the major factor behind Turkey’s rapid opening to Turkic states as soon as the 
Soviet Union collapsed.21 This study not only agrees with the statement – that 
Turkey’s relations with these two regions were primarily motivated by ethnic 
consciousness – but moreover suggests that it was the existence of a transnational 
idea – the idea of the “Turkic World” – which was based on an eight decades-years 
old ideological debate that made Turkish policy makers so willing and rapid to 
establish strong relations with the Turkic states as well as non-independent Turkic 
peoples.  
 
4.4 Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World in the early 
1990s 
 
Transnational relations and ties flourished between Turkey and newly-
independent Turkic republics in the early 1990s because both the conjuncture and 
ethnic affinity – especially the similarity of languages – made it possible for such 
rapprochement. Although there has been nationalist and Islamist networks active in 
the Turkic world besides a dynamic business community, it has been the first group 
of non-governmental actors as the entrepreneurs of the idea of “Turkic World” – read 
pan-Turkists – that have pushed Turkish decision-makers towards developing an 
ambitious and all-encompassing foreign policy toward Turkic states. It was now time 
for Turkish decision-makers and diplomats to take the idea seriously on the one hand 
and try to utilize the geopolitical opportunities that made it possible for Turkey to 
emerge as a regional leader.   
 
 
                                                 
21 In this chapter, Ersanlı examines Turkish foreign policy toward Turkic republics as an example of 
how Constructivism, with its focus on culture and identity in foreign policy, is becoming more 
important in the study of IR.  
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4.4.1 First Diplomatic Efforts to Develop Relations  
Turkey was the first in the international community to recognize the 
independence of all the five Turkic republics in November 1991. Regional leaders 
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Saparmurat Niyazov – later Turkmenbashi – 
of Turkmenistan, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan 
visited Ankara respectively in September and December 1991 in order to gain 
Turkish support for independence as well political and economic development. In 
return, Turkish leaders engaged in a massive diplomatic effort to increase dialogue 
with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin opened 
the floor for future Turkish official visits to Turkic states as he went to all the five 
Central Asian republics – including Persian-speaking Tajikistan – in February 1992 
(Robins, 2003: 277). Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel followed suit in April and 
May 1992 as he visited the newly-independent brothers with a huge number of 
businessman and academics alongside him in order to trigger multilateral relations in 
various fields. As Robins (2003: 277) mentions, Çetin’s entourage was 140 men 
strong, while Demirel’s was much larger. Such kinds of official visits at the top 
levels would in the coming years be important symbols between Turkey and Turkic 
states as important figures from all sides including Presidents and Prime Ministers 
would call each other “my brother” during all kinds of official talks. Finally, by 
spring of 1992, all the Turkic leaders of the former Soviet states had paid official 
visits to Ankara (Fuller, 1993: 68). President Özal would pay hist first official visits 
to Turkic capitals in April 1993.  
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4.4.2 Turkey’s “Responsibilities” 
As a result of the strong entry of the idea of “Turkic World” into Turkish 
politics with the efforts of “norm entrepreneurs” Turkish decision-makers rapidly 
started to talk about the “responsibilities” of Turkey regarding the newly independent 
Turkic states (Aydın, 2003: 141). According to the foreign policy agenda developed 
toward the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union, Turkey would firstly help these 
countries to establish their state structures in a way that they would consolidate their 
independence. This aim has continued to be the major official aim of Turkey toward 
these “brother” countries (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for Turkey’s 
official foreign policy priorities in Central Asia). For this aim, Turkey has sent 
military, academic and administrative personnel to offer bureaucratic and technical 
help in various fields of governance such as security affairs, national education and 
economic re-organization.  
Furthermore, Turkey signed “Friendship and Cooperation Agreements” with 
all the regional leaders who were eager to visit Turkey in order to receive full support 
for their independence by early 1992 (Aydın, 2004: 4). Secondly, since their 
independence Turkey has helped the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union to 
represent themselves in international organizations, and hence acquire prestigious 
positions in the international community. Aydın (2004: 4) quotes then Prime 
Minister Demirel saying that Turkey should have a dynamic and active role in 
connecting the newly independent brother countries to the developed world. This 
active “bridge” role of Turkey helped Azerbaijan to become a member of the Council 
of Europe, and all the five Turkic states to become members of the OSCE. Moreover, 
Turkey has made serious efforts to integrate these countries into regional cooperation 
organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) 
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and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) as well as NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace program in order to help transform the Soviet-type armies into Western-
type ones.  
According to Fidan (2010: 114), Turkey “undertook the diplomatic function 
of ‘door-opener’ and ‘right advocator’” as it contributed to establishing a strong 
relationship between the newly-independent Turkic states and Western organizations. 
By acting as a bridge Turkey was on the one hand trying to build a constructive 
image in the eyes of the regional leaders, and on the other hand expecting to receive 
the support of “the brothers” in the international platforms. One has to mention here 
that this rather brave behavior was a first-time activity in Turkish foreign policy and 
therefore it was a manifestation that Turkey no more wanted to follow its traditional 
“cautious” and “skeptical” foreign policy.  
 
4.4.3 A New Institutional Framework: Re-structuring of Turkish 
Bureaucracy 
 
Besides responsibilities, Turkey has tried to develop an institutional 
framework to coordinate its relations with the newly-independent Turkic states as 
well as other Turkic peoples such as the Gagauz of Moldova, Crimean Tatars of 
Ukraine and Turkic minorities – Uzbek and Turkmen – in Afghanistan. For this 
purpose Turkish state bureaucracy was reorganized in order to meet the requirements 
of the new agenda of Turkish foreign policy. In several ministries and 
undersecretariats such as the one responsible for Foreign Trade branches responsible 
for the Caucasus and Central Asia were established. In Robins’ (2003: 279) words, 
this was an attempt “made to expand the capacity of the Turkish state to manage 
these newly emerging relationships”. Accordingly, the existing directorate general 
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within the Minister of Foreign Affairs dealing with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Asia was divided into two, one of which was responsible for the relations with 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Robins, 2003: 279). The new 
directorate general dealing with the CIS was then divided into two departments, one 
responsible for the Slavic republics, the other responsible for Turkic republics 
(Robins, 2003: 279).  
The fact that Ambassador Bilal Şimşir, who was known for his nationalistic 
background, was appointed as the head of the directorate general responsible for CIS 
indicates that Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states was shaped according to 
ideational factors such as common identity and kinship (see Hunter, 2001: 8 for 
Şimşir’s views on the issue). The establishment of the Turkish International 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in January 1992 was a clear 
manifestation that Turkey’s neighborhood was “expanded to encompass the 
Caucasus and Central Asia” (Fidan, 2010: 113). The establishment of TIKA as a 
branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed how significant Turkey’s position 
regarding its ethnic cousins was perceived by Turkish decision-makers. It indicated 
that a new assertive instrument was incorporated into Turkish foreign policy with 
normative purposes. The establishment of TIKA sent a strong message to regional 
leaders who wondered what kind of a policy Turkey would follow toward them, that 
it would support the reorganization of their state structures. TIKA supported and 
coordinated hundreds of projects through the program coordination offices 
established in all the capitals during the 1990s. These projects and programs have 
concentrated on issues such as education, agriculture, health and water infrastructure, 
cultural cooperation, training of civil servants, administrative help, assistance in 
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banking, insurance, foreign trade and other infrastructure required for transition to 
market economies.  
Turkey’s attempt to develop an active and multi-faceted regional policy led 
more state institutions to develop relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Turkish state banks established cooperation mechanisms with regional banks and 
opened branches in Turkic Capitals. Turkish Standards Institute (TSE) and State 
Statistics Institute (DIE) began to develop bilateral and multilateral projects to help 
the modernization of bureaucratic and technocratic structures of Turkic republics 
(Bal, 2000: 82). Moreover, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized training 
programs for the diplomats of the newly-independent Turkic states. 
  
4.4.4 Turkish Presidents and Turkic Summits 
Turkish presidents were active figures in the formation of Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Turkic states in the initial phase. Özal was an active supporter of 
close personal relations with regional leaders. He initiated the “Turkic-speaking 
Countries Heads of States Summits”, or the “Turkic Summits” to establish a platform 
for increasing cooperation and possible future integration among Turkey and the 
Turkic states. The first of these summits summoned in Ankara in October 1992 and 
the famous “Ankara Declaration” that was signed there included issues on economic 
cooperation, free trade, free movement of goods, people and services, developing an 
integrated transport system, telecommunications, banking and energy cooperation 
(Robins, 2003: 285). In the first summit Turkish President Özal argued that the 
“Turkic World” now had a “historic opportunity, which was very rare in history” 
(quoted in Robins, 2003: 285). In the summit Özal would also claim that the 21st 
century would belong to Turks once the Turkic World cooperated with each other. 
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The first “Turkic Summit” was also a clear indicator that Turkey had adapted 
“Turkic World” officially as a term to be used to refer to Turkic-speaking peoples at 
the highest level. Since October 1992 nine such “Turkic Summits” have been held.22 
Çaman (2006: 194) argues that the “Turkic Summits” has been the most prestigious 
and assertive diplomatic project developed by Turkey, which showed the ultimate 
aim of Turkish decision-makers toward supranational integration.  
  
4.4.5 Cultural and Educational Cooperation as an Element of Foreign 
Policy 
 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic-speaking peoples were highly motivated 
by ethno-linguistic ties, which were glorified by common a history. As Fidan (2010: 
120) argues “common history, language, religion, tradition and lifestyle have 
engendered potential areas for facilitating bilateral and multilateral relations”. Hence 
Turkey also attempted to take steps on cultural and educational cooperation in order 
to have various channels through which relations would be sustained. In 1992, 
TÜRKSOY – Joint Administration of Turkic Cultures and Arts – was established as 
a transgovernmental body of ministries of culture and it has accepted both newly 
independent Turkic states and autonomous Turkic republics – Republic of Tatarstan, 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Altai, Republic of Tuva and Republic of 
Yakutistan in Russia and Gagauiza in Moldova – as its members.  
Education has become another important tool for Turkish foreign policy 
toward the region. Turkey has officially opened up two universities in Central Asia; 
the Turkish-Kazak International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University in Kazakhstan and 
the Turkish-Kyrgyz Manas University in Kyrgyzstan.  On the other hand Turkish 
                                                 
22 Further evaluation will be made in Chapter 6 on the importance of Turkic Summits on the 
institutionalization of Turkey’s relations with the Turkic-speaking peoples.  
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Ministry of National Education has coordinated the Great Student Project; one of the 
biggest projects of Turkey concerning the Turkic World and brother communities. 
Since the 1992-93 academic year, when the project was put into effect more than 
25840 thousand students have studied in Turkish state universities with scholarship 
opportunities (see Özkan, 2007 for the exact figures between 1992 and 2007). The 
Great Student Project was a policy tool of Turkey which indicated that the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of five independent nations in Eurasia meant more than 
a foreign policy in the traditional/Realist sense. According to Yanık (2004: 293-307) 
the Project looked very similar to the national educational campaign of the first 
republican years. Just as the young Republic embarked upon consolidating a national 
identity for the citizens, the project aimed to create a stratum of people in the Turkic 
states and communities who would be sympathetic toward Turkey and Turkish 
culture. In addition the project has aimed to contribute to the national goals of the 
newly independent countries to transform their economic and administrative 
structures in line with the Western-developed world. The idea of “Turkic World” was 
so strong in the formation of the Great Student Project that former Minister of 
National Education, Köksal Toptan, argued that students involved in this project 
would be the “architects of a common future” in the Turkic world (quoted in Yanık, 
2004: 294).   
In line with Turkey’s policy of accepting different ethnic groups in Eurasia 
which have relatives inside Turkey, the Project was extended to include students 
from a wide range of countries including the Balkan countries, Turkic-Muslim 
autonomous republics of Russia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan as well the 
five Turkic republics. The Great Student Project has been a clear indicator of how 
Turkey’s responsibilities and capabilities regarding the Turkic world have been 
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perceived by Turkish decision-makers. This project alongside other initiatives of 
Turkey has also indicated that the idea of “Turkic World” has led to concrete policy 
outcomes.  
  
4.4.6 Economic and Administrative Aid 
In order to make the Turkic states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan attractive 
for Turkish businessman and to help these countries speed up the process of 
transforming into liberalized economies Turkish Eximbank “extended loans totaling 
$ 1.2 billion” for companies active in the region (Arım, 2001: 75). Economic and 
business councils were established right after Turkey opened up embassies in the 
Turkic capitals and Turkish businessmen doing business in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia were supported by Turkish leaders. Economic relations further strengthened as 
Turkey started to endeavor to be an energy corridor between European markets and 
the Caspian natural resources. As a result of such a US-backed energy policy Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan  pipeline started to take Caspian oil to the Mediterranean. Turkish 
Airlines was the first international company to organize direct flights from İstanbul 
to the capitals in Central Asia – firstly to Tashkent and Almaty in 1992 – and Turkish 
official media organization TRT opened its Avrasya, Eurasia channel to link Turkish 
citizens directly to their brothers in the Caucasus and Central Asia and vice versa.  
Turkish PTT opened several branches in the newly independent states and 
Turkey supported these countries in developing their telecommunication sectors 
(Robins, 2003: 301). As Robins (2003: 302) mentions PTT, “Turkish public sector 
telecommunications giant” provided equipment to the Turkic states, relative to whom 
it had a great comparative technological superiority, which was worth around $ 25 
million. As a result of these economic and infrastructural attempts, it became easier 
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for micro actors such as NGOs advocating Turkic rapprochement to follow the 
activities of each other, organize transnational congresses, attract media attention and 
create consciousness in the public opinion especially in Turkey for integration among 
Turkic-speaking peoples.  
 
4.4.7 Search for a “Turkish Model” 
Another newness concerning Turkish foreign policy goals was Turkey’s 
search for becoming a model for the newly independent Turkic states. Secular 
Turkey with its predominantly Muslim population would supposedly become an 
attractive regime type for the leaders of the brother states. Hence the “Turkish 
Model” was also encouraged by the US and European states as it would curb 
possible influence of Iran with its Islamic regime in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
In addition, Turkey was a good example of cooperation of Islam and democracy and 
it also had an aspiring newly-transformed liberal economy. As stated by Karasar  
(2007: 156), Turkish decision-makers thought that the “Turkish Model” was the right 
option for regional leaders who aimed first and foremost a wise developmental and 
civilizational strategy. This line of thought was indeed consistent with the changing 
perception of identity in Turkey, which was influenced to a certain extent by the idea 
of “Turkic World”. Consequently, it was for the first time in Turkish foreign policy 
that Turkey was taking the role of being a model for other countries. Though this 
leadership and role model did not take long and left itself to a more modest approach 
in the mid-1990s it was particularly important for Turkey’s foreign policy attitude 
toward the Turkic states. Consequently, the “Turkish Model” which was a strong 
motivation for the relations in the early 1990s was a clear manifestation of the 
perception of Turkish policy makers and diplomats about the newly-independent 
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Turkic states and the euphoria marked with the re-discovery of the transnational 
Turkic identity. This perception was one based on the earlier theoretical suggestion 
of Turkish political philosophy that Turkey is a bridge between the developed 
Western and the developing Eastern world. Now Turkish decision-makers felt the 
responsibility on their shoulders to help the brother countries to become secular 
democracies while on the other hand transforming their economies for socio-
economic development.    
 
4.4.8 Turkey and Non-Independent Turkic Communities 
Turkey’s courageous new foreign policy toward the Turkic World not only 
included the newly independent states but also those non-independent Turkic 
peoples. Although the term “Turkic World” first brings five independent Turkic 
states to one’s mind – six if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is included – it 
has also officially included Turkish and Turkic minorities who either has 
autonomous republics or live merely as citizens of a country which is defined by its 
majority. Turkey has tried to protect the rights and develop the socio-economic 
conditions of the Turkish minorities of the Balkan countries. The Gagauz of 
Moldova, Crimean Tatars of Ukraine and Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia have four 
such Turkic peoples with whom Turkish politicians have tried to develop relations. 
For instance, the rights of Crimean Tatars and Turkey’s involvement on the issue of 
the return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland were put on the “Cooperation 
Agreement” signed by Turkish and Ukrainian officials in 1996 (Oylupınar, 2008: 
87). Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as two autonomous republics of the Russian 
Federation, who have the right to establish relations with foreign countries, opened 
representative offices that represent these republics in İstanbul. Turkey’s relations 
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with Tatarstan have become especially important with the agreement signed between 
Farid Mukhamedshin, the Head of the Parliament of Tatarstan and Hikmet Çetin, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in May 1995. In September 1996, Turkey 
opened a consulate in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, which had a 
strong autonomy acquired from Yeltsin’s Moscow according to the agreement signed 
in 1994, and in return Tatarstan opened its diplomatic office in İstanbul in September 
1997 (Kamalov, 2008: 82).  
 
4.5 “Norm Entrepreneurs” in Action: Non-governmental Activism 
throughout the 1990s and the 2000s 
 
Non-state actors that made the initial impact on bringing the idea of “Turkic 
World” into Turkish politics and public opinion had a freer hand to operate in Turkey 
and express their views in various transnational meetings in the post-Cold War era. 
This was related to both relatively faster democratization of Turkey and the rise of 
NGOs in numbers and activities and also to how Turkish decision-makers perceived 
the activities of non-state actors that advocated the idea of “Turkic World”. 
Accordingly, the perception has been quite positive in total contrast to Cold War 
attitude. As world politics has been going through a transformation such that non-
state actors of various kinds – micro actors such as individuals and/or macro actors 
such as companies or transnational advocacy networks – have been influential in 
states’ policies, Turkish context has also been transformed to incorporate this multi-
centric structure.  
This process of admitting the wisdom and capacity of activity of non-
governmental bodies such as social movements, associations and foundations 
advocating certain causes such as ethno-linguistic rights and compliance with the 
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Copenhagen criteria for EU affairs, think-tanks that produce thoughts on especially 
regional politics and diasporas pressuring and lobbying over governments for a 
certain ethnic group has had both a contentious and a cooperative impact. It is 
especially politicians and civic activists of Kurdish ethnic origin that have chosen 
contentious politics as both a feasible and an influential method to pressure upon 
governments, opposition parties, Turkish Armed Forces, intellectuals of various 
political wings, the media and the public opinion to advocate for improving the rights 
of Kurdish-origin citizens of Turkey. Kurdish NGOs directed by the PKK and its 
leader Abdullah Öcalan formed a transnational network quite active in terms of 
human resources and financial mobility across the European Union members, Russia, 
Syria and Iraq besides the major big cities of Turkey (Østegaard-Nielsen, 2003). 
Kurdish example might be taken as the most serious non-state challenge to the 
Turkish state as it was based on an identity issue – which is key for understanding 
transformation of world politics towards a multi-centric structure – and it included 
both an armed struggle and social activism, which are very difficult to exist in a 
single body, directed by a terrorist organization. Hence, authority and sovereignty of 
the Turkish state was challenged seriously throughout the 1990s by a collection of 
non-state entities acting transnationally and gathering around a single cause.  
  
 4.5.1 Diaspora Organizations 
Despite the negative perception on NGOs caused by Kurdish separatism, not 
every issue related to identity and non-state actors advocating matters of identity 
have become threatening for the Turkish state. Several of such pressure groups, 
which started to act louder due to the end of the Cold War, were quite successful in 
talking to and pressuring on key decision-makers such as the President, the Prime 
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Minister, Foreign and Interior Ministers and diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as well as the leaders of major political parties such as the Homeland Party, 
True Path Party, Welfare Party, Republican People’s Party, Democratic Left Party 
and NAP. Turkey’s active policy to protect the rights and lives of the Turkish 
minority in Bulgaria as a result of increasing assimilation policies of the Zhivkov 
government starting from 1984 was a turning point on that. Crises in Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s triggered Balkans immigrants’ solidarity associations to establish 
transnational ties rapidly and keep the Bosnian tragedy alive in Turkish media and 
public opinion. Besides Turkish NGOs of Bosnian origin, Balkans associations 
advocating the rights of the Turks in Western Thrace – such as the Batı Trakya 
Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği (Western Thrace Turks Solidarity Association) – were 
quite active and had close ties with politicians and diplomats. Moreover, as the “Iron 
Curtain” no more existed, Turkish citizens of Caucasian, Crimean Tatar and Central 
Asian origin were now free to visit their homelands, establish business relations and 
organize reciprocal cultural events and diaspora congresses. As one of the strongest 
diaspora groups in Turkey, Caucasian solidarity associations, which mainly included 
Turkish citizens of Circassian, Abkhazian, Chechen and Dagestani origins, reacted in 
an organized manner to the Georgia-Abkhazia War of 1991-1993 and Russo-
Chechen War of 1994-1996 (Celikpala, 2007: 58-70). Caucasus-Abkhazia Solidarity 
Committee and Caucasus-Chechnya Solidarity Committee were the platforms 
through which major associations advocating Caucasian identity came together to 
have a united and stronger voice (Celikpala, 2007: 58-65). Caucasian diaspora not 
only had contacts with prominent Turkish decision-makers but also organized huge 
humanitarian aid campaigns for Abkhazia and Chechnya. As a result of their ongoing 
pressure upon politicians, Çelikpala (2007: 59) mentions that leaders of Caucasian 
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associations in Turkey had the chance to talk to Prime Minister Demirel in October 
1992 on the ongoing war in Abkhazia and made the TGNA hold a session on this 
issue on October 13, 1992.     
As for Turkic diasporas in Turkey, it can easily be argued that they were not 
as active and influential as the Balkans and Caucasian diasporas. Azerbaijani 
diaspora, whose origins went back to the early 1920s as the Turkist Müsavat Party 
moved its political center to Turkey in April 1920 and later continued its political 
and cultural activities within different NGOs, was the most active Turkic diaspora in 
Turkey in the early 1990s (Çelikpala, 2007: 53). Having taken support of nationalist 
NGOs in Turkey, Azerbaijani diaspora pressured on governments to take an active 
position to support the presidency of pan-Turkist Elchibey and to help Azerbaijan in 
its resistance against the Armenian invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, soon 
after Azerbaijan declared its independence, in November 1992 Azerbaijani diaspora 
in Turkey led by the Müsavat movement moved its center back to Baku and hence 
Azerbaijani struggle inside Turkey ended (Çelikpala, 2007: 53). Turkestani, or 
Central Asian diaspora in Turkey was even weaker than the Azerbaijanis. Turkish 
citizens of Central Asian origins, some of which were descendants of the émigré 
activists and intellectuals of the late Ottoman and early Republican period, had 
already been representing themselves in different associations first of which – 
Turkestan Cultural Association – was established by prominent Bashkir pan-Turkist 
Zeki Velidi Togan in 1952. However, Cold War conjuncture and Turkey’s relations 
with the Soviet Union did not let Turkestani diaspora in Turkey to act like a pressure 
group. Turkestanis in Turkey could be re-active only in 1984 as they established the 
Türkistanlılar Kültür ve Sosyal Yardım Derneği (Turkestanis Culture and Social Aid 
Association) (Andican, 2007: 615). The Association organized the First International 
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Turkestanis Congress in İstanbul in 1989 in order to bring together immigrant 
Central Asians from all-over the world. The Association acquired a status of “Non-
Profit Public Association” from the state in 1991 and paved the way for state support 
for the establishment of the “Federation of Eurasia” in 1995, which included Uighur 
and Iraqi Turkmen Associations in Turkey (Andican, 2007: 625).  
Besides the efforts of Azerbaijani, Crimean Tatar and Central Asian diaspora, 
advocating the Turkic cause inside the borders of Turkey remained primarily a 
mission of Turkish nationalists and pan-Turkists. Hence nationalist NGOs acted as 
“norm entrepreneurs”, who kept the Turkic world alive in Turkish media, public 
opinion as well as in the agendas of political leaders. Besides the country-wide warm 
welcome for the independence of five Turkic republics, Armenian invasion of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Khojaly Massacre of 26 February 1992 made Turkic 
fraternity a topic that could not be ignored in Turkish politics (Milliyet, 28 February 
1992). Finally, Nagorno-Karabakh became an issue of central importance for 
Turkey’s neighborhood policy. By 1993 Turkish foreign policy toward Armenia 
changed significantly as Turkey decided to close the borderline and not to open it 
unless Armenian invasion ended in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
4.5.2 A Transnational Platform: Turkic Kurultays 
 Starting from 1991various pan-Turkist conferences and congresses have been 
held in major cities of Turkey, which has brought together activists, intellectuals, 
artists, politicians and bureaucrats from all over the Turkic world. Such congresses 
touched upon various topics such as cooperation in fields of education, transportation 
and broadcasting, unity in alphabet, Turkic arts and cultures, history, architecture, 
city planning, women’s rights and sports as means of speeding up integration both 
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between Turkey and the Turkic republics and among Turkic republics themselves. 
More importantly, pan-Turkic meetings, which were held in Turkey called Turkish 
leaders and the leaders of the newly independent Turkic states to take measures in 
order to have a united voice in the international arena. For such a broad purpose of 
increasing contacts and cooperation in the Turkic world, Türk Devlet ve Toplulukları 
Dostluk, Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Kurultayları (Turkic States and Communities 
Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation Congresses) has had a special place as 
they constituted both a platform of pan-Turkists all over the world to gather in annual 
meetings and Turkish officials to justify the significance they pay for Turkey’s 
relations with the Turkic world. Among the tens of conferences, congresses and 
meetings held in order to promote Turkic rapprochement Turkic Kurultays has 
constituted the broadest platform that incorporated pan-Turkist NGOs and 
individuals from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Crimea and Russia.  
As Çay (2010), chief organizer of such congresses from the very beginning 
mentions, it was Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the NAP and prominent pan-Turkist 
politician, who was among the Turkists jailed in the “Turkism-Turanism” trials of 
1944. Türkeş proposed establishing a foundation or an NGO, which would be 
responsible for holding the Turkic Kurultays every year and which would establish 
ties with Turkish decision-makers to make it an efficient body. The organization 
committee of the first Kurultay, Çay (2010) mentions, first visited the President Özal 
aiming to receive his support for the first congress. However, Özal hesitated to 
support such an initiative. Then, the committee visited Demirel, who willingly 
accepted to support the gathering of the first Kurultay by political means (Çay, 
2010). This support would continue in the rest of such transnational congresses and 
make him a symbolic figure for pan-Turkic gatherings. Çay (2010) further says that 
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the attraction of and popular support for the first Kurultay made the President Özal, 
despite his initial hesitance, to attend it on its final day and make a speech. This first 
contact between “norm entrepreneurs” and key Turkish decision-makers affected the 
interaction between non-governmental bodies and the Turkish state to a great extent 
as it legitimized lobbying activities and pressures of the former on the latter.   
Legitimacy of Kurultays in the eyes of the organizers and participants was 
based on their connection with the earliest Turkists. Hence, the motto of Kurultays 
has been “Unity in Language, Thought and Action” of Crimean Tatar intellectual 
Gasprinsky, whose works have become widespread in the last two decades and 
transnational activities have attracted increasing attention from Turkish intellectuals. 
Çay (2010), chief organizer of the congresses, argues that Kurultays took the All-
Russia Muslim Congresses of the early 20th century in the Tsarist Russia as an 
example as to what the format and spirit of the congresses should look like. Hence, 
organizers of the Kurultays tried to establish a forum of free thought and a “think-
tank-like” platform to offer advices for Turkish and Turkic policy-makers (Çay, 
2010).  
First of the Turkic Kurultays was held in March 1993, in Antalya. The first 
and the rest of all such pan-Turkic gatherings were organized by Türk Devlet ve 
Toplulukları Dostluk, Kardeşlik ve İşbirliği Vakfı (TUDEV), Turkic States and 
Communities Friendship, Brotherhood and Cooperation Foundation and were 
sponsored by TIKA, which was established a year ago as part of Turkey’s active 
foreign policy towards the Turkic world. The first head of TUDEV was Alparslan 
Türkeş and remained so until he died in 1997. The first meeting summoned under the 
auspices of Prime Minister Demirel and President Turgut Özal made the opening 
speech. The opening ceremony was held on March 21, which is traditionally a 
97 
 
festival day of Turkic and Persian peoples celebrated throughout Eurasia and the 
Middle East named Nevruz, The New Day in Persian. Up until Turkey re-discovered 
the Turkic world Nevruz used to be celebrated only by Kurds in Turkey and it had 
already become a symbol of popular support for the PKK in Turkey’s southeastern 
cities. Hence, the Turkish state elite wanted to utilize Nevruz as a festival also 
celebrated in the rest of the Turkic world. In his speech, President Özal told that the 
star of Turkishness was shining as Turks met their brothers (BYEGM, March 1993).  
Prime Minister Demirel argued that Turks were experiencing a “second 
Ergenekon” as the Soviet Union collapsed two years ago (BYEGM, March 1993). 
Moreover, social democrat deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü told in the Congress 
that “no one should be afraid of the togetherness of Turks as our common culture 
will make contributions to the peace all-over the world” (BYEGM, March 1993). 
Hundreds of delegates and guests from all over the Turkic world – including 
minority groups who either had their autonomous republics or lived directly as 
citizens of different countries – attended  the Kurultay, among whom there were 
ministers, diplomats, bureaucrats and dominantly academics and activists. Following 
the patterns of the first Kurultay, ten other pan-Turkis gatherings were held in the last 
nineteen years since the collapse of the Soviet Union; the second Kurultay in October 
1994 in İzmir, the third in September – October 1995 in İzmir, the fourth in March 
1996 in Ankara, the fifth in April 1997 in İstanbul, the sixth in March 1998 in Bursa, 
the seventh in July 1999 in Denizli, the eighth in March 2000 in Samsun, the ninth in 
December 2001 in İstanbul, the tenth in September 2006 in Antalya and finally the 
eleventh in November 2007 in Baku, Azerbaijan.  
A common pattern for the Kurultays was that the first eight of them 
summoned under the auspices of Turkey’s former prime minister and then ninth 
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president Demirel. Moreover, former President of Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus Denktas attended all the first nine Kurultays. Tenth President Sezer hesitated 
to take part in such congresses due to his bureaucratic attitude and efforts to remain 
objective in domestic politics. Finally, because of the hesitance of Sezer, disputes 
between the NAP and the organization committee and later the election of Justice 
and Development Party (JDP) in 2002 led to a break in Kurultays between 2001 and 
2006, until TUDEV and TIKA cooperated again to summon the tenth congress.    
 The aims of Turkic Kurultays are well-defined in each of the books prepared 
annually after the meetings. From the very start Turkic congresses have had goals 
such as increasing ties among Turkic peoples, sustaining cooperation in international 
relations, economic as well as technological development, finding solutions for the 
common problems of the Turkic world, speeding up cultural exchange, finding 
common grounds for the peaceful resolution of disputes between Turkic states and 
other states, contributing to the establishment and strengthening of rule of law, multi-
party democracy, secularism and respect for human rights in the Turkic world, 
reciprocal respect for the independence, sovereignty and internal affairs of each 
Turkic state, developing friendly relations with major powers of world politics such 
as Russia, the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, China and Japan and emphasizing 
that relations should be based on equality (Çay, 1995: 3-4).  
As a final goal, Kurultays have aimed to institutionalize relations among 
Turkic countries in such a way that all the above mentioned goals could be realized 
and friendship, brotherhood and cooperation in the Turkic world is sustained (Çay, 
1995: 3-4). In all the Kurultays, representatives from more than thirty Turkic peoples 
including independent states, autonomous republics and minority groups were 
present and given a chance to present their views before Turkish officials and media. 
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Despite warnings from the Chinese embassy in Ankara, Uighurs attended the 
Kurultays to represent “Eastern Turkestan” rather than the Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region as it is the official name of the region. Turks of Iran were also 
present to represent “Southern Azerbaijan”. This indicates that the congresses offered 
non-official positions to be supported freely although Turkey officially did not have 
a policy concerning Eastern Turkestan or the Turkic population of Iran. In contrast, 
Turkish diplomacy has supported non-interference with domestic politics of China 
and Iran.  
 In line with the central argument of this study, Turkish foreign policy toward 
Turkic peoples has been shaped to a certain extent according to what has been 
suggested by the final declarations of the Kurultays. Final declarations of Turkic 
Kurultays have included different points related to the goals of the congresses. As 
Kurultays had several different commissions such as language and alphabet 
commission, education, science and technology commission, international law and 
relations commission, economics and trade relations commission and youth 
commission, tens of suggestions have been made for the consideration of Turkish 
and Turkic decision-makers in all the eleven congresses (Çay, 2006). Each 
commission, chaired by a professor, presented its suggestions for both Turkish and 
Turkic policy-makers as policy options that could be implemented to increase 
integration among Turkic peoples. Commission reports aside, “final declarations” 
have been regarded as the most serious pieces of work that have come out of the 
Kurultays.  
Türkeş, leader of NAP and chair of TUDEV, told in the opening speech of the 
second Kurultay in 1994 that a Turkic Council and a Turkic Parliamentarians 
Assembly should be established in order to institutionalize the relationship (Çay, 
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1995: 35). Türkeş also argued that Turkey had to act like a bridge in order to help the 
newly-independent brothers to represent themselves in major international 
organizations (Çay, 1995: 34). Such proposals already existed in the first Kurultay of 
1993 alongside other points inviting Turkey and Turkic republics to search for a 
common alphabet, developing human rights and multi-party democracy, protecting 
environment and increasing cooperation in science and technology sharing (Çay, 
2006: 26-27). This indeed became a foreign policy goal of Turkey in the Turkic 
world as mentioned in the third chapter of this study. Furthermore, the proposals of 
these “norm entrepreneurs” were realized in October 2009 in Nakhchevan, 
Azerbaijan and both Turkic Council centered in İstanbul and Turkic Parliamentarians 
Assembly centered in Baku was established.23 Kurultays have also been platforms, 
where prominent Turkish politicians have made courageous and ambitious 
statements about Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world. One such instance was 
Prime Minister Çiller arguing in the second Kurultay in 1994 that the cooperation of 
North American nations in NAFTA and the regional economic integration attempts 
in the Asia-Pacific region such as APEC should have been taken as models for 
Turkic integration (Çay, 1995: 22).  
 Finally, two points emphasized by the participants of the Kurultays are worth 
mentioning concerning the state’s position toward pan-Turkism. Firstly, commission 
reports and final declarations have emphasized that the aim of the Turkic congresses 
is not pan-Turkism or pan-Turanism in the sense that these gatherings will be the 
stepping stones of an aggressive policy toward creating a single Turkic state (Çay, 
2006: 213). Rather than that, great emphasis was put on human rights and 
contributing to justice and world peace. Secondly, although participants denied pan-
                                                 
23 This process as part of the institutionalization of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Turkic world 
will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Turanism they have declared, especially in the congresses of the 1990s, that unifying 
essence of the Kurultays is Turkish/Turkic nationalism (Çay, 2006: 130). Although 
officially Turkey has not pursued a policy of Turkic nationalism, governments of 
various political wings have continued to support the activities and congresses of 
TUDEV.   
 
4.5.3 Kurultays in 2006 and 2007: Erdoğan and Aliyev 
After five years of break for the Kurultays tenth of them summoned in 
Antalya in September 2006, this time without any active support from the NAP and 
under the auspices of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Twelve years after the suggestion of 
Çiller, current Prime Minister Erdoğan, who does not belong to a nationalist and pan-
Turkist political tradition, argued that Turks, in a unified manner, should be actors 
rather than subjects of the emerging world order (Hürriyet, 19 September 2006). 
Hence, he proposed that Turkic states should establish a “Commonwealth of Turkic-
Speaking States”. There may be several explanations as to why Erdoğan made such a 
pan-Turkist-looking statement in the tenth congress. Firstly, he might have wanted to 
utilize the nationalist public opinion for popular support. The second reason might be 
that he really wanted to establish a common future for the Turkic states because it is 
a matter of identity and civilization. He might also have desired for Turkey to act as 
the leader of such a Commonwealth that would automatically make Erdoğan a 
regional leader. Any of the possibilities justify that the idea of “Turkic World” is 
undeniable in Turkish politics. The idea, which tells that Turks and Turkic peoples 
all over the world are brothers and should act together in cultural, economic and 
political terms, has made a former political Islamist Turkish leader cooperate with a 
pan-Turkist NGO and develop a pan-Turkist-like discourse. 
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1500 participants attended the tenth Kurultay including ministers, 
bureaucrats, academics, representatives of NGOs, think-tanks, chambers of trade and 
industry, and media people (Çay, 2006: 265). Final declaration of the tenth Turkic 
Kurultay, which summoned in Antalya in September 2006, was presented by former 
Minister of State and current Minister of Interior Beşir Atalay. The final declaration 
included 35 points such as immediate establishment of a Union of Turkic-speaking 
States, condemnation of political and economic isolation toward the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, call for Armenia to withdraw its armed forces from 
Azerbaijan and warning the international community and Iraqi authorities to stop 
illegal destruction of the demographic structure of Kirkuk at the expanse of Iraqi 
Turks (Çay, 2006: 265-270).   
 The eleventh Kurultay summoned a year later on 17-19 November 2007 for 
the first time outside Turkey, in Baku, Azerbaijan under the auspices of the 
Azerbaijani President Aliyev. TIKA’s and TUDEV’s involvement in the 
organization of the Kurultay continued, but this time with strong contribution from 
the Azerbaijani bureaucracy. Consistent with the tradition, Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Talat, were also 
present in the Kurultay. It was now Azerbaijan, a second Turkic state, which tried to 
utilize transnational Turkic identity and support Turkic activism in order to promote 
its national interests and especially find support from Turkic NGOs, media organs 
and public opinions in its struggle against the Armenian invasion of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Speaking in front of the Grey Wolf figure as the symbol of the Kurultays 
and a banner on which “unity in language, thought and action” of Gasprinsky was 
written, President Aliyev touched upon various fields of cooperation among Turkic 
states and communities such as energy transportation routes, economic development, 
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investment and multilateral trade opportunities and said that common history, 
culture, language and ethnic ties are what unite Turkic peoples (quoted in Qurbanov 
and Miralem: 9-12).  
What was the most important in Aliyev’s speech for the purpose of this study 
was his words on the role of non-governmental bodies in developing strong bonds in 
the Turkic world. Aliyev said that close ties among non-state actors, Turkic 
intellectuals and scholars further strengthened Turkic unity and that he looked at the 
Kurultay from such a perspective (quoted in Qurbanov and Miralem: 11). 1150 
participants from all over the Turkic world attended the eleventh pan-Turkic 
congress in Baku and Turkmens of Iraq, Turks of Western Thrace, Uighurs of 
Eastern Turkestan and Tatars of  Russia all had chance to raise their views as was the 
case in the former Kurultays summoned in Turkey. Final Declaration of the Baku 
Kurultay suggested forty policy initiatives such as the rapid establishment of a Union 
of Turkic-speaking States and Union of Turkic Parliamentarians, cooperation among 
Turkic states in Azerbaijan’s struggle against Armenian invasion, establishment of 
economic, cultural and political ties with the TRNC, support for Turkic diasporas 
that are actively organized in Europe and helping Turks and Turkic peoples, which 
live as minorities to acquire political and cultural rights.  
 
4.5.4 Turkic Kurultays and the Idea of “Turkic World” 
Consequently, The Kurultays have been symbolically important as they were 
quite prestigious in the eyes of Turkish politicians. Moreover, they have contributed 
to the consolidation of the idea of “Turkic World” in the public opinion, media and 
Turkish politics in general. Although they were organized by an NGO, Kurultays 
acquired “semi-official status” in Hale’s words (Hale: 2000, 292). Either Prime 
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Ministers or Ministers of Interior and Foreign Affairs, regardless of their political 
parties, attended all the Kurultays and state sponsorship through TIKA has remained 
constant. As the content of the speeches of Özal, Demirel, İnönü, Çiller and Erdoğan 
indicate the idea of “Turkic World” is well-established in the discourse of key 
Turkish politicians. It was the strength of the idea of “Turkic World” that made these 
leaders, who come from different but definitely not pan-Turkist backgrounds, make 
bold statements about the future of the Turkic world and that pushed them towards 
cooperation with intellectuals and activists advocating the Turkic cause. It is, 
however, still debatable whether these leaders have really internalized the idea of 
“Turkic World”, which indicates whether the idea has transformed into a norm. 
Attention paid by the national media contributed to the excitement of the 
public and Kurultays became important symbols through which Turkish citizens 
learned about Turkic-speaking peoples. Abdülhalûk Çay, became the chair of 
TUDEV and acted as the organizer of the Kurultays after Türkeş died in 1997. In the 
general elections of 1999 he was elected as a member of parliament from NAP and 
held the position of Minister of State responsible for coordination between Turkey 
and Turkic states and relative communities. Most importantly for the purpose of this 
study, Turkish governments have given priority to the views, suggestions and 
demands of the participants of the Kurultays and have implemented many of the 
points made in the final declarations of those congresses as Turkish policy toward 
both independent Turkic republics and Turkish/Turkic minorities. Opening of a new 
TRT Channel, TRT Avrasya and later on TRT Türk that could easily broadcast in the 
Balkans, Azerbaijan and Central Asia, the establishment of Turkic Council to act as a 
secretariat for the coordination of Turkic Summits, Turkic Parliamentarians 
Assembly (Turk-Pa) to foster intra-parliamentary cooperation among Turkic states 
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and Turkic Academy to conduct research on common Turkic history, cultures and 
languages were the most important implementations of Kurultay decisions. But it 
should also be noted that many of the demands made by participants of these 
congresses in commission reports and final declarations have not been realized. 
Creation of a Turkic customs union and establishing visa-free regimes among the six 
independent Turkic states have been such goals which require strong political will 
and commitment to be realized in the future.  
In this sense, Turkic advocacy networks that support Turkic rapprochement 
have played the role of “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891) as 
they were supposed to be “epistemic communities” (Haas, 1992) and hence carried 
the transnational idea of “Turkic World” into Turkish foreign policy agenda. It is no 
secret that Turkish political elite and foreign policy bureaucracy had very little if no 
knowledge about Turkic-speaking peoples of the former Soviet Union in 1991. 
Similarly, Turkish political scientists and IR scholars did not have a “Eurasian” or 
“Turkic” concept and very few of them knew Russian or any Turkic dialects when 
the Cold War ended. In such an atmosphere, Turkic Kurultays as well as many other 
congresses and meetings among Turkic peoples have reduced uncertainty for Turkish 
decision-makers as suggested by Haas (1992: 3-4). Acting like an epistemic 
community pan-Turkist activists and intellectuals, who have used non-governmental 
platforms such as the Kurultays have brought together hundreds of people – 
politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, artists, students – from the Turkic world and 
introduced them to Turkish decision-makers, diplomats, media and public opinion.  
Hence was the idea of “Turkic World” so widely accepted by different 
segments of the Turkish elite. In other words the efforts of Turkish/Turkic nationalist 
politicians, academics and intellectuals led to the “norm emergence” (Finnemore & 
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Sikkink, 1998: 891) stage in Turkish foreign policy. In response to such an effort, 
Turkish presidents, governments and diplomats have regarded Turkic activism as a 
means to carry Turkey into the Turkic world and vice versa. Moreover, pan-Turkists 
in Turkey and the rapidity with which they established transnational networks in the 
Turkic world have been perceived by Turkish decision-makers as a contribution to 
Turkey’s efforts of opening up to the newly independent Turkic republics of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Eleven Turkic Kurultays and similar pan-Turkist 
congresses have also triggered the establishment of networks throughout the Turkic 
world, which were connected to each other in ideational terms – as they all advocated 
the idea of “Turkic World” – and which could communicate easily thanks to 
technological developments. Although the last Kurultay summoned in Baku, the fact 
that the first ten congresses were organized in Turkey made it a familiar country for 
NGOs operating in the Balkans, Azerbaijan, Russia and Central Asia. Finally, that 
the last congress was organized in Baku under the auspices of Aliyev indicates that 
the transnational idea of “Turkic World” is also getting stronger in countries other 
than Turkey.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the entrance of the Turkic-speaking peoples – 
both independent states and non-independent peoples – into Turkish foreign policy in 
the early years of the post-Cold War era as well as the efforts to sustain a policy 
framework during the 1990s. As the end of the Cold War opened windows of 
opportunity for Turkish decision-makers, a new active foreign policy framework was 
developed that reshaped Turkey’s position in its neighborhood. Within this active 
foreign policy framework, special attention was paid for the emergence of Turkic 
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world as the definition of Turkish identity was enlarged and traditional feeling of 
Turkish loneliness was replaced by a new world of “brothers”. This activeness 
towards the Turkic world owed much to the efforts of non-governmental 
organizations and individuals – mainly pan-Turkist figures – to bring the idea of 
“Turkic World” into Turkish politics. Perception of Turkish intellectuals and 
decision-makers regarding Turkish identity was also going through transformation as 
the Cold War was ending. Now, Turkishness was being connected to the wider 
Turkic world just like it was the case during the latest period of the Ottoman Empire. 
Hence, “society world” had a significant say in the re-definition of Turkish national 
interests as the issue was strongly related to identity.  
Ideational factors were cooperating with geopolitical ones as Turkey was 
developing an active foreign policy framework toward Turkic-speaking peoples as a 
whole.  Otherwise, geopolitical factors are not sufficient to explain such an active 
foreign policy move of Turkey towards the Caucasus and Central Asia. Accordingly, 
Turkey followed various policy moves such as offering political, administrative and 
technical aid to the newly-independent countries, establishing a new organization – 
TIKA – to coordinate the aids, starting an unprecedented student exchange project 
and bringing Turkic leaders together in annual summits. In all those policy areas 
Turkicness has been embedded as an identity and Turkish decision-makers have kept 
in mind that Turkey is a part of the entire “Turkic World”. The framework developed 
for Turkey’s relations with Turkic states, which was highly influenced by the 
transnational idea of “Turkic World”, have remained more or less the same in the 
2000s, when strong steps have been taken concerning the institutionalization of 
Turkish foreign policy. The next chapter will focus on this process and patterns of 
institutionalization.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
TURKIC WORLD IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: PATTERNS OF 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
 
 
 
5.1 Disappointment in Relations 
The excitement of Turkey’s rapprochement with the Turkic world and the 
foreign policy framework developed accordingly left itself to a more rational and 
pragmatic one as of the late 1990s. This process went hand in hand with the 
assumption that Turkish foreign policy goals toward the Caucasus and Central Asia 
had been unsuccessful and hence had to be reformed. As of the late 1990s Turkish 
decision-makers were aware that it was very difficult to establish a “Union of Turkic 
States” stretching from the “Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” and creating a Turkic 
customs union. According to some authors (Erol, 2007: 44-45, Karasar, 2007: 160, 
Torbakov, 2005: 119-120, Tworkowski, 2008: 44, Winrow, 2003: 100-101), who 
study Turkey’s relations with the post-Soviet space, several domestic and 
international reasons were explanatory for such a policy change. Firstly, Turkey’s 
struggle against PKK terrorism and Kurdish question was a major factor, which 
diverted Turkey’s regional focus to a more security-oriented foreign policy approach 
109 
 
that focused more on territorial integrity. Secondly, Turkey’s economic crises in the 
mid-1990s and 2001, combined with huge amounts of financial resources devoted to 
counter-terrorism made Turkey’s attempts to create a common Turkic market and 
Turkish investment plans in the Turkic states impossible to be realized.  
Thirdly, although Turkish politicians and public opinion were eager to 
develop ties with Turkic peoples and Turkish bureaucracy was reorganized to 
incorporate the Caucasus and Central Asia, there was a certain lack of knowledge 
and expertise regarding the Turkic world. Winrow (2002: 159) quotes Andican, 
former government spokesperson, complaining about the attitude of Turkish officials 
towards Central Asia saying that they could not comprehend the level of higher 
education and scientific expertise reached by Turkic republics during the Soviet 
period. As the initial excitement could not be supported by regional expertise, 
Turkish diplomats, politicians and public opinion lost their belief in a common 
Turkic future by the late 1990s. This was evident from the loss of attention paid by 
national media to the Turkic Kurultays and Presidential Summits. Çay (2010) depicts 
the situation as follows: “We used to think it was a love like Leyla and Mecnun. 
Within a few years after independence, it was understood that neither Leyla was so 
beautiful, nor Mecnun was so courageous to meet Leyla.”  
Fourthly, by the late 1990s Turkey focused more on EU integration, Cyprus 
problem and disputes with Syria as traditional issues of Turkish foreign policy rather 
than building a Turkic economic and political union. Fifthly, as an international 
factor, Russia’s turn-back to the Caucasus and Central Asia revitalizing its “Near 
Abroad” doctrine hampered Turkey’s initial search for a regional leadership. As a 
sixth factor, “Turkish Model” did not become too much an attractive option for the 
authoritarian Turkic leaders as they “did not have much interest in fostering broader 
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political participation and pluralism” (Torbakov, 2005: 119). Moreover, newly-
independent Turkic leaders hesitated from accepting a new “big brother”, which was 
supposed to be Turkey, although Turkey did not have sufficient financial and 
political leverage to carry on such a hegemonic role (Winrow, 2003: 101). Finally, 
several years after independence, Turkic leaders of Azerbaijan and Central Asia no 
more depended on Turkish assistance, to open up their markets and energy resources 
for foreign powers. Hence Western as well as Chinese and Indian economic and 
political activity in the region increased, making Turkish geopolitical influence 
smaller.  
 Turkey’s relations with the Turkic republics went through a serious test in 
balancing democratic development in the Turkic republics and keeping stable and 
well-governed state structures. According to Andican (2010), “autocratic nature” of 
Turkic leaders prevented Turkey to establish in-depth relations – especially non-
governmental ties – with the peoples of Turkic republics. Turkey hesitated to support 
Turkist Elchibey of Azerbaijan, who adhered to a democratic model of governance, 
and supported Aliyev in order not to sacrifice Turkey’s relations with its closest ally 
(see Ergun, 2007: 246-252 for a detailed analysis). Tensions with Uzbek leader 
Karimov was even a more critical test for Turkish foreign policy. As of 1996 
Karimov started to warn Turkey and the Welfare Party not to establish ties with 
Uzbek radical Islamists (Yanık, 2004: 295). Moreover, Uzbek opposition leader 
Muhammad Salih’s presence in Turkey and the warm-welcome towards him from 
nationalist circles further increased the anger of Karimov. Following rumors that 
Uzbek students in Turkey, who had the Turkish government scholarship, were 
controlled by Salih, Karimov withdrew a total of 1298 students in 1997 and another 
243 students by 1999 (Yanık, 2004: 296). As Yanık (2004: 296) quotes then-Prime 
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Minister Ecevit, Turkish-Uzbek relations were hardly damaged due to “unnecessarily 
created distrust”. Karimov’s authoritarian rule in Uzbekistan not only damaged its 
relations with Turkey but also closed the windows for non-state actors to interact 
transnationally.  
 
5.2 Revision in Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World: 
Pragmatism or Continuity? 
 
Turkey experienced a slow-down in relations as Turkish politicians and 
decision-makers realized fact that neither Turkey was strong to acquire a regional 
leadership status in such a short period of time, nor the Turkic states of the former 
Soviet Union were so eager to build relations based on a common identity. 
Nevertheless, the relationships have been sustained and followed patterns of 
institutionalization – internalization and socialization – concerning Turkish foreign 
policy behavior. The explanatory factor for the insistence of Turkish decision-makers 
to establish a coherent policy toward Turkic republics despite mutual 
disappointments is the idea of “Turkic World”, which made Turkey’s relation with 
the Turkic states one of top issue-areas in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, 
during the Foreign Ministry of İsmail Cem – between June 1997 and July 2002, who 
was a well-known social democrat, Turkish foreign policy toward Turkic republics 
was perceived as a source of Turkish soft power in Eurasia that could contribute to 
Turkey’s bargaining power in EU accession process (Cem, 2005: 99-100, 113). 
However, Cem (2005: 240) also recognized that Turkey had an “Asian” identity and 
had brother nations in the East with for which Turkey had a responsibility to assist 
economic transition and state-building. Hence his perception of the Caucasus and 
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Central Asia was not only shaped by a geopolitical vision, but carried a normative 
aspect.  
According to Winrow (2003: 107) the emergence of the Caspian basin as a 
potential source for influencing Turkey’s geopolitical significance has given Turkish 
foreign policy toward Turkic states a new dimension. Similarly Aydın (2004: 10) 
argues that it was “actual economic, political and strategic gains expected from the 
transportation of Caspian energy resources” that led to an evolution of Turkish 
foreign policy toward the former Soviet space in more pragmatic terms. Hence, 
construction of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and possible involvement of 
Kazakhstan to the project became an important aspect of relations. Energy diplomacy 
among Turkic peoples caused such a euphoria that Turkish president Demirel and 
Azerbaijani President Aliyev would call the BTC “the project of the century”, which 
facilitated closer ties among brothers (Demirel, 2005: 20). Turkey’s focus on getting 
involved in pipeline diplomacy – such as the ongoing Nabucco Project – in order to 
become an energy hub connecting the Caspian Basin with Western markets might be 
evaluated as a turn to pragmatism as Turkey no more relied on ideational factors 
related to common ethnicity.  
However, the idea of “Turkic World” has remained in Turkish foreign policy 
toward the Turkic world and also continued to influence it. Accordingly, there have 
been strong indicators of continuity, in other words internalization in Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Turkic world. As stated in the official website of the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey has followed several goals towards Central Asia, 
which was comprised of “brother” countries. These goals are; “to contribute to the 
consolidation of their state structuring, to preserve political and economic stability 
and promote regional cooperation, to encourage political and economic reforms, to 
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assist their integration with the international community and Euro-Atlantic 
structures, to develop bilateral relations in all fields on the basis of equality, mutual 
interest and respect for sovereignty, to support the transportation of their energy 
resources to international markets freely and through alternative routes”. As it was 
mentioned before in this study, the first, third and fourth official goal has been a 
responsibility for Turkey, who has wanted to assist brother nations administratively, 
economically and politically. One result in international platforms has been the rapid 
strengthening of Kazakhstan and finally its success in holding the chairmanship of 
OSCE for the 2010 term. Although almost two decades have passed since Central 
Asian republics gained their independence, this official responsibility felt by Turkish 
diplomats and decision-makers has remained constant. Finally, the fifth official goal 
might be interpreted in such a way that Turkey hesitates to look like a “big brother” 
in Central Asia. Otherwise, it is natural and not required to mention at all that 
relations are based on equality, mutual interest and sovereignty, which is the case for 
relations with all countries. A similar note appears for Turkey’s relations with the 
Balkan countries, “with which Turkey has historic, cultural and humanitarian ties”. 
Finally, there is a similar note for Turkey’s political relations with Russia, which 
arises from mutual understanding in fight against terrorism and ethnic separatism.  
 
5.2.1 Turkic Summits: a Transgovernmental Platform 
Turkic-speaking States Heads of States Summits, or “Turkic Summits” have 
been an important component of Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world. This is 
primarily because authoritarian and non-democratic structures of Turkic leaders have 
inevitably made inter-personal contact between Turkish Presidents and their 
counterparts undeniably significant. All six Turkic leaders attended the five summits; 
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first in 1992 in Ankara, second in İstanbul in 1994, third in Bishkek in 1995, fourth 
in Tashkent in 1996, fifth in Astana in 1998. Turkmen leader Niyazov did not attend 
the sixth summit in Baku in 2000 and the eighth summit in Antalya in 2006, whereas 
Uzbek leader Karimov has not attended the summits since the sixth one in 
Azerbaijan. New Turkmen president Berdymukhammedov followed his predecessor 
and did not attend the ninth summit in Nakhchivan in 2009. Despite the failure of the 
summits to realize concrete goals throughout the 1990s and hesitance of Turkic 
leaders to trust Turkic bonds as a means of increasing multilateral cooperation, 
summits have paved the way for institutionalizing Turkish foreign policy toward the 
Turkic world.  
The final summit, which was held in Nakhchivan in October 2009, was of 
crucial importance due to the steps taken by Aliyev of Azerbaijan, Gül of Turkey, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Kurmanbekbakiyev of Kyrgyzstan. The 
first result that came out of the Summit was the establishment of the Turkic-speaking 
Countries Cooperation Council, “Turkic Council” in short – based in İstanbul – 
which would act as a secretariat of Turkic Summits (Kanbolat, 2009). Hence, 
summits bureaucratized in a transgovernmental manner to incorporate Turkic 
diplomats and bureaucrats to discuss their views on critical matters in Eurasia such as 
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, transportation of Caspian energy resources, 
cooperation in trade and fight against terrorism. Besides permanent secretariat, 
Turkic Council also includes Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Council of 
Senior Officials and Aksakallar Konseyi, Council of Wise Men (Kanbolat, 2009).  
Secondly, Turkic Parliamentarians Assembly based in Baku, which was 
established in November 2008 with an agreement signed between the Heads of 
Parliaments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, was made a sub-unit 
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of the Turkic Council. Turkic Parliamentarians Assembly, Turk-Pa in short, 
constitutes an international platform bringing together Turkic parliamentarians 
periodically. Third result of the Nakhchivan summit was the decision to establish a 
“Turkic Academy” in Kazakhstan, which is planned to bring together Turkic 
academics by organizing congresses and publishing books and journals on common 
Turkic identity. Turkic Academy was opened in May 2010 by Nazarbayev and Gül, 
during the official visit paid by the latter to Kazakhstan.  
According to Kanbolat (2009), who thinks that the 9th Turkic Summit was a 
“turning point” for the future of the Turkic world, the aim of the Nakhchivan 
Agreement signed between four Turkic leaders was to “establish an institutional 
structure similar to the cooperation achieved in the Arab League, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), the International Organization of the Francophonie 
(OIF), the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe and among Latin 
American countries”. Concerning transnationalism the institutionalizing pattern of 
the Turkic Summits are significant since internationalization leads to fewer 
regulations between states and closer ties among citizens of the states, which are part 
of the process. According to Risse-Kappen (1995: 7):  
The more the respective issue-area is regulated by international norms of 
cooperation, the more permeable should state boundaries become for 
transnational activities. Highly regulated and cooperative structures of 
international governance tend to legitimize transnational activities and to 
increase their access to the national polities as well as their ability to form 
“willing coalitions” for policy change.  
 
 If Risse-Kappen’s (1995: 29) argument comes true, the establishment of 
transgovernmental and international institutions that coordinate cooperation among 
independent Turkic states, then one can foresee that the policy impact of 
transnational actors that advocate a common Turkic future will increase. This 
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institutionalizing pattern may also contribute to further transnationalization of social 
movements and advocacy networks of the Turkic world as such transnationalization 
becomes more and more expected by Turkish and Turkic governments. That NGOs 
interested in Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world have been invited to a meeting 
in the Çankaya Palace in order to be informed about the Turkic Council is a clear 
indicator of this further transnationalization. As Güngör (2009), a Turkish activist of 
the rights of Turks living in the Netherlands, mentions a significant role is predicted 
for NGOs that are accepted to be the “third sector” of world politics to handle the 
mission of the Turkic Council.  
Steps taken as a result of the 9th Turkic Summit were important also because 
it was the Kazakh leader Nazarbayev who proposed the establishment of a Turkic 
Council in the 8th Summit in Antalya as well as the 9th Summit in Nakhchivan (see 
TGNA Website on Turk-Pa). In the 11th Turkic Kurultay held in Baku in 2007, 
Erdoğan followed the proposal made by Nazarbayev a year ago, and said that Turkic 
Summits should have been institutionalized to foster ties among Turkic peoples 
(Qurbanov and Miralem, 2008: 18). Consequently, Turkic-speaking Countries Heads 
of States Summits have constituted a basis for the institutionalization of the idea of 
“Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy. Although they were not as effective and 
fruitful as it was supposed in the first Summit held in Ankara in 1992, they have 
established platforms for Turkic leaders to come together periodically. Efforts made 
by the Turkish decision-makers to take steps for establishing an institutional 
framework for Turkic Summits, Turk-Pa as well as forming transgovernmental 
bodies to bring Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior diplomats together is a clear 
indicator of the significance paid to the Turkic world by the Turkish state despite 
dissapointments. Such a step is also a strong part of the socialization and 
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internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998 and Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 1999) 
of the idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy on its process of becoming a 
norm.  
 
5.2.2 TIKA: Turkey’s Soft Power 
As analyzed before in this study (see Chp. 4: 57) TIKA’s establishment, as a 
new pattern in Turkish foreign policy behavior, was a clear indicator of the 
importance paid by Turkey to the Turkic world. Referring to aid directed by 
developed nations to the developing world during the Cold War, Fidan and Nurdun 
(2008:95), as a former and a current top-level administrators of TIKA, mention that 
humanitarian aid may also aim to benefit donor countries politically, economically 
and strategically in the long run. A similar situation may be claimed to exist for 
TIKA as it has acted as the primary actor of Turkish “Soft Power” in Turkey’s 
neighborhood including the Balkans, the Caucasus, Black Sea basin, Central Asia 
and the Middle East. The emergence of newly-independent states in the former 
space, five of which are of Turkic origin, and “cultural ties” with those Turkic 
republics have been the major motive behind Turkey to develop a comprehensive 
foreign aid policy (Fidan and Nurdun: 2008, 102). Enhancement of such a policy by 
revising TIKA to become a powerful regional donor institution is a continuation of 
the “responsibility” (Bal, 2000: 44) felt by Turkish decision-makers to assist brother 
countries.  
According to Karasar (2007: 153), TIKA’s ambitious and exciting initial 
efforts almost came to a halt by the end of the 1990s as the institution was left open 
to problems stemming from domestic political problems of Turkey. Since 1999, 
when the agency was reorganized as a relatively strong institution under the Prime 
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Ministry, TIKA has been a very important actor of the evolving Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia as three regions with the 
biggest bulk of Turkic-speaking peoples.  The symbolic significance and budget of 
TIKA have been increasing since the first JDP government took the seat in 2002. 
According to a report of the Agency, the total number of projects and activities 
realized by TIKA between 1992 and 2002 was 2345 whereas the number between 
2003 and 2006 rose up to 2792 (TIKA, 2006: 19).  
As former Minister of State Yazıcıoğlu mentions in the TIKA Annual Report 
2007 (foreword), the Agency has become an important instrument of Turkish foreign 
policy as well as a respected development institution of the international community. 
Parallel to the Strategic Depth doctrine of the JDP, the geographic scope of TIKA 
has increased in the last decade as the institution has opened up offices in the Middle 
East and Africa. However majority of its projects and aid have continued to focus on 
the Turkic world. In 2007 the Caucasus and Central Asia –including Afghanistan- 
have received the greatest share of expenditure for projects and programs with 57 % 
(TIKA, 2007: 13). Similarly, according to the Annual Report of the Agency (TIKA, 
2008: 10)  prepared for activities in 2008, South – refers to Afghanistan – and 
Central Asia maintained its priority receiving almost 54 % of the total amount of 
Official Development Assistance given through TIKA. The agency also offers 
humanitarian and technical aid for the Crieman Tatars and who live as a minority in 
the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine in order to trigger their integration into the main 
bulk of the society as well as maintaining their ethnic well-being (TIKA, 2008: 79-
80). The amount of projects completed by TIKA in Central Asian countries are worth 
$ 100 million (MFA website).  
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What should also finally be mentioned as an important contribution of TIKA 
to Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world from a point of view of transnationalism 
is that the Agency has been directing a “Turcology Project” to bring together 
academics of Turkic history and languages since 2000 and has been supporting the 
activities of NGOs such as the Turkic World Research Foundation, Turkish Hearths, 
World League of Turkic Youth and Turkish Cultural Centers in Eurasia. The Agency 
has devoted special focus on strengthening non-governmental organizations and 
cooperation of governments with NGOs in the countries, where it has offices. TIKA 
has also sponsored the activities of Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birlidği (Turkic World 
Union of Municipalities) which is an umbrella organization that aims to foster 
cooperation among local administration of Turkic countries and regions (TIKA, 
2008b: 14).  
Consequently, TIKA, with its focus on development aid and support for non-
governmental actors, has become a major actor of Turkish “Soft Power” in Turkey’s 
neighborhood and this indicates the evolving though continuing importance of the 
place of the Turkic world in Turkish foreign policy. Through its projects in various 
fields, TIKA, as a governmental body, has acted as a facilitator for closer contacts 
among the bureaucrats, academics and intellectuals of the Turkic world. Its 
strengthening role in Turkish foreign policy has proved that Turkey’s relations with 
the Turkic-speaking peoples have much more to do with than energy security and 
economic cooperation. In this sense it has led to the consolidation of the 
transnational idea of “Turkic World”.   
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5.3 Patterns of Norm Creation: Government and Party Programs, 
Ministers of State and Official Visits 
 
5.3.1 Turkic Republics in Government Programs 
Another indicator that the idea of “Turkic World” is on the process of 
internalization as a norm in Turkish foreign policy is the emphasis given to relations 
with Turkic states of Eurasia in government programs. In each program of a newly 
elected Turkish government, foreign policy constitutes an important component. As 
in other sub-topics of the program such as domestic security, economic development, 
fight against unemployment and matters related to social security, most important 
foreign policy concerns are listed. In “foreign policy” as a chapter of government 
programs, Turkey’s relations with the EC and then the EU, Turkey’s crucial role in 
NATO, Turkish-Greek problems and Cyprus issue have always appeared as natural 
topics of Turkish foreign policy and political life (see TGNA website for 
“Governments of Republic of Turkey” for detailed information).  
While there was no reference to relations with the Turkic world in the 
program of the 48th government of Mesut Yılmaz24, the term “Central Asia” was first 
used in the 49th government25 program, which was declared by Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel. However, the term was used to describe Turkey’s role as a bridge 
to carry European values and norms to its neighborhood. The First Çiller, or the 50th 
Turkish government26, was clearer in terms of defining Central Asia and the 
Caucasus as the program argued that Turkey had “linguistic, religious and cultural 
ties” with those regions and hence cooperation should have been increased. The 50th 
program also stressed upon the determination of the government to support “brother 
Azerbaijan” against Armenia, with which Azerbaijan had an ongoing war over 
                                                 
24 23 June 1991 – 20 November 1991. 
25 20 November 1991 – 25 June 1993.  
26 25 June 1993 – 5 October 1995.  
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Nagorno-Karabakh. The 51st government27 program, which was again declared by 
Çiller, listed relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which Turkey had 
“brothers”, among only five foreign policy priorities and two paragraphs were 
devoted to it. Interestingly enough, program of the 52nd government28, or the third 
Çiller government, included no references to Central Asia or the Caucasus in the 
foreign policy section.  
Program of the 53th government29 of Yılmaz included similar sentences 
related to Central Asia and Azerbaijan while it also emphasized need to increase 
social, cultural and educational ties with Turkic states and communities. Program of 
the 54th, or Erbakan government30, in which the Islamist Welfare Party was the 
leading partner, had three paragraphs on relations with the “Turkic Republics” and 
listed relations with those countries as important as relations with Europe, the 
Balkans and Muslim countries. Program of the 55th Government31 of Mesut Yılmaz 
had a similar approach as well. Fourth Ecevit, or the 56th government32 was the first 
to touch upon “Turkic and relative communities that live in different countries”.  
Program of the 57th government of Ecevit33, in which pan-Turkist NAP was a 
government partner besides the Homeland Party, also included a paragraph related to 
proposed efforts to foster cooperation with Turkic republics. For the purpose of this 
study, Erbakan’s and Ecevit’s government programs were especially important 
because both leaders came from two distinct political traditions – political Islam and 
democratic left – which both dismissed pan-Turkism. The fact that relations with 
Turkic states has been accepted as a foreign policy priority for all Turkish leaders 
                                                 
27 5 October 1995 – 30 October 1995.  
28 30 October 1995 – 6 March 1996 
29 6 March 1996 – 28 June 1996.  
30 28 June 1996 – 30 June 1997. 
31 30 June 1997 – 11 January 1999.  
32 11 January 1999 – 28 May 1999.  
33 28 May 1999 – 18 November 2002.  
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including an Islamist and a Leftist one is a clear manifestation of the process of norm 
creation in Turkish foreign policy. 
Period of JDP governments started in Turkey with the 58th government of 
Abdullah Gül in November 2002. In the program of the 58th government34, Prime 
Minister Gül said that it was a fact that Turkey could not realize what had been 
expected of it in its relations with Turkic republics and that the new government 
would carry relations between Turkey and the Turkic Republics of Central Asia to 
the “farthest point”. Moreover, Gül’s program proposed to “transform the region into 
a region of cooperation”. Similar to Gül, program of the first Erdoğan or the 59th 
government35, the same paragraph as in Gül’s program existed. Finally, in the 60th 
government program, which is the current second Erdoğan government, Central Asia 
was listed as one of the regions alongside the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle 
East, and Caspian, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Basra basin  as regions of Turkish 
foreign policy interests. Moreover, the program emphasized former and current 
development aid given to Turkic states and Turkic communities. 
Consequently, although the term Türk Dünyası (Turkic World) has never 
been used in government programs, brotherhood with Central Asian republics and 
Azerbaijan – sometimes brother republics, Turkic republics and Turkic and relative 
communities – has been emphasized and determination for stronger cooperation has 
been stressed. The 52nd government program has been an exception for this 
institutionalized and internalized pattern related to foreign policy.    
 
 
 
                                                 
34 18 November 2002 – 14 March 2003 
35 14 March 2003 – 29 August 2007 
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 5.3.2 Ministers of State 
 It is quite significant as a foreign policy behavior for Turkey that most of the 
above-mentioned governments have included a Minister of State responsible for the 
coordination of Turkey’s relations with Turkic states and communities. No such 
position has been devoted for another region or group of countries and identities, 
including the Refahyol government that was dominated by the Islamist Welfare 
Party. Although the Ministry has occupied a symbolic importance for Turkey’s 
relations with the Turkic republics and it did not have personnel of its own to 
organize as a full-fledged ministry, it has conducted important missions such as 
coordinating TIKA, and fostering cooperation among NGOs in Turkey related to 
Balkans, the Crimea, Iraqi Turkmen, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Ministry 
also supported transnational and transgovernmental – among bureaucratic bodies of 
Turkey and Turkic states – conferences and congresses on increasing cooperation 
among Turkic peoples in fields such as economic transition, information 
technologies and alphabet union. Since TIKA’s re-organization as an Agency, its 
President has been responsible for reporting to the related Minister of State. The 
Ministry was symbolically very important for Turkish domestic politics in the 55th 
government as Minister of State responsible for coordination between Turkey and the 
Turkic world, Ahat Andican, was also the government spokesperson, and hence was 
quite popular and well-known in Turkish media and public opinion. In the current 
60th government, Minister of State responsible for this task is Faruk Çelik, who took 
over this mission from Sait Yazıcıoğlu in May 2009.   
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 5.3.3 Official Visits  
 Official visits of Turkish leaders to Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics 
upon invitation from Turkic leaders have been a ceremonious event. Consistent with 
the “brotherhood” discourse internalized by Turkish politicians concerning Turkic-
speaking peoples, current Turkish Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs have tended either to pay their first official visits to Turkic capitals, 
or include Turkic capitals among the first to be visited. Despite his hesitance in 
fostering inter-personal relations with Turkic leaders unlike his predecessor Demirel, 
Turkey’s 10th President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid his first official visits to TRNC in 
June 2000, Azerbaijan in July 2000 and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan respectively in a four-day trip to Central Asia in November 2000. 
Similar to his predecessor Sezer, 11th President Gül went first to TRNC in September 
2007. Three of his next five official visits were paid to Turkic capitals; Azerbaijan in 
November 2007, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in December 2007, and the 
US in January 2008. That the former and current Turkish Presidents have chosen to 
visit TRNC first and Azerbaijan second indicates the importance of Turkic ethnicity 
in Turkish foreign policy, which is a pattern for norm internalization process.  
 Prime Ministers have also chosen TRNC and Turkic capitals as their first 
destinations to fly. However, as foreign policy agendas of Prime Ministers as chief 
executers in the Turkish political system may vary according to the conjuncture, their 
official visit schedules for Turkic states are not as clear as those of the Presidents. 
One instance is former Prime Minister Yılmaz, who visited Azerbaijan in April 1996 
just a month after he took his seat. In his third term as Prime Minister, Yılmaz visited 
Kazakhstan as his first foreign destination in November 1997 with a large group of 
businessmen to sign important agreements.  One should note here that Prime 
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Minister Erdoğan paid his first three official visits to TRNC in May 2003, Malaysia 
and Pakistan in June in 2003; he had already visited Azerbaijan and all the Turkic 
capitals of Central Asia in January 2003 before anywhere else, while he was the 
leader of JDP during Gül’s Prime Ministry, but not a member of parliament since his 
political ban was continuing. Similar to Erdoğan, current Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Davutoğlu paid his first official visits to TRNC and Azerbaijan in May 2009 right 
after he was appointed.  
 
 5.3.4 Party Programs 
Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world has also been included in the 
programs of major political parties such as the ruling JDP, main opposition party 
RPP, nationalist NAP, Kurdish PDP and center-right DP within their foreign policy 
sections. Similar to the most recent three government programs the ruling JDP argues 
that it will transform Central Asia into a region of cooperation and will also foster 
ties between Turkey and Turkic republics, which are not in the expected level (see 
AK Party Official Website). Major opposition party RPP, despite its more Western-
oriented Kemalist vision of foreign policy devotes a considerable space to Turkey’s 
relations with “Turkic republics” as well as “consanguineous” citizens of different 
countries such as Turks of Western Thrace and the remaining Balkans (Republican 
People’s Party, 2008: 129-131). In addition to such an emphasis on Turkic peoples, 
RPP (2008: 134) officials regard Turkey’s relations with the “Turkic republics” as a 
key element of establishing a “distinctive character” in foreign policy alongside 
relations with the Balkans, Muslim countries, the Caucasus, Cyprus, the UN and 
OSCE. As the first and foremost pan-Turkist political party in Turkey, NAP’s 
program includes the biggest emphasis on relations with Turkic-speaking peoples. 
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Under a sub-chapter of foreign policy titled “Turkic World”, NAP (2009: 126-127) 
offers priority and privilege for Turkey’s relations with Turkic states and 
communities. In addition, NAP’s program (2009: 77, 81) proposes priority given to 
Turkic states in fields such as mining, energy security and technological and 
scientific cooperation. NAP also has a vice-chair, former Ambassador Deniz 
Bölükbaşı, who is responsible for relations with the Turkic world. Finally, as the 
fourth party, which has a parliamentary group in the TGNA, Kurdish Peace and 
Democracy Party’s program (see PDP Official Website) also includes Central Asia 
as one of the regions, which Turkey is a part of. Consequently, programs of the 
major political parties in Turkey all agree that Turkey’s relations with the Turkic 
world should be enhanced, which is another indicator of the ongoing process of 
“norm creation” in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
5.4 Test Cases in Norm Creation: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in Turkish 
Foreign Policy 
 
 
5.4.1 Turkey and Kazakhstan: Strategic Partners in Eurasia 
 
Central Asia is not supposed to be a foreign policy priority for the ruling JDP, 
according to various scholars (Aydın, 2004, Murinson 2006, Öniş and Yılmaz, 
2009). For instance Aydın (2004: 17) argued that JDP’s foreign policy priorities 
“raised doubts about Turkey’s commitment towards the region. Similarly, Murinson 
(2006), Öniş and Yılmaz (2009) and Keyman (2009) did not list “Central Asia” or 
“Turkic states” among countries or regions of importance for Turkish foreign policy. 
Rather, rapprochement with Syria, relations with Iraq in the post-2003 period, 
friendly relations with Iran, Turkey’s struggle to act as mediator in Middle Eastern 
conflicts – Syria-Israel and Syria-Lebanon – efforts towards EU membership, a new 
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vision on the Cyprus problem, Turkish-US strategic partnership, increasing Turkish-
Russian trade relations have been listed as top issues for Turkish foreign policy 
within the “Strategic Depth” doctrine of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu.  
Although relations with Turkey’s near neighborhood including the Balkans, 
the Middle East and the Caucasus have been of prior importance for the foreign 
policy conducted by JDP, the impact of the idea of “Turkic World” has been 
strengthened by the step taken toward strategic partnership with Kazakhstan. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu (2007: 81) indeed argues that Turkey is a part 
of Caucasian and Central Asian geopolitics alongside the Balkans and the Middle 
East (see also Davutoğlu, 2001: 455-500 for the place of Central Asia and the Turkic 
world in his theory of “Strategic Depth”). Both President Gül’s and Nazarbayev’s 
close ties and the latter’s two-decade old commitment to Turkic cooperation in 
Eurasia have speeded up the process. During Kazakh leader Nazarbayev’s official 
visit to Ankara in October 2009, “Strategic Partnership Agreement” was signed 
between Turkey and Kazakhstan, which aimed to foster cooperation in fields of 
defense and military affairs, foreign direct investment, economic development, 
scientific cooperation, educational exchange and tourism. As the two leaders talked 
about the agreement before the media Gül said it was for the first time that such an 
agreement was signed between Turkic states of Eurasia and praised Nazarbayev 
during the ceremony when he received a medal from Turkey for being “the Elder 
Statesman of the entire Turkic world” (see Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 
Website). Both leaders’ speeches made references to a common Turkic civilization 
that is the cement that make the partnership between two countries an obligation to 
be fulfilled.  
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 In February 2010, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu visited Kazakhstan. 
In an article of him published in a Kazakh newspaper, that had a quite emotional 
tone, Davutoğlu (2010) praised Nazarbayev as the “wise man of the Turkic world” 
and said contribution of Kazakhstan to cooperation mechanism among the Turkic 
states shall never be forgotten. Recently, in May 2010 Gül paid an official visit to 
Kazakhstan, for the third time during his Presidency. Gül’s visit looked very similar 
to trips of Özal and Demirel to Central Asia in the 1990s as there were more than 250 
Turkish participants, including ministers, heads of Higher Education Council (YÖK) 
and TÜBİTAK, academicians, and business-men alongside the President. According 
to a report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan (2010: 1-3), Gül’s visit 
boosted “brotherly ties” in the Turkic world as the officials of two countries signed a 
package of agreements worth $ 400 million. During the visit, two leaders opened the 
above-mentioned Turkic Academy in Astana, which was “visionary idea of 
Nazarbayev” in Gül’s words (see Presidency website). Both presidents pledged to 
increase the trade volume between Turkey and Kazakhstan to $ 10 billion in a few 
years, which is currently around $ 3 billion, in a meeting of Turkish-Kazakh 
Business Council organized by Turkish Assembly of Exporters (TİM) and Turkish 
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON). Turkish President also 
delivered a speech at the Kazakh parliament.  
Based on the initial perception of Turkish leaders that Turkey has several 
“responsibilities” in the Turkic world, Turkish-Kazakh partnership further 
strengthened as Turkey has supported Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of OSCE in 2010 
and Islamic Conference Organization in 2011. In addition, Turkey hosted the third 
Conference on Confidence and Interaction-building Measures in Asia in June 2010, 
which is an Asian platform initiated by Kazakh leader Nazarbayev. In the 
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Conference, Turkey took over the presidency of CICA from Kazakhstan for the next 
two years. Finally, the second General Assembly meeting of Turk-Pa is planned to be 
held in Astana in October 2010. Finally, geopolitical dimension cannot itself explain 
the deepening relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan. It is also based on identity 
and the perception that peoples of both countries share the same origins as well as 
cultural and civilizational roots. Therefore, Turkish-Kazakh strategic partnership and 
its patterns – discourse of leaders, agreements signed and fields of cooperation – are 
outcomes of the consolidation of the idea of “Turkic World” in the minds of Turkish 
leaders.  
 
5.4.2 Undeniable Alliance with Azerbaijan 
 The second recent test case concerning Turkey’s relations with the Turkic 
world has been the place of Azerbaijan in Turkish foreign policy. In this case, 
ideational factors have been even more evident than the case of Kazakhstan since 
Azerbaijani Turks are the closest to Anatolian Turks in terms of ethnicity and 
language. Since 1991, Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan have been marked with 
pan-Turkist Elchibey’s presidency, Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Haydar Aliyev’s takeover, Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline and energy diplomacy, and 
finally the process of Armenian opening. Haydar Aliyev’s words “one nation, two 
states” have determined brotherly relations among the leaders of both countries and 
the idea of “Turkic World” has influenced relations with Azerbaijan at the highest 
level. Website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also quotes Atatürk’s words 
“Azerbaijan’s happiness is our happiness, and its sorrow is our sorrow” in order to 
describe ties between two countries and peoples. As for official visits, similar to 
Turkish President Gül, Azerbaijani President Aliyev paid his first official visit to 
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Turkey in November 2008 having been reelected for his second term. Due to such a 
brotherly basis of relations Azerbaijan officially recognizes Turkey as a “strategic 
partner” alongside Russia and the US (National Security Concept of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, 2007). This strategic partnership and the notion of “one nation, two 
states” date back to Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan against the Armenian invasion 
of Nagorno-Karabakh as a result of a war that continued between 1988 and 1994 (see 
Cornell, 1998 for a detailed analysis). Besides energy diplomacy, which has kept 
relations quite dense and alive, another field that has helped transform the 
relationship into a strategic one has been cooperation in military field and Turkey’s 
ongoing support to modernize the Azerbaijani army to meet NATO standards.  
Since Armenia declared its independence in September 1991 and Turkey 
recognized it in December 1991 diplomatic relations have never been established. 
There are three reasons for that (Görgülü et al., 2009: 7; Oğuz, 2010: 79-80). Firstly, 
Turkey has asked Armenia to recognize the territorial integrity of Turkey as well as 
to denounce its claims over Turkish territory. Secondly, Turkey has refused to 
normalize relations as long as Armenia kept Azerbaijani territories under invasion. 
Thirdly, Turkey has wanted Armenia to put an end to genocide campaigns (Görgülü 
et al. 2009: 7). Since April 1993, the major official reason obstacle for the 
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has been Armenia’s aggression in 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Punsmann, 2009). 
Turkey’s attempt for an “Armenian opening” has acted as a cornerstone and 
hence has seriously tested partnership based primarily on Turkic brotherhood 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan (see Oğuz, 2010 for an analysis). It was until the 
ruling JDP came up with a roadmap to normalize relations between Turkey and 
Armenia starting from a so-called “football diplomacy” in September 2008 as 
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President Gül went to Yerevan to watch a football game between the national teams 
of two countries. As the possibility of a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement became 
clearer in April 2009, Azerbaijani media, public opinion and politicians have reacted 
to the proposed opening process (Oğuz, 2010: 92-96). The tone of reactions from 
Azerbaijan was quite romantic and based on the brotherhood between to countries. 
Azerbaijani reactions have gone as far as closing the Turkish mosque in Baku’s 
center in April 2009 and lowering the Turkish flag in the Turkish Martyrs’ 
Monument in October 2009. However, Baku has undertaken responsibility for 
neither of these reactions officially. Such reactions from Azerbaijan as well as the 
nationalist sentiment of the opposition in Turkey have made the “Nagorno-
Karabakh” link in Turkish-Armenian relations a key factor (see ICG, 2009: 6-8, 18-
20 for the Azerbaijani factor in the process).  
More importantly, Azerbaijani President Aliyev refused to attend the Alliance 
of Civilizations meeting İstanbul in April 2009. Following that, Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu went to Baku in May 
2009 respectively, in order to convince Azerbaijani leadership and public opinion 
that Turkey’s relations with Armenia will not be normalized unless Armenia ends its 
invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh. In his speech at the Azerbaijani parliament Erdoğan 
assured members of parliament saying that Turkish perspective on the Caucasus 
cannot be different than the Azerbaijani one and constantly referred to Azerbaijanis 
as “brothers” (Hürriyet, 13 May 2009). In response to Gül’s visit Armenian president 
Sarkisian visited Bursa in October 2009 to watch the second game between two 
football teams. October 2009 was more important concerning the “Armenian 
opening” process as Turkish and Armenian Foreign Ministers signed Protocols in 
Zurich (see MFA website to read the official document), which were the legal 
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documents that prescribed a roadmap to open-up Turkish-Armenian border and settle 
diplomatic relations between two countries. Although there were no direct references 
to the ongoing conflict and occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey has not 
brought the legal document to the TGNA in order for it to be ratified, but on the 
contrary has waited an Armenian initiative to withdraw from the seven Azerbaijani 
districts surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Following his trip to Tehran on the 
uranium exchange deal Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Baku in May 2010. During 
the visit two leaders agreed on the establishment of “High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council” between two countries, with “brotherhood” and “common 
ties” being stressed as usual (Hürriyet, 18 May 2010).  
President Gül visited Azerbaijan five times since he took office in 2007 and 
Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Azerbaijan ten times since 2003. Although Turkey’s 
efforts to normalize its relations with Armenia is a recent and new trend in Turkish 
foreign policy, Nagorno-Karabakh problem still continues to be the major issue 
where Turkey fixes its bilateral relations. In parallel with such a policy, Turkey’s 
Armenian opening has come to a halt as Armenia has refused to progress with the 
current roadmap, whereas Turkey has insisted on Armenia to withdraw from the 
Azerbaijani cities surrounding Karabakh.  Alternative explanations for why Turkey 
could not sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan may rely on energy diplomacy and 
JDP’s neighborhood policy. However, Turkey’s energy policy does not solely rely on 
the Caspian Basin and projects conducted with Azerbaijan. Moreover, Davutoğlu’s 
“zero-problem” policy with Turkey’s neighbors should have pushed Turkish 
decision-makers towards insisting on normalizing relations with Armenia. On the 
contrary, Turkey has hesitated to lose Azerbaijan for the sake of opening-up to 
Armenia. At this point the idea of “Turkic World” comes out as the explanatory 
133 
 
factor, which is supported by high level official visits paid to Baku after each crisis 
that occurred between Turkey and Azerbaijan because of Turkish-Armenian 
rapprochement. This means that Turkic brotherhood between Turkey and Azerbaijan 
has an unquestionable status in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers.  
The “Armenian opening” process has been a serious case for Turkish foreign 
policy, in which the place of the idea of “Turkic World” has been tested. 
Consequently, the idea and “Turkic brotherhood” have proved to be successful, not 
letting Turkey change its policy towards Armenia despite the international euphoria 
that marked the protocols before and after October 2009. Nationalist and pro-
Azerbaijani sentiment in Turkish public opinion is the final element, which indicates 
the strength of the idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish society and politics. The idea 
of “Turkic World” has had its strongest impact over Turkish foreign policy towards 
Azerbaijan and all fields of cooperation between the two countries have been based 
on the motto “one nation, two states”.  
 
5.5 Conclusion: Place of the Turkic World in Turkish Foreign Policy  
This chapter has made an evaluation of the evolution of Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Turkic world since 1991 with emphasis on the behaviors of actors 
– presidents, governments, and political parties – and the role of different 
instruments and agents – Turkic Summits, Turkic Council, Turk-Pa and TIKA – in 
order to indicate that there has been a continuity in Turkish attitude towards Turkic-
speaking peoples despite the disappointment dominant in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Although Turkey could not prove to be successful in inter-state relations by 
the late 1990s, transnational relations have remained strong and the idea of “Turkic 
World” has continued to be kept alive and consolidated through non-governmental 
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efforts. Due to the impact of the perception that Turkey should somehow sustain its 
relations with brother peoples of the Turkic world a revision was sought for in the 
early 2000s. Although the ruling JDP’s “Strategic Depth” doctrine is supposed to 
focus more on Turkey’s Ottoman heritage – that has tended to include the Balkans 
and the Middle East more than other regions – as a geopolitical opportunity, 
Turkey’s relations with Turkic states have deepened in political and economic terms 
for the last decade.  
In various stages such as Turkic kurultays or summits, Turkish decision-
makers have repeated their calls for establishing a Union of Turkic States similar to 
the 9th President Demirel. As of 2008, Turkey’s trade with Azerbaijan has 
approached $ 3 billion, whereas the amount for Central Asian states has exceeded $ 
5.5 billion, with Kazakhstan having the largest share making almost 60 % of it (see 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade Report for details). Moreover, final chapter of this 
study has attempted to analyze Turkey’s relations with Kazakhstan as a recent 
official “strategic ally” and Azerbaijan as one of the two states of the same nation in 
the rhetoric of leaders. Turkey’s relationship with Kazakhstan was selected because 
the concept of “strategic partnership” is based on Turkic brotherhood and 
cooperation in this case. Hence, this case is a clear indicator that ideas and identity 
can strengthen ties between two countries to reach the highest level. In addition, case 
of Azerbaijan was selected because, the idea of “Turkic World” in this case has 
affected Turkey’s regional policies – in Transcaucasia – and bilateral relations with 
Armenia as a problematic issue dating back to the early 20th century.  
Consequently, despite efforts and trends of making Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Turkic world more “realistic” and “pragmatic”, there is certainly a 
normative aspect to it which can be explained by the impact of the transnational idea 
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of “Turkic World”, whose roots go back to a century-old pan-Turkist activism. 
Regardless of their political views and ideological backgrounds – Kemalist Sezer, 
social democrat Cem or former Islamist Erdoğan – Turkish decision-makers cannot 
ignore the Turkic world, and on the contrary try to foster economic, political, 
cultural, scientific and educational ties between Turkey and their “brothers”. At this 
point the attitude of Turkish decision-makers towards political Islam is crucial. 
Despite the efforts of political Islamist Erbakan to re-orient Turkish foreign policy 
towards the Islamic world with an emphasis on Islamic identity rather than 
pragmatism, Turkish politicians and decision-makers have not internalized Erbakan’s 
offers such as establishing the D-8 composed of Islamic states and therefore, his 
ideas have not been socialized in Turkish politics. On the contrary, Turkish leaders of 
the last two decades have given priority, though in varying degrees, to Turkey’s 
relations with the Turkic world and emphasized common ethnicity and linguistic ties 
as facilitators of partnership among Turkic states.  
Re-structuring of key foreign policy organs of the Turkish state to encompass 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, devoting sentences or sometimes paragraphs for the 
Turkic states and communities in government and political parties’ programs, paying 
first official visits to Turkic capitals and sticking relations with a third party – 
Armenia – in favor of a brother Turkic state – Azerbaijan – are strong patterns 
indicating institutionalization or norm internalization in Turkish foreign policy. 
Beside all that, although Turkey could not reach its ambitious goals set in the early 
1990s there has emerged a strong Turkic consciousness in Turkey and Turkic 
republics in the last two decades. Transnational relations have increased to an 
unprecedented level as Turkish state has been supporting and taking into account the 
views of non-governmental activities such as congresses related to Turkic literatures, 
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architecture, urban planning, youth activism, cinema and theater festivals, sports 
games as well as transgovernmental meetings among different bureaucratic bodies 
such as foreign trade, scientific cooperation and cultural exchange.  
As Karasar (2007: 168) mentions Turkey’s “gains exceed beyond the limits 
and capacities of state policies” due to several outcomes. Accordingly, integration 
has speeded up among Turkic intellectuals, artists, writers as a result of various 
transnational meetings. Thousands of Turkic students who study in Turkey – both in 
universities and military schools – and Turkish students who study in Azerbaijan and 
Central Asia have been dynamic components of multilateral relations. Turkish 
companies have constructed hotels, congress centers and state buildings, which are 
quite prestigious and, Turkish and Turkic companies have formed joint ventures in 
major Turkic cities. Besides all these transnational efforts commitment of Turkic 
leaders towards transition to Latin alphabet (Karasar, 2007: 168) have all contributed 
to what Şen (2007: 142) depicts as dynamism in relations between Turkey and the 
Turkic world. The emergence of such dynamism and intensity of relations indicate 
the strength of “transnational” and its primacy over “international” or state-to-state 
relations. Although Turkey has become unsuccessful in reaching its goals in the 
Turkic world throughout the 1990s, Turkish decision-makers have acted much better 
as they have re-evaluated the suggestions of pan-Turkist NGOs made in several 
platforms such as the Turkic kurultays. Such policy revision and the emergence of a 
dynamic Turkish community in the Turkic world within two decades after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union are clear indicators of the strength of the transnational 
idea of “Turkic world” based on Turkic identity.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
  
In 1994 in his speech for the annual opening ceremony of TIKA the Turkish 
President Süleyman Demirel elaborated on the importance of the Turkic World in 
Turkish foreign policy (Quoted in Bal, 2000: 44): 
It is quite natural that Turkey acts by taking into account its national interest 
in terms of its security, its economic and social relations. However, Turkey, 
which considers its national interests in this issue, has some moral 
responsibilities. These moral responsibilities come from Turkey’s history…It 
is impossible to isolate yourself from your history…History offers 
opportunities as well as responsibilities and difficulties. 
 
Demirel’s emphasis on history is closely related with how the Constructivist 
turn in the study of international relations have brought ideas, identity and culture in 
the formation of foreign policy and definition of national interests. The explanatory 
factor for the special meaning attached to the emergence of five newly independent 
Turkic states in Turkey’s Eastern neighborhood, and the redefinition of Turkey’s 
national interests in order to incorporate those states and other Turkic-speaking 
peoples into Turkish foreign policy is the impact of the transnational idea of the 
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“Turkic World”. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
forced Turkish decision-makers to a re-evaluation of Turkey’s foreign policy goals 
and national interests. Turkish decision-makers were quick enough to respond to the 
process of globalization as they enlarged the scope of Turkey’s neighborhood to 
incorporate Central Asia. The increasing ease with communication technologies, the 
eradication of the Turkish-Soviet border,  and use of media across borders on the one 
hand enabled Turkic peoples to speed up in establishing contacts with each other and 
on the other hand offered Turkish decision-makers to benefit from the potential 
transnational relations. This signaled a significant perception change among the 
Turkish political, bureaucratic and intellectual elite regarding the borders of Turkish 
ethnicity. The once-jailed and punished idea of “Turkic World” was now re-entering 
into Turkish minds now as an asset to be utilized for Turkish national interests.  
  
6.1.1 Life Cycle of the Idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
The first phase of the lifecycle of the idea of “Turkic World” was the “norm 
emergence” period (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). In fact this phase would be 
better titled as “norm re-emergence” as the idea was almost eight decades old in 
1991. What brought the idea back to Turkish politics were the efforts of “norm 
entrepreneurs”, which were mainly nationalist and pan-Turkist intellectuals and 
activists in Turkey. Committed to a common Turkic identity that would shape the 
cultural, economic and political future of the entire Turkic world, Turkish 
nationalists managed to keep the idea alive during the Cold War although they did 
not have any transnational contacts with pan-Turkist networks in the Soviet Union. 
There were indeed, no such networks in the Soviet Union and hence, the only “norm 
entrepreneurs” for Turkish foreign policy would be domestic non-state actors.  
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Second phase of the lifecycle of the idea of “Turkic World”, “norm cascades” 
would be realized quite rapidly since many of the prominent actors of Turkish 
politics; presidents, prime ministers, political parties as well as different branches of 
Turkish media, including the Kemalist Cumhuriyet and Conservative Tercüman 
accepted the re-emerging reality and took it seriously as a factor that could have a 
significant place in Turkish foreign policy36. The “norm cascades” stage also 
included the “socialization” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11) of the norm by Turkish 
politicians, public opinion and bureaucrats, who all-together started to perceive 
Turkey as part of the entire Turkic world alongside the European, or Western 
civilization, transatlantic security community and the Islamic world. Consequently, 
Turkic identity was accepted as part of Turkish identity by Turkish decision-makers. 
The socialization of the idea was a key step in the transformation of the idea into a 
norm in Turkish foreign policy as it created a society of actors agreeing on the 
priority of the idea (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 11). As Andican (2010) argues even 
the Turkish left did not oppose the new policy framework.  
The third phase, the “internalization” phase of the idea of “Turkic World”, 
still continues in Turkish foreign policy. There are strong political indicators as 
mentioned in Chapter 5 that the “Turkic World” as a principled idea has been 
transforming into a norm in Turkish foreign policy, as it leads to certain behavioral 
patterns in Turkish foreign policy such as continuing support for non-state actors, 
empowering TIKA as a “soft power” instrument, paying frequent official visits to 
Turkic capitals and taking steps to institutionalize multilateral ties among Turkic 
                                                 
36 For the attention paid by the left-wing Cumhuriyet, see 10 April 1993, “Anadolu Anayurt Orta Asya 
Atayurt” (Anatolia is the Homeland, Central Asia is the Fatherland) and 18 October 1994, “21. Yüzyıl 
Türklerin Olacak” (The 21st Century Will Belong to Turks); and right-wing Tercüman, see 15 April 
1993, “Türkiye Milleti ve Devleti ile Azerbaycan’ın Dostu” (Turkey is a Friend of Azerbaijan with its 
Nation and State) and 19 October 1994 “Türk Birliğine İkinci Adım” (The Second Step for Turkic 
Union). 
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states. Special emphasis given to Central Asia in government and party programs, 
bureaucratic bodies such as the Central Asian department of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Turkic republics and other CIS countries department of the 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, technical and humanitarian aid given to the 
Balkans, the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia by TIKA, official visits paid to 
Turkic capitals and participation in pan-Turkic cooperation bodies such as Turk-Pa 
and the Turkic Council are such standards of appropriate behavior concerning 
Turkish foreign policy toward the Turkic world.   
Risse and Sikkink (1999: 17) argue that once actors follow the norm, it is 
incorporated in the “standard operating procedures” of domestic institutions and it 
becomes the “normal thing to do” to act according to the norm.  Therefore, norm 
internalization leads to “depersonalization” as actors implement the policies required 
by the norm “irrespective of individual beliefs” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 17). 
Although there are signs of behavioral and discursive institutionalization of the idea 
of “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy it is yet early to claim that “norm 
internalization” process is over. In other words, “Turkic World” is still a principled 
idea advocated by “norm entrepreneurs” and socialized by Turkish political actors; 
but one which requires further efforts of both transnational actors and governments 
to become a norm.  
Obstacles remain as well, for the transformation of the idea into a norm in 
Turkish foreign policy. One obstacle might be that the idea is still advocated by 
nationalist and/or pan-Turkist NGOs in Turkey, which has strong ties with the wider 
nationalist community as well as the NAP. In order for the idea to become a norm, it 
should be accepted and promoted by a variety of non-governmental actors in Turkey 
and transnational contacts should be established in new areas such as journalism, 
141 
 
human rights and environmental protection. Acccording to Pope (2010), a journalist 
researching and writing on Turkey for two decades, diplomats in the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not have a Turkic concept in their minds. Western-
oriented philosophy of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prevented Turkish 
diplomats from establishing close relations with their Turkic counterparts and acting 
together in international platforms. Çay (2010) argues that Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have regarded Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkic republics as 
countries with secondary importance and hence Turkish diplomatic personnel in 
Turkic capitals have remained very small, making it impossible to compete with 
diplomatic efforts of the US, Russia and even Iran, which have much bigger numbers 
of diplomats in these regions. Thirdly, the establishment of the Turkic Council, Turk-
Pa and the Turkic Academy may not contribute to the internalization of the idea 
unless bigger financial support is given to those institutions. It is early yet to evaluate 
on the achievements of those institutions.  
 
6.1.2 Ideas and Foreign Policy: “Turkic World” as a Road Map 
In Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) terms, it can be claimed that transnational 
idea of “Turkic World” played the role of a roadmap in the minds of Turkish 
decision-makers. Ideas offer roadmaps when policy makers need a prescription for 
sudden developments related to domestic politics or foreign policy (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993: 13-16). Under such conditions an idea as a roadmap determines what 
is right and wrong – similar to the Constructivist definition of norm – and provides 
decision-makers new visions. In the case of Turkey’s relations with the Turkic world 
Gasprinsky’s motto, “unity in language, thought and action” was loudly repeated in 
every official visits and multilateral meetings between Turkic leaders. More clearly, 
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the idea led to active efforts among several key figures of Turkish foreign policy to 
formulating a policy framework, which was based on ethno-linguistic ties – unity in 
language –, promoted a common position regarding international politics – unity in 
thought –, and stimulated bilateral and multilateral projects in political and economic 
cooperation between Turkey and the five newly independent Turkic states to pave 
the way for future integration – unity in action. Moreover the idea of “Turkic World” 
as a roadmap captured “the attention of a wide array of actors” as it was so 
compelling (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 16) and hence made the socialization 
process easier.  
Having indicated that the idea of “Turkic World” offered a roadmap for 
Turkish decision-makers from the perspective of the impact of the idea on foreign 
policy, one should also elaborate on what kind of an idea in Goldstein and Keohane’s 
(1993: 8-10) terms “Turkic World” is. At this point, the transnational idea of “Turkic 
World” can be located in between a “worldview” and a “causal belief”. Worldviews 
are closely related with identities and hence determine the framework of action 
within which an actor might operate depending on one’s identity. According to 
Goldstein and Keohane, world’s great religions offer such worldviews. On the other 
hand causal beliefs are such ideas, about which decision-makers have a consensus as 
to what kind of results are derived once they are implemented as policies. 
Environmental protection policies can be given as the most concrete example for 
causal beliefs. The idea of “Turkic World” offered a worldview for Turkish decision-
makers as it led to a redefinition of “Turkishness” and hence enlarged the boundaries 
of Turkish nation to include even the Balkans and Western China. Former Minister 
of State responsible for Coordination of relations between Turkey and Turkic states 
and relative communities Andican (2010) mentioned that all political wings in 
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Turkey, including the Turkish left, which was opposing pan-Turkist ideology of the 
NAP, accepted the Turkic world as a necessity and even an “obligation” to be dealt 
with. However, the idea of “Turkic World” also acted as a causal belief as Turkish 
policy makers and diplomats thought that newly independent Turkic states offered 
Turkey a chance to increase its economic and political might in its neighborhood. 
This was the result of a perception that any kind investment in those countries – 
political, cultural or economic – would bring in great benefits for Turkey. 
Consequently, the idea of “Turkic World” offered a road map for Turkish decision-
makers and offered both a worldview-like position in the minds of Turkish 
politicians- bureaucrats and intellectuals and a great opportunity to be utilized in 
material terms.  
 
6.1.3 Social Movements, Identity and National Interests  
According to Rucht (2009: 207), a social movement can be called a 
transnational one “when it is essentially composed of closely interrelated groups and 
organizations that belong to more than one country”. As soon as the Soviet Union 
collapsed Turkic activists and intellectuals from Turkey, the Crimea, Azerbaijan, 
Central Asia and Russia engaged in a campaign to establish NGOs and platforms 
through which transnational contacts could be sustained. Hundreds of intellectuals, 
scientists, artists and politicians from among the whole Turkic-speaking world have 
attended different meetings related to cooperation in academic life, language and 
alphabet, agriculture, economic development, cultural rapprochement and political 
dialogue. Although the intensity of such transnational Turkic activities have changed 
depending on the political conjuncture both in Turkey and in the other Turkic 
countries they have laid the ground for future ties among Turkic peoples. In addition, 
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they have sent strong messages to Turkish policy-makers that transnational Turkic 
identity is a phenomenon that should not be dismissed but rather utilized. 
As the process of globalization has become irresistible for states, decision-
makers have searched for ways to cooperate with non-state actors of the new age. 
Due to globalization, activities of non-governmental organizations and social 
movements have spread throughout the globe in recent decades. Advocacy networks 
that have been promoting causes such as human rights and environmental protection 
have followed the path of conducting “contentious politics” in order to make 
governments accept their demands. However, the case of transnational Turkic 
activism indicates that there is not necessarily contention in any kind of social 
movement/advocacy network-government interaction process. Rather since the 
emergence of the newly independent Turkic states in Turkey's eastern neighborhood 
Turkish governments have supported-at least not seriously tried to stop- activists 
from all over the Turkic-speaking countries, who support a pan-Turkic future, to 
establish ties with Turkey.  
Moreover Turkish governments have devoted funds to sponsor civil society 
organizations such as the Balkan Turks' associations, Crimean Tatar associations and 
leading pan-Turkist NGOs such as the Türk Ocakları or the Türk Dünyası 
Araştırmaları Vakfı to establish institutional ties with the Turkic peoples and 
promote the transnational Turkic identity. 14 Turkic World Youth Days and 
Congresses have been organized by Dünya Türk Gençleri Birliği (World Leage of 
Turkic Youth) – a pan-Turkic platform of youth NGOs all over the Turkic world – 
under state sponsorship in various places including Bishkek, Baku, Skopje and 
Nicosia. Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği (Union of Turkic World Municipalities) as 
a huge platform with tens of members from fourteen countries, which aims to 
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increase cooperation among local administrations in the Turkic world, has been 
another pan-Turkic platform that has been sponsored by the Turkish state.  More 
seriously, Turkish state has sponsored Turkic Kurultays as the broadest platforms 
united pan-Turkists from all over the Turkic-speaking areas. In Tarrow's words, 
nationalist social movement leaders in Turkey who have supported the integration of 
Turks of Turkey and the other Turkic peoples “have become skilled at combining 
contention with participation in institutions” (Tarrow, 1998: 5). To put it more 
correctly, they have had the chance to cooperate with Turkish governments to 
promote the Turkic cause. From the perspective of the state and decision-makers 
those nationalist groups in Turkey, which had been dissidents within the Turkish 
political system since the early 1940s, were now accepted as legitimate actors as a 
bridge between Turkey and the newly independent fraternal countries. This particular 
cooperation of a transnational advocacy network with the government, or vice versa, 
is a direct outcome of the impact that the idea of “Turkic World” has made on the 
reconceptualizion of Turkey's national interests and redefinition of its foreign policy 
goals. In addition, such a cooperation, as a result of which the transnationalization of 
Turkish identity would become easier to realize, has been understood by Turkish 
decision-makers as a way of increasing Turkey's influence in the Turkic countries of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia and occupying a prestigious position in world politics. 
 
6.1.4 Prerequisites for Transnational Impact Revisited 
As mentioned in the first chapter several conditions are key for understanding 
transnational impact on foreign policy. The end of the Cold War was one of the 
factors that led to an increase in transnational activity between Turkey and the Turkic 
world. The easing up of tensions between Turkey as a part of the Western security 
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bloc and the Soviet Union led non-state actors to flourish dramatically and search for 
ways to influence governmental policies toward newly independent Turkic republics. 
This was the geopolitical factor that also made the interaction between non-state 
actors and the Turkish state easier and desirable.  
Secondly, domestic structures in Turkey and policy networks connecting the 
Turkish state and non-state actors should be addressed to understand the impact of 
the idea on Turkish foreign policy (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 22). Similar to the impact of 
anti-colonialism, human rights and environmental protection as transnational norms 
on foreign policies of a significant number of states, political conditions or domestic 
structure were important intervening variables concerning the impact of the idea of 
“Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy. Following the argument suggested by both 
Keohane and Nye (1971: 329-349), and Risse-Kappen (1995: 3-36), Turkey’s search 
for democratization and liberalization that speeded up in the early 1990s as the 
country was slowly moving away from the effects of the 1980 military coup could 
have been another factor that paved the way for the interaction between the state and 
transnational actors.  
However, one should also take Evangelista’s (1995: 1-38) counter-argument 
that countries, which are going through a process of transformation but which are not 
necessarily democratic might have open doors for transnational influence over their 
foreign policies. Hence, it can be argued that although Turkey had serious problems 
related to human rights abuses, domestic security and civil-military relations, its 
regional power aspirations helped the transnational idea of “Turkic World” and non-
state actors that advocate the idea to influence Turkey’s new active foreign policy 
toward the Turkic republics. Finally, highly centralized and authoritarian nature of 
domestic structures in Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkic states have prevented 
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further transnationalization among Turkic peoples and the consolidation of the idea 
of “Turkic World” in foreign policies of those states. Non-state actors advocating the 
idea of “Turkic World” could not find winning coalitions especially in the most 
authoritarian states of Central Asia; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but on the 
contrary have been accepted by leaders as dangerous groups for the regime and 
sovereignty. 
Risse-Kappen (1995: 3-36) takes international institutionalization as the 
second pillar of the power of transnational activity. His argument is that “the more 
the respective issue-area is regulated by international norms of cooperation, the more 
permeable should state boundaries become for transnational activities” (Risse-
Kappen, 1995: 7).  As analyzed in the sub-chapters above Turkish decision-makers 
were quite sensitive toward representation of the newly independent Turkic republics 
in regional and international organizations such as BSEC, ECO and OSCE. 
Moreover, Turkic Summits constituted a transgovernmental platform where Turkic 
diplomats and high-ranking bureaucrats could share their views. It can be predicted 
that steps taken for institutionalizing cooperation in international platforms will 
continue to create a positive image of “norm entrepreneurs” who promote the idea of 
“Turkic World” in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers.  
As argued by Risse-Kappen (1995: 32) activities of transnational actors – 
lobbying, pressurizing, informing – advocating Turkic unity will be legitimate in the 
eyes of Turkish politicians, decision-makers and diplomats so long as the idea of 
“Turkic World” is consolidated and heads towards becoming a norm in Turkish 
foreign policy. Moreover, further internationalization among Turkey and 
independent Turkic states will contribute to collective Turkic identity thereby 
making it possible for transnational relations to flourish. Finally, such 
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institutionalization might make non-state actors advocating the Turkic cause in 
Azerbaijan and the four Central Asian Turkic republics more acceptable and 
legitimate for the authoritarian domestic structures of those countries. 
Besides domestic structures and international institutionalization, it is crucial 
for the state and those decision-makers who define a state’s foreign policy goals and 
national interests to accept the ideas promoted and advocated by non-state actors as 
legitimate and applicable in policy terms. This has indeed been the case for Turkey’s 
relations with the Turkic world, in which Turkish decision-makers have chosen to 
cooperate with NGOs, intellectuals and activists of pan-Turkist background in order 
to develop a foreign policy framework towards the Turkic world. In Risse-Kappen’s 
(1995: 293) words, transnational actors advocating Turkic unity have been able to 
form “winning coalitions” with domestic actors since 1991. Moreover, “norms 
embedded” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 293) in the Turkish political culture – nationalism 
mainly – was suitable for the transnational idea of “Turkic World” to penetrate into 
Turkish politics right after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
 6.2 Policy Implications and Future Prospects 
There are several reasons why it was the idea of “Turkic World”, whose 
origins go back to Turkism of early 20th century that led Turkish decision-makers 
toward new lines of foreign policy thinking with a certain emphasis on identity and 
fraternity on the one hand and economic cooperation and integration on the other 
hand. One reason is that it was perceived to be a cooperative and peaceful idea 
(Aydın, 2006: 307) as opposed to the early Republican and Cold War perception that 
it was a sign of irredentism and imperialism. As the public opinion was also eager to 
incorporate an enlarged Turkish identity, thereby putting an end to the centuries-old 
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feeling of loneliness in the world, the idea was not conceived to be related to racism 
or fascism as it used to be during the Cold War confrontation between the left-wing 
activists and nationalists. As Bal’s study clearly indicates, though more hesitant than 
conservative and nationalist figures, left-wing politicians were not against 
developing friendly relations with Turkic-speaking peoples. It is significant to note 
that it was the social democrat Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin – and an 
ethnic Kurd – who organized the first Turkish official visit to the newly-independent 
Turkic republics after they acquired independence. The traditional reactionary 
position of Turkish left-wing intellectuals and politicians towards the Turkic world 
changed in the 1990s as they also welcomed the independence of Turkic countries 
(Bal, 2000: 60). Bal (2000: 60) quotes Murat Karayalçın, one of the leaders of the 
Social Democratic Populist Party in the 1990s, saying that Turkey had to side by 
Azerbaijan in its struggle against the Armenian invasion of Karabakh and that 
withdrawal of Armenia from Karabakh might be the only way for re-starting 
Turkish-Armenian diplomatic relations. 
Secondly, the end of the Cold War offered a chance for Turkish politicians 
and diplomats not only in the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also in a closer 
neighborhood such as the Balkans and the Muslim Middle East. However, for none 
of these regions and countries Turkey has tried to develop an institutionalized foreign 
policy with different state bodies such as the Ministry of National Education and 
TIKA included alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even during the Refah-Yol 
government, in which the Islamist Welfare Party was the dominant force in the 
cabinet, no such institutionalization was followed regarding the Islamic world and no 
serious transnational Islamic movement challenged the policies of Ankara. Robins 
(2003: 149-154) argues that Kemalism and Islamism offered the two clashing 
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dominant ideologies of foreign policy in contemporary Turkey. According to Robins 
the National View led by Erbakan strengthened by the late 1980s as a strong foreign 
policy option to oppose the Kemalist tradition. Its strong ideological background and 
transnational ties all-over the Muslim world made Erbakan’s Islamist foreign policy 
agenda a priority for Turkey’s national interests. However, there has been no 
consensus among Turkish diplomats and different governments formed by different 
political parties since the end of the Cold War on the benefits of such rapprochement 
with the Muslim world.  
Thirdly, there was little if no political and academic knowledge on the Turks 
of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the scholarly world it was only a group 
of nationalist-oriented Turkologists, who studied Turkic languages and history. 
However no political assessment and analysis was made as to what kind of a future 
awaited the Turkic world. Despite this lack of academic and political wisdom 
regarding Turkic-speaking peoples, the Turkish state was rapid enough to develop a 
comprehensive foreign policy approach, which also indicates the influence of the 
idea of “Turkic World”.  
As analyzed in the chapters above Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic 
world has gone through an evolution as the romanticism and excitement of the initial 
phase of relations were marked with disappointment as of the late 1990s. However, 
transnational relations have remained constant creating NGO networks among 
Turkic-speaking peoples. Moreover, thousands of Turkic students have received 
education in Turkey and thousands of Turkish students have studied in Turkic states. 
Finally, Turkish business community in Turkic republics have made Turkish citizens 
and products familiar with the local population and Turkish public and private 
television broadcasts have made Turkish way of life popular for Turkic audience. 
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Since linguistic ties and common ethnicity make communication and permanent 
contacts very easy, there is further room for the consolidation of transnational ties 
among the Turkic world.  
The possibility of permanence of transnational relations among the Turkic 
world will be something that Turkish decision-makers should take into account as it 
will utilize Turkish national interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In other 
words, transnational should inform and enlighten international, or inter-state relations 
as a mere geopolitical perspective on Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states will 
not be enough to sustain a successful foreign policy framework that results in the 
achievement of the official goals of Turkey. If Turkish decision-makers really want 
to increase cooperation among Turkic states by establishing a Commonwealth of 
Turkic states, one similar to cooperation bodies among European states (EU) North 
American states (NAFTA)  and Southeast Asian states (ASEAN), they should 
support and take into account the views, principles and demands of non-state actors 
advocating the transnational idea of “Turkic World”. This means that Turkish 
governments should work together with non-governmental actors in order to 
“maintain order and achieve collective goals” as is required by an ideal type of 
governance (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008: 78). Even if such interaction between the 
state and the transnational may not lead to a union-like organization among Turkic 
states, it might contribute to better policy formulations in various fields ranging from 
educational exchange and scientific and academic cooperation to economic 
integration and commonalities in regional and international politics.   
One the other hand, advocacy networks operating transnationally to promote 
the idea of “Turkic World” and make it a norm in foreign policies of Turkic states, 
should increase their contacts with Turkish governmental officials and politicians 
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through lobbying and pressuring methods in order to contribute to the consolidation 
of the idea in Turkish political life. Finally, it can be argued that in the foreseeable 
future, the consolidation of the idea of “Turkic World” in Turkish foreign policy will 
continue as the issue is perceived to be related to Turkish identity, which is itself 
related to history and geography.  
 
6.3 Directions for Future Research 
In order to enrich theoretical studies on world politics and make them more 
reliable for both scholars and decision-makers, impact of non-state actors on foreign 
policies of states should be analyzed with more case studies. Such studies will also 
contribute to the strengthening of theoretical approaches on the emergence of non-
state actors in international relations. Therefore, similar case studies focusing on 
other Turkic republics – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan – might contribute to understanding how the transnational idea of 
“Turkic World” have influenced politics of the post-Soviet Turkic space.  
Nevertheless, there is certain limitation to studying the role and impact of 
non-state actors on international relations of states. It is a difficult topic because 
geopolitical factors that are closely intertwined with realist conceptions of national 
interest are very powerful explanatory factors. This difficulty in distinguishing the 
role of non-state actors in foreign policy from geopolitics or rationalist explanations 
may lead researchers to the pre-assumption that the former does not have any or little 
influence in world politics. Moreover, it is difficult to measure how adaptive 
governments have become for transnational relations and global governance.  
However, the role of various non-state actors – advocacy networks, NGOs and illegal 
armed groups – on states’ policies should be studied by scholars of Diplomatic 
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History, Comparative Politics and International Relations to overcome perceptional 
limitations. The more theoretical approaches are enriched by case studies the more 
boundaries of scholars will be eliminated.  
In order to achieve that, actors should be taken as the primary units to be 
studied. For any kind of ideational factor on foreign policy, the anatomy and 
evolution of the “norm entrepreneurs” as well as their relations with the state should 
be analyzed. Researchers should observe behaviors – both intellectual efforts and 
activism of certain issue areas – of non-state actors carefully, while on the other hand 
keeping a scholarly distance to the subject studied. This is because there is the risk of 
becoming a part of those promoting ideas rather than studying the issue in an 
academic manner. Actor-centric studies might push researchers towards 
understanding non-governmental involvement in policy making processes.  
As a further effort, studies on the impact of ideas and identities on foreign 
policies of states should be merged with studies on transnationalism. This is because 
ideas and identities, as regional and sometimes global phenomena, go beyond the 
borders of the Westphalian modern nation-states thereby causing transnational 
loyalties to affect the policy preferences of individuals or groups within 
governments. Such an approach would also help better understand and explain 
foreign policy behaviors of states that have on the one hand regional power potentials 
or aspirations, and on the other hand identity perceptions that exceed national 
boundaries. Moreover, since it is non-state actors that promote transnational ideas 
and identities, Constructivist emphasis on ideational and normative factors of foreign 
policy analysis should incorporate transnationalism. Consequently, the role of non-
state actors on making decision-makers adapt governmental policies according to 
ideational factors will be better understood.  
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